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Background and purpose.  The body in stroke physiotherapy is everywhere in 
practice but neglected as a concept in clinical theory.  This study explored the embodied 
experience for people with stroke at the time of transition from rehabilitation to community 
living.  The purpose of this study was to gain an in-depth understanding of embodiment to 
inform the delivery of physiotherapy after stroke. 
Subjects and methods. Seven people with stroke, aged 66 to 89 years, were 
interviewed one month after discharge from a stroke rehabilitation unit.  Interviews were 
analyzed using grounded theory methodology. 
Results. Two main themes in the embodied experience of stroke were: (1) a ‘divergent 
body-self’ where participants referred to an objective physical body, separate to oneself; and 
(2) a ‘cohesive body-self’ reflecting a sense that ‘it’s all me’.  A ‘divergent body-self’ 
included subthemes of a body that was ‘strange’, ‘unpredictable’ and ‘effortful’.  In contrast 
the ‘cohesive body-self included subthemes of ‘freedom’, ‘control’, and ‘identity’, reflecting 
experiences of bodily movement and personal independence.  Participants fluxed between 
these perspectives, within moments and over time, with these perspectives influenced by 
‘anchors’ that included their environment, knowledge and attitudes.   
Discussion and conclusion. The bodily experience of stroke is dynamic and intimately 
connected with a person’s sense of self.   The social and physical environment as well as 
individual attributes can serve to ‘anchor’ people within their embodied experience of stroke. 
Physiotherapists play a pivotal role in how stroke survivors view themselves and their body 




integral connection between body and self. This study supports the need to widen the scope of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The body is central to all physiotherapy practice and to a degree there is an 
assumed understanding of what the body means to physiotherapists.  This assumption 
extends to person-centred practice being viewed as synonymous to adopting an all-
encompassing view of the body.  The study reported on in this thesis critically evaluates 
the concept of the body in physiotherapy practice by exploring the embodied experience of 
stroke reported by people after leaving hospital. 
 
 1.1 Background 
It is through our bodies that we know and experience the world around us. My body 
is me.  This is not something that I have ever really questioned until recently.  In my role 
as physiotherapist I have worked with people’s bodies every day.  Despite the physical 
focus of my work, I have always considered myself as a ‘people person’, enjoying getting 
to know people as individuals, and I felt this reflected in my practice.  I considered that I 
treated people as a ‘whole’.  However, in recent years, I have become aware that rather 
than being ‘holistic’ my physiotherapy work in stroke rehabilitation is enshrouded in 
dichotomies. ‘Can’ versus ‘cannot’; ‘before stroke’ versus ‘after stroke’; and from my 
patients perspective, ‘me’ versus ‘my body’.  I started wondering, what does it mean for 
someone to have a body which cannot allow them to be that ‘active person’ they had 
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For many stroke survivors their bodies are abruptly changed by stroke, and their 
future is clouded with uncertainty.  In my role as community physiotherapist, I met people 
after leaving hospital following stroke.  While in hospital there appeared to be a 
preoccupation with getting home.  However, once home, people seemed to question what it 
meant for them to have had a stroke and how this translated into their own life story.   I 
became increasingly attentive to the way patients described who they were and their 
bodies.  What did it mean for someone to consistently refer to their arm as ‘lame Larry’? 
Had they always seen their arm as lame and separate to them self, and how did my 
approach as a physiotherapist influence their experience of living with a changed body?  
Essentially, I began to question what the embodied experience of stroke was, as the 
comments of patients indicated embodiment went beyond the physical body of muscles 
and joints that is so central to physiotherapy. 
 
For me, embodiment meant how I use my body as a vehicle to interact with the 
environment around me.  At times I have loved the sensations my body provides, such as 
when running and biking, and felt gratitude for the freedom it allowed.  At other times I 
have felt self-conscious and critical of how I appeared and this impacted on my self-esteem 
and consequent interactions with others.  This was my experience of a ‘normal’ body but 
what would a post-stroke body feel like?  In my physiotherapy role and through previous 
postgraduate studies I had read extensive literature around the general experiences of 
stroke survivors including their transition home.  From this literature and my own 
observations I knew that people sometimes felt frustrated with their bodies and 
uncomfortable about their appearance, although I had often seen the uniqueness of each 
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stroke survivor’s experience.  I had attempted to acknowledge and respect patients’ 
feelings as they experienced these emotions but, until undertaking this research I had never 
considered what the changed relationship between their physical body and other aspects of 
their embodied self may mean for them in the wider context of their existence.  This left 
me with preconceptions about approaches to physiotherapy in stroke that influenced my 
own clinical practice but also many questions about the focus of my work.   
 
I started to read more specifically about the embodied experience of stroke and 
found that, although this is a topic being increasingly considered, embodiment is not yet 
reflected in rehabilitation theoretical models.  Instead what I found was confusion around 
terminology, contradictions between professions, and a lack of clarity.  If this is what the 
evidence reflects, I wondered what was actually happening in healthcare practice.  In my 
experience of physiotherapy, the body still seemed to be considered as some kind of 
machine to physiotherapists.  In particular, I started to question our understanding of the 
embodied experience of stroke when people leave hospital.  I wanted to understand this 
better so that our practice could be improved and consequently started my research 
journey.   
 
1.2 Research aim 
The purpose of this study was to explore the embodied experience of stroke for 
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1.3 Definition of key terms 
‘Embodiment’ can be defined as “how we live in and experience the world through 
our bodies” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962 as cited by Wilde, 1999, p.27). Embodiment theory 
acknowledges that the lived body is never just a material object in the world, but the basis 
for understanding others, self-reflection and participating in everyday life (Charmaz, 
1995).  The embodied experience recognizes the innate connection between the body, self, 
others and the world (Kitzmüller, Häggström, & Asplund, 2013).  There are multiple 
interpretations of embodiment for different professions and areas of health, and this will be 
revisited in Chapter Two. 
 
A ‘stroke’, also known as a cerebrovascular accident, is the rapid loss of brain 
function due to disturbance of blood supply to the brain.  A stroke can either be ischaemic 
whereby the brain is deprived of blood through a blockage or haemorrhagic when there is a 
bleed from the vessels into brain tissue.  The resultant cell death in the brain causes a range 
of neurological impairments depending on the location and extent of brain tissue damage. 
 
‘Physiotherapy’ aims to provide services that develop, maintain and restore 
people’s maximum movement and functional ability through the application of physical 
modalities (World Confederation for Physical Therapy, 2014). Functional movement is 
quoted as being central to what it means to be healthy, and practice is thought to include 
assessment and treatment aimed at enhancing functional movement (Higgs, 2001; 




  5 
 
‘Rehabilitation’ is “a proactive, person-centred and goal-oriented process” which 
aims to “improve function and/or prevent deterioration of function, and to bring about the 
highest level of independence physically, psychologically, socially and financially” (Stroke 
Foundation of New Zealand & New Zealand Guidelines Group, 2010, p.44). This 
definition acknowledges the multi-dimensional nature of rehabilitation but given that the 
term “highest level” is value-laden, interpretations of rehabilitation vary both between 
professional bodies and models of health mirroring conflicting societal views relating to 
the person, disability and the role of health professionals (Young, Brown, Forster, & Clare, 
1999).  This will be considered further in Chapter 5.   
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
Chapter Two provides the background to this research topic, providing a summary 
of existing literature focused on embodiment, stroke rehabilitation, and transitioning from 
hospital.  A justification for the need for further understanding of the embodied experience 
of stroke is also provided. 
  
Chapter Three describes the rationale for the choice of a constructivist approach 
using the qualitative methodology of grounded theory.  The method for participant 
recruitment, data collection, data analysis and techniques to enhance scientific rigour are 
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Chapter Four provides a description of the substantive theory developed from 
analysis of the data of participants.  Here the embodied experience of stroke survivors 
transitioning from hospital is constructed and summarized from emergent themes. 
  
Chapter Five is a discussion of the study findings including a comparison with 
existing understanding of the embodied experience of stroke.  The significance of this 
research for physiotherapy practice is considered, and future directions for research and 
implications for clinical practice are suggested.  Finally, Chapter Six summarises the key 
findings and concluding remarks on their relevance to stroke rehabilitation and 
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Chapter 2: Background 
 2.1 Introduction 
The effects of stroke for individuals can be profound with sudden, usually 
multidimensional, changes in stroke survivors’ life situations.  Rehabilitation is often 
offered to stroke survivors to minimize the impact of stroke and support return to usual life 
situations. Life after stroke, including the rehabilitation process, will be a unique 
experience for each person.  Physiotherapy is one aspect of rehabilitation which serves to 
develop, maintain and restore maximum movement and functional ability throughout the 
lifespan (World Confederation for Physical Therapy, 2014). The development of scientific 
knowledge of stroke physiotherapy has advanced significantly over recent decades with 
research focusing on the effects of physiotherapy interventions (Higgs, 2001; 
Intercollegiate Stroke Working Party, 2008; Maher, Moseley, Sherrington, Elkins, & 
Herbert, 2008; Stroke Foundation of New Zealand & New Zealand Guidelines Group, 
2010; Wikström-Grotell & Eriksson, 2012).  However, the profession, both within stroke 
and other specialties, has been criticized for being dominated by a biomedical perspective 
(Nichols & Gibson, 2010) which limits the adoption of person-centred rehabilitation 
(Roberts, 1994), suggested in international stroke guidelines to be critical to the best 
rehabilitation outcomes for people with stroke (Intercollegiate Stroke Working Party, 
2008; Stroke Foundation of New Zealand & New Zealand Guidelines Group, 2010). 
 
International stroke guidelines (Intercollegiate Stroke Working Party, 2008; Stroke 
Foundation of New Zealand & New Zealand Guidelines Group, 2010) recommend 
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rehabilitation approaches aimed at increasing physical activity post-stroke to promote 
functional recovery, facilitating return to life-roles and reducing cardiovascular risk 
factors.  Extensive research supports best practice for the physical effects of stroke 
including the promotion of walking, upper limb use and exercise (Gordon et al., 2004; 
Intercollegiate Stroke Working Party, 2008; Stroke Foundation of New Zealand & New 
Zealand Guidelines Group, 2010).  Physically focused evidence-based interventions 
include repetitive task training (French et al., 2009), strengthening (Ada, Dorsch, & 
Canning, 2006), cardio-vascular exercise (Pang, Eng, Dawson, & Gylfadóttir, 2006) and 
sensory retraining (Carey & Matyas, 2005).  These approaches, although diverse in the 
target body structure, all promote bodily movement (Wikström-Grotell & Eriksson, 2012).  
Thus the body is central to stroke physiotherapy rehabilitation.  As well as physical 
changes following stroke there may be non-physical changes, such as psychological and 
social changes, which also impact on the recovery process for stroke survivors (Stroke 
Foundation of New Zealand & New Zealand Guidelines Group, 2010). Many studies have 
explored these non-physical factors, especially in the context of the transition from hospital 
to the community when the full impact of stroke on life roles and living circumstances are 
at its most apparent (Cott, Wiles, & Devitt, 2007; Rittman et al., 2004; Salter, Hellings, 
Foley, & Teasell, 2008; Turner, Fleming, Ownsworth, & Cornwell, 2008).   However, 
generally people’s experiences after stroke are divided into either physical or non-physical 
changes, and the entire embodied experience for stroke survivors is not yet fully 
understood (Faircloth, Boylstein, Rittman, & Young, 2004a). 
Experiences of loss (Salter et al., 2008), uncertainty (Ellis-Hill et al., 2009; Salter et 
al., 2008), social isolation (Salter et al., 2008; Turner et al., 2008), lowered self-esteem 
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(Wood, Connelly, & Maly, 2010), and identity changes (Cott et al., 2007; Wood et al., 
2010) have all been reported by stroke survivors transitioning to the community from 
hospital. The process has been described as a chaotic and stressful period for stroke 
survivors (Ellis-Hill et al., 2009; Salter et al., 2008; Turner et al., 2008).  A resounding 
theme across studies is the all-encompassing nature of stroke.  More specifically, a number 
of studies describe how stroke survivors have found their body to be “unfamiliar” 
(Kitzmüller et al., 2013, p.24) or separate from themselves (Faircloth et al., 2004a;).  The 
attention stroke survivors’ body demands of them has also been highlighted (Kitzmüller et 
al., 2013) with their body being described as risky (Ellis-Hill, Payne, & Ward, 2000) or 
“demanding” (Kvigne & Kirkevold, 2003, p.1300).  At the time of transition from hospital 
to home ongoing changes have been described in the interaction between bodily 
perception, participation in everyday life and sense of self as stroke survivors move 
between the different contexts of hospital and home (Arntzen & Elstad, 2013).  The 
embodied experience of stroke may also be changeable at this transitional time although 
little research has as yet explored this. 
 
The World Health Organization (2001) advocates for the holistic and multi-
dimensional consideration of people with all health conditions, viewing health from body, 
individual and societal perspectives (World Health Organization, 2001). Given that a third 
of strokes result in permanent disability (World Health Organization, 2002) there are 
potentially a significant number of stroke survivors learning to exist in a changed body.  
Their changed body is likely to impact on more than just physical abilities. Previous 
studies have also suggested physical changes after stroke influence a person’s sense of self 
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identity, often being situation dependent (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000; Faircloth et al., 2004a; 
Kitzmüller et al., 2013).  Clearly the effects of stroke on people’s physical activity cannot 
be adequately understood from a single, physically-orientated, vantage point typical of 
physiotherapy (Nicholls & Gibson, 2010).   
 
 2.1.1 Researcher perspective 
As a physiotherapist working in stroke rehabilitation, I have become increasingly 
interested in the journey that stroke survivors take in their recovery.  In particular it 
interests me how resilience can be born in the face of stroke adversity and, as a health care 
professional, how I can contribute to that.  The service I work in is interdisciplinary, and 
strives for a person-centred approach to rehabilitation (Canterbury District Health Board, 
2009a).  However, my training, professional culture and rehabilitation approach still, I feel, 
promote the compartmentalizing of people into specific parts or aspects of stroke survivors 
experience, such as ‘mobility’ or ‘arm function’, with an objectifying and mechanistic 
view of people.  More specifically within physiotherapy, there is often a disproportionate 
focus on physical symptoms in my experience.  
 
I moved to New Zealand from the United Kingdom seven years ago having 
graduated as a physiotherapist there in 2004.  I have spent nine years working with people 
with neurological conditions and seven of those years in community stroke services in the 
role I am currently in.  As a physiotherapist I have witnessed a vast range of responses to 
people having a stroke.  I have been particularly struck by the way some people have gone 
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on a journey of rediscovering their own bodies after having a stroke.  This, for some, has 
been a positive process with resilience predominating, but for others a bitter process of 
grieving for the body they have lost.  Similarly it has fascinated me how some stroke 
survivors objectify their own body.  This can extend to people giving their hemiplegic arm 
a name and ‘telling off’ this ‘person’ when their arm fails to perform in the way they 
would like.  This division of self and viewing the body as an object made me wonder how 
this impacted on their participation in rehabilitation.  Moreover, I postulated the 
significance of a changed body on their self-identity.   
 
Another growing point of interest for me has been the disparate responses people 
have of being seen by friends, family and strangers in their post-stroke body and 
potentially with adaptive aids such as walking frames.  At times perplexed, their response 
seemed disproportionate for their level of impairment and has been frustrating for me as a 
physiotherapist.  For instance, a woman who had standing balance problems following a 
cerebellar stroke who was hugely upset at not being able to wear high heels whilst dancing, 
to the point where she chose to retire from dancing; something she had been passionate 
about prior to her stroke.  This individual experience and adjustment after stroke has been 
acknowledged by a number of authors (Faircloth, Boylstein, Rittman, Young & Gubrium, 
2004b; Murray & Harrison, 2004; Salter et al., 2008) but is not something which I had 
been exposed to during my undergraduate training.  Instead the focus of my training, which 
is comparable to the New Zealand physiotherapy training content, was on the biomedical 
influences on health and recovery. At times, this training appeared to me to be inadequate 
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to make sense of some stroke survivor’s experiences after stroke and impacted on my 
ability to provide physiotherapy rehabilitation.  
 
The Community Stroke Rehabilitation Service, where I currently work as a 
physiotherapist, reports attaining good outcomes in terms of patient goal attainment and 
reducing impairment levels (Canterbury District Health Board, 2009a).  However, patient 
surveys indicate stroke survivors have a poor understanding of stroke and low activity 
levels (Canterbury District Health Board, 2009b).  Although the Community Stroke 
Rehabilitation Service aims to foster a person-centred approach to improve independence it 
is possible that stroke survivor’ problems are still compartmentalized into specific 
disciplinary issues.  In particular, physiotherapy is predominately focused on remediation 
of physical abnormalities, focusing on the physical changes of stroke and viewing the body 
as a physical entity.  It is in the role of physiotherapist that I have developed a desire to 
improve understanding of the experience of living in a changed body following a stroke 
and explore what this means for the individual.  On a personal level I hoped that increased 
understanding would direct my physiotherapy practice to improve outcomes, rehabilitation 
effectiveness, and most importantly the journey for stroke survivors.  For the 
physiotherapy profession I hoped that this research may inform an enhanced understanding 
of embodiment in stroke survivors in ways that advance physiotherapy theory to adopt a 
more holistic approach to stroke rehabilitation. 
 
The aim of this study is therefore to improve understanding of stroke survivor’s 
experience of transitioning home with a changed physical body.  The remainder of this 
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chapter provides a background of what is already known about embodiment after stroke 
and highlights the limitations of this knowledge in relation to physiotherapy. 
 
 2.2 Embodiment 
Embodiment distinguishes between the objective body, where the body is regarded 
as a physiological entity, and the phenomenal body, where the body is not just a 
physiological entity, but my (or your) body as I (or you) experience it (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962). Thus embodiment encompasses a holistic view of a person whilst rejecting 
reductionist views of the body (Nicholls & Gibson, 2010).  Historically, in the medical 
model of health, there has been a suggestion of a mind-body dualism in which the body 
can be considered as a “machine” (Roberts, 1994, p.364).  This ontological approach to the 
body was perhaps most famously advocated by the 17th-centuary philosopher Rene 
Descartes in his theory of Cartesian dualism where subjective and objective experiences 
were separated (Goldberg, 2011).  The prevalence of this concept is apparent in the 
division of health care professions into dealing with either the body or the mind, with 
physiotherapy clearly focused on the physical body (Roberts, 1994).  The mind-body 
dualism has since been largely rejected, including by Merleau-Ponty who argued that 
embodiment is the core principle of human existence with the body being both uniquely 
subject (the lived body) and object (the observed body) (Goldberg, 2011).  However, the 
physiotherapy profession, though acknowledging the interconnection of body and mind, 
still works from an assumption that physiotherapists will focus on the physical body and 
other professions will consider the mind (Mudge, Stretton, & Kayes, 2013; Nicholls & 
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Gibson, 2010; Roberts, 1994).  My experiences as a physiotherapist working with people 
following stroke, indicates this dualistic view of the body and mind is negatively affecting 
physiotherapy practice.  
 
The concept of embodiment in health and disability, especially in terms of stroke 
and physiotherapy, is poorly developed (Nicholls & Gibson, 2010).  Despite ‘bodies’ being 
at the core of physiotherapy practice there is very little theoretical exploration of the body 
as a whole and as the medium through which we experience the world.  This is in part due 
to the biomedical foundations from which physiotherapy practice grew in late Victorian 
England (Nicholls & Gibson, 2010; Roberts, 1994).  A professional distance between 
patients and physiotherapists was proactively cultivated by endorsing the body as an object 
or machine to enable intimate touch to be culturally acceptable without any sexual 
connotations (Barclay, 1994).  Despite approaches to health and disability advancing from 
this time, there is limited corresponding development around the concept of the body and 
embodiment in physiotherapy practice (Jorgensen, 2000).  It is my view that this stance is 
limiting for some areas of physiotherapy practice including stroke and other chronic health 
conditions. 
 
Conceptualizations of the body vary greatly among health related disciplines with 
the notion of embodiment being variably defined and embedded in theoretical models and 
clinical practice to differing degrees.  For example, fundamental to the biomedical model 
which underpins medical practice is the assumption of body-workings as being either 
normal or abnormal (Roberts, 1994).  This concept of normality has been contested by the 
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disability movement due to the negative connotations of being “abnormal” and the 
implications of using personal judgment to ascertain “normality” (Roberts, 1994, p.363). 
Medicine’s body-ontology has also been criticized for being a ‘dead’ body, with 
objectification of people’s bodies being engrained in practice (Slatman, 2014).  Although 
medical practice is increasingly touting person-centred care, embodiment does not yet 
feature in theoretical models of health (Slatman, 2014), rather the body is still represented 
within practice and literature in dis-embodied compartments.  
 
Likewise, in nursing, embodiment remains poorly defined despite the term being 
utilized increasingly in nursing research (Thomas, 2005; Wilde, 1999).  Like 
physiotherapists, nurses often provide intimate care to people’s bodies and strive to take a 
holistic approach to health care (Mason, 2014).  However, the body arguably remains silent 
because nurses are not actively involved in the development of embodiment as a paradigm 
for practice (Mason, 2014; Thomas, 2005; Wilde, 1999).  Consequently embodied 
meanings of illness are under-acknowledged and the human body remains submissive in 
nurse-patient relations (Thomas, 2005; Wilde, 1999). 
 
Conversely, embodiment concepts are more established in the area of psychology, 
and to some degree social work and occupational therapy practice.  For instance, in social 
psychology embodiment has been referred to as the “assumption that thoughts, feelings 
and behaviours are grounded in sensory experiences and bodily states” (Meier, Schnall, 
Schwarz, & Bargh, 2012, p.706).  Psychological approaches related to embodiment are 
engrained in practices such as addressing how physiological arousal affects emotions, and 
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temperatures influence behaviour (Kiverstein, 2012; Meier et al., 2012).  Similarly, bodily 
ability has been shown to influence individuals’ perceptions of the world around them.  For 
example, elderly people and others with declining health have been found to perceive hills 
as steeper, reflecting their decreasing ability to climb hills (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999).  
Despite this knowledge, theories of embodiment, especially in relation to health and 
disability remain primarily descriptive rather than explanatory in social psychology (Meier 
et al., 2012).   
 
In social work practice, embodiment theory is more widely acknowledged, 
although a more complex understanding of the interconnectedness of the body is desired 
by scholars in the hope to better understand people’s individual experiences as well as 
broader social conditions such as discrimination (Bell, 2011; Tangenberg & Kemp, 2002).  
For example, social work is said to strive to understand and recognize the complexities of 
diversity and social equity, encompassing the experience of difference.  This includes 
experiences of difference within the body, which serves both as an external marker, such as 
age, race, gender, ability, and sexuality, as well as an internal experience (Tangenberg & 
Kemp, 2002).  However, in contrast to physiotherapy practice, it has been argued within 
social work literature that the body has been historically under-recognized in social work 
practice, especially as a construct for self, social identity and power (Tangenberg & Kemp, 
2002).  Although suggestions have been made for potential frameworks of practice 
(Tangenberg & Kemp, 2002), such as considering the body as a physical, societal and 
relationship medium,  a linear and biomedical focus for social work practice reportedly 
prevails (Bell, 2011).   
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Disparately occupational therapy models are focused on how people occupy 
themselves with individuals generally viewed as a whole in relation to a given occupation 
or activity (Stamm, Cieza, Machold, Smolen, & Stucki, 2006).  ‘Participation’ and ‘person-
centred practice’ are central to occupational therapy theory and practice, with a focus on 
eliminating environmental barriers to maximise independence with activities of daily 
living.  However, occupational therapy academics have still reported the discipline lacking 
theoretical models that explicitly acknowledge embodiment (American Occupational 
Therapy Association, 2002; Thibodaux, 2004).  In particular, occupational therapy 
professional knowledge and ideas about disability have been criticized due to a perceived 
over-reliance on “outsiders” perspectives rather than exploring people’s lived experienced 
of disability (Thibodaux, 2004, p.508).   
 
The lack of understanding of embodiment theory in health and disability may be 
due, in part, to a lack of common philosophical language to link these isolated professional 
theories.  Furthermore, the links of the embodied experience to health and disability are as 
yet grossly under explored amongst healthcare professionals.  The World Health 
Organisation’s International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF; 
World Health Organization, 2001) provides a common language for inter-professional 
understanding of health conditions with impairments, function and participation being 
integrated into one model.  The ICF also considers contextual factors such as the 
environment and personal influences.  However, the ICF does not acknowledge the 
subjective experience or social engagement (Wade & Halligan, 2003), both of which are 
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fundamental to the embodied experience. Consequently there is potential for inter-
disciplinary theory development of embodiment and how embodied experiences relate to 
health and disability.   
 
 2.2.1 Embodiment in stroke 
The focus on the embodied experience of stroke is broad, with relatively few 
studies conducted.  Table 1 provides a narrative summary of articles which have the bodily 
experience of stroke as a primary aim of study.  The scope/limitations with regard to my 
research question have been briefly identified and will be further considered in the 
following sections.
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Table 1: Summary of key articles which consider the embodied experience of stroke survivors as a primary aim 
Reference Focus of study Methodology and 
strategies for rigour 

















 Field notes 
 Peer meetings 
 Stated background of 
primary researcher 
 Use of literature 
explicit 
 Extended interview 












again at six 
months 
Stroke influenced participant’s perception of 
their body, sense of self and participation.  As 
an in-patient participants described feeling 
they were in a good place whilst they felt 
vulnerable.  This environment “shielded” 
(p.10) them with hope of recovering the 
physical body being all-absorbing at this time. 
After discharge home participants described 
uncertainty with their sense of self feeling 
fragmented.   They described having to 
negotiate and change participation in 





This may be due to 
this study being part 
of a broader study 
which may have 
influenced the 











issues of identity 
in physical 
recovery. 
Life narrative approach 
 Explicit recruitment 
process 
 Field notes 









months and one 
year 
All participants described a fundamental 
change like entering a new world.  They 
described their body as separate and 
precarious being perplexing and unreliable to 
them.  They also described a changed body, 
social self-body relationship. There were 
ongoing issues at one year especially physical 
activity in community which was restricted by 
participants increased awareness of physical 
limits 
Focus on stroke 
within participant’s 
life story, broader 
than embodiment.  
Participants are a 









Unclear.  Semi-structured 
interviews part of a larger 
51 stroke 
survivors one 
Participants described managing their body 
within a mind-body dualism with a sense of 
Observational study 
from a larger mixed 
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Reference Focus of study Methodology and 
strategies for rigour 








stage post-stroke  
study.  Strategies for 




the body being a passive/foreign object.  At 
other times though participants described their 
body as an active/familiar object.  Participants 
“tested” (p.78) their body in everyday 
situations in order to help create coherence in 
their “biographical body” (p.80)  
method multisite 
project - process of 















 Field notes 
 Coding process explicit 
 Extended interview 




(over 3 years 
after stroke) 
Stroke forced participants to adjust to a 
suddenly altered body that felt fragile.  This 
caused participants to live with increased 
attention to their bodily functions.  This lost 
control over their body caused feelings of 
strangeness and a sense of “living in a body 
that is not me” (p.24). Highlighted the 
importance of perception of self in bodily 
experiences.   
Captures life-long 
dynamic nature of 
embodied 











their bodies after 
stroke 
Phenomenology study 
 Theoretical framework 
stated 




 Coding process clearly 
explained 
20 women post-
stroke at six 
weeks, six 
months and one 
year 
Participants linked current bodily experiences 
with their past and future.  The bodily 
experience after stroke was described as 
unpredictable, demanding, and a sense of an 
extended body. Identified profound disturbing 
experiences of a changed body after stroke 
with a dynamic process as people moved from 
bodily strangeness towards “re-embodiment” 
(p.1304) 
Data collected over 
one year capturing 
how embodied 
experiences changed 
over time. Strong 
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The studies which have been completed, although having varied foci, overlap in a 
number of the concepts identified that relate to embodiment (Arntzen & Elstad, 2013; 
Ellis-Hill et al., 2000; Faircloth et al., 2004a; Kitzmüller et al., 2013; Kvigne & Kirkevold, 
2003; Pallesen, 2014).  I have summarised these concepts as: a self-body split, an altered 
bodily awareness, an altered perception of self, social context, and dynamic self-body 
relationship.    
 
Self-body split 
A common notion amongst studies of the bodily experience of stroke was having a 
body which felt different and separate to their sense of self.  This difference in the post-
stroke body has been associated with different labels in various studies but can be 
summarized as a body which feels (a) foreign, (b) out of control, (c) fragile, and (d) 
disliked.  The foreignness of the post-stroke body is perhaps the most striking and common 
theme in interviews with stroke survivors.  For example, Ellis-Hill, Payne and Ward (2000) 
identified how stroke survivors interviewed at six and 12 months after their strokes 
described a changed relationship with their bodies.  Participants expressed their body as 
being precarious and separate from their sense of self.  Similarly Faircloth, Boylstein, 
Rittman and Young (2004a) described how stroke survivors referred to their body as a 
passive, foreign object when interviewed one month after leaving hospital.  This led to 
participants having to “listen” to what their body was “telling” them, with a feeling of a 
mechanized body, separated into parts (p.75).  This alienation of the body has also been 
described in the early stages after stroke whilst people are still in hospital with participant’s 
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perceiving their bodies in a fragmented way (Arntzen, Hamran, & Borg, 2014).  Thus a 
separateness between the self and the physical body appears to be a component of the 
embodied experience of stroke. 
 
Stroke survivors’ perception of their body as foreign may be in part due to the lack 
of control many have described.  This lack of control has been associated with a body that 
is unpredictable (Kvigne & Kirkevold, 2003), perplexing (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000) and 
unreliable (Kitzmüller et al., 2013; Pallesen, 2014), and is often associated with frustration 
(Pallesen, 2014).  The sense of a foreign and uncontrollable body suggests a detachment 
between the stroke survivor’s sense of self and their body.  This self-body split is 
reinforced by stroke survivors often objectifying their own bodies (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000; 
Faircloth et al., 2004a).  In interviews with chronic stroke survivors these perceptions have 
amounted to people describing living in a body “that is not me” (Kitzmüller et al., 2013, 
p.24).   
 
Bodily symptoms such as pain and weakness, combined with lack of control, have 
been suggested as further contributing to stroke survivors perceiving their body differently, 
for example, as fragile (Kitzmüller et al., 2013) or vulnerable (Kvigne & Kirkevold, 2003).  
As a result, the body has been seen as limiting for stroke survivors, and caused them to 
question the continuity between themselves and what their body will allow (Arntzen et al., 
2014).  This separation can be such that stroke survivors have developed a dislike of the 
affected side of their body (Loetscher, Regard, & Brugger, 2006) and have a negative 
relationship with their own body (Kitzmüller et al., 2013).  Thus it is common for stroke 
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survivors to have a changed relationship with their bodies, often viewing their body as 
passive and separate to their sense of self.   
 
Altered bodily awareness 
In addition to a changed relationship with their bodies, many stroke survivors 
alluded to an altered awareness of their bodies; with a body that ‘demanded’ their attention 
in particular situations.  Over time stroke survivors described being at ease with their 
changed body to the point where they were often no long consciously aware of these 
changes in their everyday life (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000).  However, in new or social situations 
participants described becoming acutely aware of their body (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000; 
Kitzmüller et al., 2013; Kvigne & Kirkevold, 2003).  This was at times due to a changed 
physical appearance (Kvigne & Kirkevold, 2003), or because a heightened awareness of 
the body was required for functional tasks such as walking (Ellis-Hill et al. 2000) or 
dressing (Kitzmüller et al., 2013).  As a result stroke survivors have been described to 
experience their body as a negative and demanding entity, which directs many of their 
behaviours and determines the meaning of their physical experience (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000; 
Kitzmüller et al., 2013; Kvigne & Kirkevold, 2003).  
 
In unproblematic and healthy conditions the body is said to “dys-appear” (Leder, 
1990, p.26) or be “silent, taken for granted” (Bleeker & Mulderij, 1992, p.2).  A person 
may experience their body as ‘re-appearing’ such as during sporting activities, with an 
enjoyment of increased bodily awareness (Zeiler, 2010). However, when the person is 
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faced with problematic situations such as with disability, the body is said to reappear in an 
unpleasant manner.  Leder (1990) termed this “dys-appearance” (p.26) with the ‘dys’ 
meaning ill or bad.  This dys-appeared body is characterized by being apart and ‘alien’ but 
also demands more attention from the subject than ever before.  This attention has been 
described both as conscious and forced.  For instance stroke survivors often described 
consciously looking for signs of potential problems and trying to actively gain 
understanding of their perplexing body via health care professionals (Ellis-Hill et al., 
2000).  For others, the heightened bodily awareness was forced as they attempted to 
achieve smooth functioning (Kitzmüller et al., 2013).  This attention has been suggested as 
context specific, with certain situations demanding more attention than others (Ellis-Hill et 
al., 2000; Kitzmüller et al., 2013).  Thus the post-stroke body was experienced as 
demanding energy-consuming attention and direction from a seemingly separate self (Ellis-
Hill et al., 2000).  Furthermore, the novelty and complexity of the context in which a 
person attempted to use their body is apparent. 
 
Altered perception of self 
Stroke can have a profound effect on self-identity with selfhood frequently being 
questioned by stroke survivors (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000; Murray & Harrison, 2004). Self-
identity is defined as “a dynamic collection of self-representations, which are formed 
through personal experiences, and interpretation of the environment” (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 
2000, p.280).  The embodied self is only one part of one’s self-identity, but self-identity 
forms a part of embodiment. The perception of self is also, at least in part, socially 
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constructed comprising of aspects such as roles, social positions, preferred activities and 
appearance (Gelech & Desjardins, 2010).  It is also constructed intrinsically in how we see 
ourselves in terms of traits and values (Gelech & Desjardins, 2010).  For stroke survivors 
who have experienced a loss in any one of these domains, “who am I?” is a question 
frequently evoked (Kitzmüller et al., 2013, p.24).  Thus an altered body can cause stroke 
survivors to question their selfhood and existence.  
 
Furthermore, many stroke survivors have grappled with their altered perception of 
self due to a changed physical body, such that their own personhood could have an 
unfamiliarity to them (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000; Kitzmüller et al., 2013; Murray & 
Harrison, 2004).  Murray and Harrison (2004) identified a “profound loss of self” (p.810) 
by stroke survivors they interviewed over two years after their stroke, with an apparent 
detachment from their “new” selves (p.811). This is particularly confusing for stroke 
survivors where there is a mismatch between what they considered themselves to be and 
what their post-stroke body allowed them to be (Arntzen & Elstad, 2013; Kitzmüller et al., 
2013). These bewildering and negative perceptions of body and/or self have been 
commonly associated with loss of confidence and grief in a number of studies of stroke 
survivors (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000; Kitzmüller et al., 2013; Murray & Harrison, 2004).  
Furthermore, the degree of deterioration in self-concept does not necessarily correlate with 
physical ability (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000).  For instance stroke survivors with less visible 
problems such as fatigue, or loss of confidence expressed questioning their self-identity, 
and feeling frustrated at being unable to express these more ambiguous experiences to 
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others (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000; Kitzmüller et al., 2013).  Consequently it appears the 
relationship between the embodied self and physical changes after stroke is complex. 
 
Social context in embodiment   
The self-body relationship of stroke survivors has also been reported as being 
socially dependent.  For example Ellis-Hill, Payne and Ward (2000) found some stroke 
survivors felt quite comfortable with their body in the company of close family and 
friends.  However, in the community their body became “the focus of social gaze and lost 
its silence” (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000, p.730).  This caused participants to withdraw from 
public scrutiny and spend increased time at home (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000).  This sentiment 
was echoed by participants in a study by Murray & Harrison (2004) where physical 
presentations that are ambiguous to lay public, such as ataxia and use of aids, served as 
barriers to social interaction because they created a discord between people’s perception of 
how they looked, and who they perceived themselves to be (Murray & Harrison, 2004).  
Consequently the self-body relationship is influenced by, and in turn influences, the social 
context of people after stroke. 
 
Dynamic self-body relationship  
Embodiment after stroke is a dynamic process with people’s experiences of their 
bodies changing over time.  The process has been described as re-embodiment where 
stroke survivors describe becoming gradually familiar with an unfamiliar body (Kvigne & 
Kirkevold, 2003).  This re-embodiment process has been considered at various stages of 
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life after stroke including as an inpatient (Arntzen et al., 2014), one month after discharge 
from home (Faircloth et al., 2004a), and up to one year after stroke (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000).  
Previous studies appear unanimous in stating that the embodied experience is a dynamic 
process, but the trajectory of this re-embodiment remains unclear.  For instance Faircloth et 
al. (2004a) described how subjects sought to “create coherence in the biographical body” 
(p.80) whereby meaning and future projections of self were developed and linked with past 
self-perceptions and experiences.  However, stroke survivors have also expressed conflict 
in their self and body one year after their stroke (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000) suggesting they had 
not been able to create coherence or at least that this relationship remained unresolved.   
This process of adjustment has instead been considered as a life-long process of adaptation 
(Kitzmüller et al., 2013) although some researchers have explored influential events such 
as transitioning from hospital to home and view these events as pivotal in peoples 
embodied experiences (Arntzen et al., 2014).  Thus it appears a temporal and responsive 
shift in the embodied experience may occur after stroke that is not yet fully understood. 
 
A number of social indicators have been identified as accounting for the extent of 
this disrupted biographical flow including age, gender, other health concerns and previous 
knowledge of the illness experience.  For instance Faircloth et al. (2004b) identified how 
stroke survivors could normalise some of the limiting effects by attributing it to the ageing 
process.  Similarly Kitzmuller et al. (2013) identified how the impact of stroke on self-
perception varied according to life stage with those losing their jobs as a result of their 
stroke being more affected in terms of selfhood than a retired stroke survivor.  Gender 
differences have also been considered as significant in the self-body relationship.  For 
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instance Kvigne & Kirkevold (2003) specifically explored women’s experiences and 
considered how appearance can often be socially and personally more important for 
women than men.  This notion was mirrored by Charmaz (1995) who contended that 
appearance may be more important to women, but proposed that women also tend to adapt 
to illness better (Charmaz, 1995).  Thus the relationship between body and self after stroke 
appears to be dynamic, being influenced by a number of factors, but this relationship in 
people’s embodied experience is not yet fully understood. 
 
 2.2.2 Embodiment in chronic illness 
Embodiment has been explored in relation to a number of other chronic health 
conditions.  The understanding gained from people with other health conditions may 
inform considerations for the post-stroke experience because, while stroke is a one off 
neurological event, the sequelae essentially constitute living with a chronic condition.  The 
unity of body and self is thought to be frequently disrupted in other chronic health 
conditions as has been described after stroke.  Drawing on qualitative research with people 
living with chronic health conditions, Charmaz (1995) proposed that bodily alienation 
caused by illness disrupts a person’s assumptions of the relationship between their body 
and self and therefore their sense of wholeness.   However, Charmaz (1995) suggested that 
a familiarity with the body develops over time.  Changed identity goals may also emerge 
which may include trade-offs to avoid situations that threaten the established sense of self.  
Charmaz (1995) argued these trade-offs include “surrendering” (p.672) to their sick body 
whereby they stop pushing bodily limits and affirm that their self is inextricably linked to 
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their sick body (p.672).  These embodied experiences appear comparable to those 
expressed by stroke survivors in the literature exploring concepts of self and body. 
 
Similarly the changed relationship between body, self and the world has been 
considered in chronic pain (Bullington, 2009; Zeiler, 2010).  In the presence of chronic 
pain, a multi-dimensional phenomenon, the perception of people’s world may narrow, the 
body becomes illness and there may be a lost sense of self (Bullington, 2009).  Bullington 
(2009) considered how the physical body is usually in the background of our lives yet 
comes to the foreground in the presence of pain, so people “become pain” (p.106) resulting 
in the experience of alienation from others, not in pain, around them.  Additionally an 
experience of body “listening” and altered bodily awareness has been described in the 
presence of pain (Zeiler, 2010, p.336).  Thus the embodied experience of chronic pain may 
mirror that of stroke whereby the body and self can be perceived as split, and connections 
with society altered.  
 
Likewise, the altered bodily awareness which stroke survivors have expressed is 
echoed in other chronic health conditions.  For instance, Price (1993a) interviewed adults 
with multiple sclerosis and asthma and asked them to keep a diary for six weeks to 
understand their body experience in comparison to healthy individuals.  She found that 
those with chronic health conditions had an increased awareness of their bodies and this 
directed their behaviours, whilst holding meaning for their physical experience (Price, 
1993a).  This was in contrast to healthy individuals who described their body experience as 
“a function taken for granted” (Price, 1993a, p.46).  This study built on a previous study of 
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diabetic adults who learnt to “listen” to their body in order to understand their disease 
(Price, 1993b, p.37).  Therefore it appears a number of chronic health conditions influence 
bodily awareness, a component of the embodied experience, in a similar way to stroke. 
 
Similarly, factors which may influence the embodied experience have been 
considered in other health conditions.  For instance Clarke and Griffin (2008) explored 
body image in people aged over 68 years with greater than five health conditions.  They 
alluded to the embodied experience being shaped by cultural ideals and related this to 
“successful ageing” (Clarke & Griffin, 2008, p.1084). The embodied experience has also 
been specifically considered for men and women separately (Kvigne & Kirkevold, 2003; 
Sparkes & Smith, 2002).  For example, Sparkes and Smith (2002) considered how “alien” 
(p.259) body-self relationships prompted anxieties around the loss of masculinity and 
athletic identities in men who had sustained a spinal cord injury.  Likewise, social 
expectations and femininity were considered by Kvigne and Kirkevold (2003) when 
interviewing women who had sustained a stroke.  Kvigne and Kirkevold (2003) referred to 
Leder’s terminology, bodily “dys-appearance” (Leder, 1990, p.26), arguing that this 
experience may be even more pronounced for women, for whom bodily appearance may 
be culturally more significant than for men.  Additionally the embodied experience has 
been considered in relation to assistance aids such as wheelchairs and walking frames.  For 
instance, walking aids made older people feel they were being perceived as vulnerable and 
dependent (Brännström, Bäckman, & Santamäki Fischer, 2013) and wheelchairs have been 
expressed both as a physical barrier to accessing social environments, as well as impacting 
on social self-identity (Papadimitriou, 2008).  These studies support the notion that the 
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embodied experience of health conditions is deeply entwined in self-identity and social 
relationships. 
 
2.2.3 Embodiment and physiotherapy 
To date, there are few studies specifically considering physiotherapy and the 
embodied experience of chronic health conditions.  Of the existing studies on embodiment 
and physiotherapy, much of the research originates from the field of chronic pain 
(Bullington, 2009; Zeiler, 2010), mental health conditions (Fuchs & Schlimme, 2009; 
Williams, 2000), ageing (Charmaz, 1995; Clarke & Griffin, 2008; Price, 1993), and 
traumatic brain injury (Sivertsen & Normann, 2014).  The majority of studies exploring the 
embodied experience of stroke and other health conditions have been conducted by 
scholars in the area of social psychology or health philosophy.  There appears to be an 
unacknowledged division between the biomedical aspects of health conditions and the 
psycho-social aspects within physiotherapy, with the marrying of these two seeming 
challenging.  Nicholls & Gibson (2010) suggested that historically too much emphasis has 
been placed on the biomechanical view of the body, and challenged physiotherapists to 
also consider the body in terms of the self and societal body, meaning that people’s 
perceptions of their body is, in part, shaped by cultural, economic, political and social 
influences.  
 
Physiotherapy approaches vary in focus from the early stages of stroke recovery, 
usually during hospital stay, to returning home and then longer-term needs (Kwakkel et al., 
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2004).  There is consensus that for the majority of people with stroke neuroplasticity is at 
its most rapid during the first few months after stroke and therefore recovery mostly occurs 
during this time (Bamford, Sandercock, Dennis, Warlow, & Burn, 1991).  However, 
physical gains can occur for people throughout life, with evidence for physical progress in 
people many years after their stroke (Ferrarello et al., 2011).  Similarly, the approaches of 
services are also varied with research evidence supporting community-based stroke 
specialist services (Legg & Langhorne, 2004; Stroke Foundation of New Zealand & New 
Zealand Guidelines Group, 2010; Van Der Bij, Laurant, & Wensing, 2002), mono-
disciplinary outpatient services (Britton & Andersson, 2000) and group based therapy 
(Wevers, van de Port, Vermue, Mead, & Kwakkel, 2009). Although home based 
rehabilitation is recommended in the New Zealand Clinical Guidelines for Stroke (2010), 
no one approach in isolation is advocated and a combined, person-centred approach is 
recommended (Stroke Foundation of New Zealand & New Zealand Guidelines Group, 
2010).   
 
Given the diversity of stroke effects, stages of recovery and potential settings, best 
practice physiotherapy for stroke can be considered dependent on individual client 
presentations and circumstances.  However, clinical research for stroke physiotherapy to 
date is predominately related to the biomedical view of the body and physiotherapy 
approaches are focused on the physical body such as exercise therapy, walking 
interventions, task repetition, sensory retraining, provision of aids and education (Tyson, 
Connell, Lennon, & Busse, 2009; Van Der Bij et al., 2002; Van Peppen, Hendriks, Van 
Meeteren, Helders, & Kwakkel, 2007). 
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There has been criticism of the physiotherapy profession for its lack of theoretical 
evolution generally (Cott et al., 1995; Nicholls & Gibson, 2010) and hyper-focus on 
physical function (Sarre et al., 2013) across all health conditions.  There is a lack of 
physiotherapy specific models of practice, and instead the profession is most commonly 
associated with generic models such as the ICF (World Health Organization, 2001) which 
acknowledges the multi-faceted nature of health, including personal and social factors.  
Some theoretical papers have attempted to consider professional models more specifically 
tailored to physiotherapy and a more multi-dimensional view of the body.  For example, 
Wikström-Grotell and Eriksson (2012) discussed the concept of movement in 
physiotherapy, emphasizing the need for a more multi-dimensional understanding of 
movement instead of the historically biomedical focus.  Wikström-Grotell and Eriksson 
(2012) summarized earlier research on the concept of movement in physiotherapy and 
identified movement as 1) intentional, 2) emotional, 3) having personal value or 
independency, and 4) an absolute value and sign of life, suggesting movement as having 
meaning beyond physicality.   
 
A small number of studies have attempted to explore if this multi-dimensional view 
of the body and movement is taken by physiotherapists in practice.  For instance, 
Jorgensen (2000) explored the concept of the body and health specifically in physiotherapy 
by conducting semi-structured interviews, and observing physiotherapists with orthopaedic 
patients (Jorgensen, 2000).  They concluded that, despite physiotherapists believing they 
took a holistic approach, physiotherapy practice tended to reflect a very physical and 
instrumental concept of the body focusing on the anatomical body and overlooking 
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people’s lived experiences of their bodies.  Similarly, Thornquist (1994) also considered 
encounters between physiotherapists and patients, alluding to a dualistic consideration of 
the body and mind in their examination and treatment.  However, physiotherapists were 
said to communicate with their patients as “embodied subjects” (p.711) suggesting a gap 
between theory and practice.  This gap is echoed by others who suggest a contrast between 
theoretical understandings and what actually occurs in practice, alluding to a lack of 
consideration of ontological foundations by the physiotherapy profession (Noronen & 
Wikstrom-Grotell, 1999; Roskell, Hewison, & Wildman, 1998).   
 
Physiotherapists are not alone in fragmenting the body when working with people 
after stroke (Bendz, 2003) but given the increasing weight of evidence that the embodied 
experience goes beyond the physical body it appears that there is a discrepancy between:  
1. The predominantly biomedical theoretical models of physiotherapy and the 
clinical practice of physiotherapy for chronic health conditions such as stroke. 
2. Theoretical basis to interventions used by physiotherapists and the health 
issues experienced by patients with stroke.  
3. What physiotherapists perceive their approach to be and what they deliver.   
 
It appears that if the embodied experience of stroke could be better understood and 
integrated into physiotherapy theoretical models, interventions that extend beyond the 
physical body could be developed.  This may ultimately enhance outcomes for stroke 




  35 
 
2.3 Stroke overview 
 2.3.1 Stroke pathology 
The embodied experience of stroke may be, in part, related to the type of stroke a 
person has and the resulting impairments.  Impairments may include motor loss, sensory 
loss, tonal changes, higher cerebral dysfunction, visuospatial disorders and movement 
disorders.  Collectively these impairments can have a profound effect on the way a person 
perceives and relates to their body, which are aspects of embodiment.  For instance, altered 
sensory-motor control, a symptom of many strokes, can cause a change in the ability to 
feel and move the body.  For some stroke survivors there is altered feedback from the body 
of what is happening.  This may result in disordered movement patterns such as ataxia 
(lack of voluntary coordination of muscle movements) or dyspraxia (altered planning of 
movements and co-ordination). Similarly visual-spatial and perceptual changes can 
significantly impact on how a person can move their body in space and in relation to their 
environment.  Commonly stroke survivors experience weakness which can affect a 
person’s ability to move. These impairments often impact on the stroke survivor’s 
everyday function and participation in life roles (World Health Organization, 2001) as well 
as their relationship with their body (Faircloth et al., 2004a; Kvigne & Kirkevold, 2003).  
The extent that these physical changes influence a person’s embodied experience is unclear 
in the existing research (Arntzen & Elstad, 2013; Ellis-Hill et al., 2000). 
 
Stroke survivors with these physical changes would typically be referred for 
physiotherapy assessment and intervention.  Physiotherapists have been reported as 
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tending to focus on their biomechanical expertise, separating the body and minimizing the 
relevance of individual bodily experiences (Mudge et al., 2013).  The incidence of altered 
bodily experience after stroke is unknown but likely to occur for the majority of stroke 
survivors, at least temporarily, given the incidence of physical changes (Feigin et al., 
2014).  However, existing research on the experience of stroke for people with a changed 
physical body suggests that learning to live with an altered body after stroke requires more 
than a biomechanical approach (Arntzen et al., 2014; Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000). Greater 
understanding of the bodily experience of stroke could therefore usefully inform 
physiotherapy practice. 
 
 2.3.2 Epidemiology 
Stroke and its effects are a globally significant issue.  The prevalence of stroke is 
high with 33 million stroke survivors worldwide recorded in 2010 (Feigin et al., 2014). A 
recent extensive meta-analysis indicated that between 1970 and 2008 the incidence of 
stroke in low-income and middle-income countries had more than doubled in this 
timeframe (Feigin et al., 2014).  Conversely in high-income countries there was a 42% 
decrease in stroke incidence.  However, the absolute number of stroke survivors worldwide 
has increased by 84% since 1990, explained by the growth and ageing of our population.  
Stroke is a significant cause of long-term disability with approximately 50% of stroke 
survivors experiencing some degree of permanent disability (Department of Health, 2001).  
The risk of stroke increases with age with at least two thirds of strokes occurring in persons 
over 65 years of age (Department of Health, 2001).  Risk factors for stroke include 
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hypertension, diabetes, atrial fibrillation, hypercholesterolemia, smoking, obesity as well as 
some iatrogenic factors (Donnan, Fisher, Macleod, & Davis, 2008).  Stroke entails 
significant financial and societal costs.  International expenditure studies of stroke indicate 
3% of total health expenditure is spent on stroke (Evers et al., 2004).  Similarly quality-
adjusted life years1 has been calculated as a mean reduction of three years in moderate 
stroke (Tengs, Yu, & Luistro, 2001).  Globally, despite some improvements in stroke 
incidence, the burden of stroke is increasing with a rise in disability-adjusted life years2 of 
12% between 1990 and 2010 (Feigin et al., 2014).  The burden of stroke is therefore of 
international significance both for individuals and on a societal level.  Improved awareness 
of people’s experiences of health care conditions is important for guiding research, 
understanding complex issues and providing a person-first understanding (Dixon‐Woods, 
Fitzpatrick, & Roberts, 2001).  Insights into stroke survivors’ experiences of their body 
therefore have the potential to influence outcomes like Disability or Quality Adjusted Life 
Years for stroke survivors. 
 
 2.3.3. Stroke rehabilitation in New Zealand 
One in 56 adults have had a stroke in New Zealand (Ministry of Health, 2008) with 
over 700 strokes annually in Canterbury, the location for this study (Canterbury District 
Health Board, 2009a).  Lifetime costs per stroke survivor in New Zealand are estimated at 
$73,600 with a total cost to the country of over $450 million annually (Brown, 2009).  
                                                 
1 Quality-adjusted life years is a measure of disease burden, including both the quality and the quantity of life 
lived 
2 Disability-adjusted life years is a measure of overall disease burden, expressed as the number of years lost 
due to ill-health, disability or early death 
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Stroke services are based on National best practice guidelines (Stroke Foundation of New 
Zealand & New Zealand Guidelines Group, 2010) and there can generally be considered to 
be an integrated stroke specialist pathway from acute management through to long-term 
community integration.    
 
 2.3.4 Overview of Christchurch stroke services 
At the time of this study a stroke survivor who received treatment with the 
Canterbury District Health Board over the age of 65 years, or over 55 years if identifying 
as NZ Maori or Pacific Islanders, would be admitted to the Acute Stroke Unit at 
Christchurch hospital.  This unit is operated by an acute medical and multi-disciplinary 
team who provide acute intervention, assessment and discharge planning.  Stroke survivors 
who unable to function at home from the Acute Stroke Unit will be transferred to the 
Stroke Rehabilitation Unit at Princess Margaret Hospital. There a coordinated stroke 
specialist team would provide therapeutic intervention until either stroke survivors are able 
to function at home or their progress plateaus.  On discharge from either the Acute Stroke 
Unit or Stroke Rehabilitation Unit the stroke survivor may then be referred to the 
Community Stroke Rehabilitation Service, where I work as a physiotherapist, if further 
rehabilitation potential is identified.  Younger people who have strokes followed a 
different pathway of care outside of the service I worked, and were therefore not 
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 2.3.5 Biculturism and embodiment 
New Zealand is a bicultural society comprising indigenous Māori people, and later 
immigrants of a range of ethnic origins.  There are differing stroke demographic profiles 
for Māori and non-Māori stroke survivors, with unique cultural perspectives, which may 
influence stroke survivors’ experiences of their body.  Ongoing health disparities exist 
between Māori and non-Māori populations (Feigin et al., 2006; Harwood, 2010) as well as 
disparities in experiences of health services (Dyall, Feigin, Brown, & Roberts, 2008).  
Culture has been suggested to influence people’s embodied experiences in that our cultural 
values influence our perceptions (Thomas & Wardle, 2014; Wilde, 1999).  The mean age 
of first stroke is 61 years in Māori and 65 years in Pacific people, compared with 76 years 
among New Zealand Europeans (Feigin et al., 2006).  Age has been suggested as a factor 
in the embodied experience (Faircloth et al., 2004a,b; Thomas & Wardle, 2014) therefore 
Māori people may have a unique embodied experience after stroke.  The New Zealand 
Stroke Guidelines make recommendations for stroke services to be accessible and effective 
for all New Zealanders, irrespective of where they live, their age, gender or ethnicity 
(Stroke Foundation of New Zealand & New Zealand Guidelines Group, 2010).   
 
 2.4 Life after stroke 
Although controversy exists around the content of stroke rehabilitation and the 
philosophy that underpins it, there is growing consensus that the consequence of stroke in 
terms of a persons’ engagement in valued activities and social roles should be considered 
more in stroke rehabilitation than it currently is (Hartman-Maeir, Soroker, Ring, Avni, & 
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Katz, 2007; Robison et al., 2009; Stroke Foundation of New Zealand & New Zealand 
Guidelines Group, 2010).  A person’s embodied experience is integrally related to their 
engagement in valued activities and social roles, although in what way is not yet fully 
understood (Arntzen et al., 2014; Faircloth et al., 2004a; Kitzmüller et al., 2013). 
 
 2.4.1 Participation in meaningful activities 
It is widely acknowledged that many stroke survivors have significant restrictions 
in meaningful activities of daily living, socializing, occupations and recreation (Hartman-
Maeir et al., 2007; Mayo, Wood-Dauphinee, Côté, Durcan, & Carlton, 2002; Robison et 
al., 2009).  Physical impairments account for some of these restrictions (Wang, Mitchell, 
Smith, & Leeder, 1999) as do social constraints such as stigma and non-physical personal 
factors, such as mood (Pound, Gompertz, & Ebrahim, 1999).  However, the influence of 
the embodied experience after stroke on non-physical personal factors and people’s 
participation in meaningful activities is less understood.  Robison et al. (2009) who 
interviewed stroke survivors following discharge home, then again at one year, attempted 
to explore what helped people to resume previously valued activities.  A number of factors 
including environmental influences, support from others, adaptability of the individual, and 
professional support were identified as influencing the resumption of valued activities.  In 
terms of bodily experiences, Robison et al. (2009) identified people had a loss of 
confidence in their bodies, negative sensations when doing activities, less control of their 
body in unfamiliar environments, shame at appearing disabled and overall feeling like “a 
different person” (p.1560).  Robison et al. (2009) concluded that stroke survivors needed to 
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address the emotional and behavioural responses people made to their stroke in order to 
adjust positively.   
 
Similarly a systematic review of 95 qualitative studies involving stroke survivors 
identified an overarching theme of “loss” in life after stroke including loss of activities and 
identity (McKevitt, Redfern, Mold, & Wolfe, 2004, p.1501).  Despite this relatively 
extensive review, there is no specific mention of the bodily experience of stroke and the 
authors concluded there was a need for greater participation of health service users in 
future research (McKevitt et al., 2004) with acknowledgment of how intensely personal the 
stroke experience is to each individual (Burton, 2000).  Greater understanding of the 
embodied experience of stroke may be an important part of this adjustment process and 
improve resumption of meaningful activities. 
 
 2.4.2 Quality of life 
Quality of life is significantly affected following a stroke (Carod-Artal, Egido, 
González, & De Seijas, 2000) and the embodied experience may play an important part in 
achieving higher quality of life given that embodiment recognises the lived experiences of 
stroke survivors.  Quality of life is described as the “individuals’ perceptions of their 
position in life in the context of the culture and value system in which they live and in 
relation to their goals, expectations, standards and concerns” (The WHOQOL Group, 
1998, p.1570).  Physical activity influences the physical and mental aspects of quality of 
life after stroke (Carod-Artal et al., 2000; Chen & Rimmer, 2011) but only in the short 
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term (Chen & Rimmer, 2011).  Similarly, physiotherapy has been suggested as important 
in enhancing quality of life especially in terms of exercise (Chen & Rimmer, 2011).  
However long-term quality of life is dependent on factors other than exercise and physical 
ability, which may be influential for physiotherapeutic approaches, which historically have 
focused on physical aspects of health in isolation.   
 
Quality of life is not strongly correlated with stroke survivor’s level of physical 
function indicating that resuming physical ability alone does not necessarily improve 
quality of life (Carod-Artal et al., 2000; White et al., 2007).  White et al. (2007) allude to 
the need for clinicians to look beyond function when considering long-term quality of life 
for stroke survivors.  Similarly, in a general literature review exploring determinants of 
health related quality of life after stroke, the predictors identified were disparate (Carod-
Artal et al., 2000).  Although functional status was identified as a predictor in some 
studies, depression, stroke type and age were more common predictors.  This suggests that 
it is prudent to look beyond physical function when considering quality of life in stroke 
survivors. 
 
 2.5 Transition to community 
This thesis explored the embodied experience of stroke one month after leaving 
hospital, a substantial transition point in the recovery from stroke.  Transition home 
following a stroke is consistently described by stroke survivors as challenging (Cott et al., 
2007; Ellis-Hill et al., 2009; Rittman et al., 2004; Sarre et al., 2013). A transition can be 
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described as “a passage from one life phase, condition, or status to another and is 
embedded in the context of a particular social situation” (Rittman et al., 2004, p.260).  
Transition home for stroke survivors often results in feelings of loss, uncertainty and social 
isolation (Salter et al., 2008).  Transition from hospital has also been described as a period 
of contradictions in perceived progress, emotions and self, with feelings of “loss of 
momentum” (p.64), “being abandoned” (p.66), and “being in the dark” (Ellis-Hill et al., 
2009, p.68).  It is during this transition that stroke survivors may also identify an altered 
“sense of self” (Rittman et al., 2004, p.264) of which the body is one component.  
Although these studies do not specifically consider the embodied experience on 
transitioning from hospital, they suggest that this is often a time stroke survivors reflect on 
their sense of self, which may relate to their bodily experiences. 
 
 Constructions of self are in part gained from bodily experiences (Murray & 
Harrison, 2004) hence are intimately linked with the embodied experience.  Sense of self 
has been thought to be overlooked in evaluations of stroke rehabilitation and in wider 
models of rehabilitation such as the International Classification of Functioning and 
Disability, especially in relation to the transition to the community (Cott et al., 2007).  It is 
this transitional stage which I have been especially interested in exploring as it appears to 
evoke questioning and quest for meaning in stroke survivors. When stroke survivors leave 
hospital they begin to revisit their pre-stroke life roles and activities for the first time with 
their changed, post-stroke body.  It is therefore a time of learning and reflection for stroke 
survivors as they gain understanding of their body in everyday life, and what having a 
changed body means to them.    
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Personal, psychological, social and environmental factors help or hinder stroke 
survivors during the transition process when people adapt to changes in their self, social 
connectedness and community participation (Gage, Noh, Polatajko, & Kaspar, 1994; 
Gustafsson & Bootle, 2013; Sarre et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2010).  For instance self-
efficacy, a person’s belief in their capabilities, is an important aspect of community 
reintegration in terms of quality of life, and return to meaningful roles (Gage, et al., 1994; 
Sarre et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2010).  Similarly personality, adjustment practices and 
relationships are important in preserving resilience following stroke (Sarre et al., 2013).  
Transitioning from hospital has been termed the “modelling phase” (Gustafsson & Bootle, 
2013, p.1383) and often reflects a time of evolution from physically focused goals to 
establishing independence and then finally returning to “real living” (Wood et al., 2010, 
p.1048).  Health professionals and services have been found to influence the success of 
transitioning from hospital although the mechanisms for this are unclear (Turner et al., 
2008).   Thus the relationship between personal, psychological, social or environmental 
factors and embodiment are currently vague, but given their influence on other aspects of 
the transition experience, they are likely to play a role in the embodied experience.  
Despite much research focused on transition from hospital after stroke, there is little 
understanding of the embodied experience (Pringle, Hendry, & McLafferty, 2008). 
 
 2.6 Summary 
The embodied experience of post-acute stroke, particularly during the transition 
from hospital to the community, remains elusive in theoretical models of rehabilitation. 
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Though common themes of the bodily experience of stroke have been identified, the notion 
of embodiment remains poorly defined and dominated by discourse on the objectively-
perceived and physical body.  The experience of stroke continues to be compartmentalized 
as is reflected in the organization of stroke rehabilitation services and research literature.  
Transition from hospital has been described by stroke survivors as a challenging time and 
is often associated with reflections of the self, hence is an important time in which to 
consider capricious experiences of one’s body.  This study further explored the embodied 
experience of stroke one month after leaving hospital.  It is hoped that this thesis will add 
to current knowledge and contribute to future theoretical models so that the embodied 
experience can be integral to physiotherapy stroke rehabilitation practice. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Methods 
 
 3.1 Introduction 
A constructivist approach to grounded theory as described by Charmaz (2006) was 
utilised to develop a theoretical model of embodiment in the transition to life after stroke.  
Seven interviews were conducted with people over age 65 one month after discharge from 
hospital following a first stroke.  Scientific rigour was promoted through a variety of 
methods widely accepted in grounded theory.  Ethical issues regarding peer review, 
recruitment and competence were satisfactorily addressed and approval was granted by the 
relevant ethics committee.  This chapter will describe and explain the selected 
methodology and methods in further detail.  First however, in order to understand the 
rationale for the methodology, I establish my theoretical perspective as a researcher. 
 
3.2 Philosophical and theoretical perspectives 
Grounded theory is an established approach to qualitative research.  However, 
dispute exists as to exactly how grounded theory be conducted under particular conditions 
(Crotty, 1998; Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2008).  Furthermore, a number of differing 
philosophical and theoretical perspectives exist underpinning what is called grounded 
theory.  This study utilized a constructivist epistemology to grounded theory with a 
relativist ontology.  The theoretical perspective behind this methodology was that of 
symbolic interactionism.  This section serves to explain these terms, describes the 
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foundations of grounded theory, and justifies why this approach and perspective was 
endorsed for this particular research question. 
 
 3.2.1 Justification for grounded theory  
Grounded theory was selected as the specific qualitative research method as it 
enables generation of research-based knowledge about the behavioural patterns that shape 
social processes (Glaser & Strauss, 1970).  Grounded theory is an approach where 
conceptual frameworks or theories are developed from information ‘grounded’ in the data.  
A theory can be defined as a “set of well-developed concepts related through statements of 
relationship, which together constitute an integrated framework that can be used to explain 
or predict phenomena” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.15).  Theories developed from this 
method are usually substantive where the contexts are expansive, such as in the experience 
of stroke.  A further rationale for grounded theory for this study is that it serves to explain 
what is being expressed rather than being based on a priori orientation.  This is especially 
pertinent when researching the notion of embodiment in stroke, where there are currently 
no widely established theories (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000; Faircloth et al., 2004a; Wilde, 1999).   
Alternative qualitative approaches such as phenomenology or ethnographic research, 
although still aimed at gaining a more in-depth understanding of human experience, do not 
aim to develop theory.  Furthermore, grounded theory is underpinned by an inductive 
approach to data collection whereby the researcher does not set out to either prove or 
disprove ideas or hypotheses (Mills et al., 2008).  Thus grounded theory provides a 
structured approach to actively position the researcher as the author of a reconstruction of 
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participant experience and meaning (Charmaz, 2006) with intertwined analysis and theory 
development (Mills et al., 2008).  Therefore grounded theory methodology provides a 
logical approach for advancing theory of the relatively poorly understood concept of 
embodiment for stroke survivors.  
 
History of grounded theory 
Grounded theory has evolved into an established approach with systematic, explicit 
processes for theory development.  It was first developed in the 1960s by Barney Glaser 
and Anselm Strauss, whilst exploring the experience of dying (Charmaz, 2006).  It was 
during this study that grounded theory methodology began to coalesce, resulting in the 
documentation of methods for systematically generating new theory from data.  This 
notion of generating theory, while simultaneously collecting and analysing data resonated 
with other social scientists looking for a more robust approach to qualitative theory 
development and the approach became increasingly popular (Kennedy & Lingard, 2006).  
Since this first generation of grounded theorists, a number of subsequent theorists have 
established their own interpretations and approaches to grounded theory including Corbin, 
Clarke, and Charmaz (2006).  Each of these theorists have taken their own philosophical 
stance but all have been underpinned by the use of inductive analysis to develop 
conceptual frameworks or theories (Charmaz, 2006).  Grounded theory is also consistently 
characterized by the fusion of data collection and analysis, shaping of data collection by 
initial data analysis, and the detailed systematic procedures for data collection, analysis and 
theorizing.  Despite these commonalities, a number of interpretations of grounded theory 
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exist, each with associated guidelines.  Each interpretation differs on a number of 
fundamental aspects of grounded theory both at philosophical and procedural levels (Mills 
et al., 2008).  Hence when employing grounded theory it is necessary to specify 
epistemological, ontological and theoretical assumptions.   
 
 3.2.2 Relativist ontology  
Ontology is the study of being and existence; the beliefs regarding what is reality.  
A relativist approach assumes that multiple realities exist.  This approach is advocated by 
grounded theorist, Charmaz (2006) who considers the context of participants’ responses, 
including the social context, as important.  This is well suited to exploring individuals’ 
experiences of embodiment which are likely to be dependent on their unique situation.  
Given the complexity of human experience it seems incongruous to presume that there will 
be only one ‘true’ version or correct interpretation of reality.  This view is contrary to that 
of Glaser and Strauss who took a stance of critical realism which assumed that although an 
objective reality exists this reality can only be perceived imperfectly (Mills et al., 2008), 
therefore a ‘real’ or ‘true’ social reality is surmised.  Given that every participant has a 
unique stroke experience and a unique journey to recovery (Cott, 2004) it is unlikely that 
there will be one single social reality of embodiment in the transition to life after stroke.  
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 3.2.3 Constructivist epistemology  
Epistemology relates to the nature of knowledge and meaning. Whereas ontology 
relates to beliefs about what constitutes reality, epistemology relates to how we make sense 
of reality.  A constructivist epistemology is a belief that people construct the realities in 
which they participate and that meaning is not presumed to reside in objects (Crotty, 1998).  
In Charmaz’s interpretation this means that “both data and analysis are seen as created 
from shared experiences and relationships with participants” (Charmaz, 2006, p.130).  This 
approach rejects the belief that the researcher can be entirely neutral and objective in their 
extraction of data and theory development as pioneering grounded theorists advocated 
(Mills et al., 2008).  The stance of Charmaz resonated well with me as a researcher.  I was 
already embedded in my clinical role working with stroke survivors and, as a postgraduate 
student, I had extensive exposure to research exploring peoples’ experiences following 
stroke.  Therefore my ability to be impartial and objective was contestable.   It would have 
been naïve to assume that I could separate myself entirely from my inner beliefs, 
preconceptions and approach with this client group.  The way I conducted interviews and 
interpreted data was specific to my construction of meaning.  Furthermore, the way in 
which participants expressed themselves was constructed in their interpretation of their 
reality at that moment in time and hence knowledge was clearly socially constructed by 
them also.  A constructivist approach recognizes this shared experience and relationship I 
had with participants when questioning them about embodiment following their stroke. 
 
A constructivist approach is contrary to ‘objectivism’ and ‘subjectivism’ which are 
alternative epistemological approaches.  Objectivism views that objects exist as 
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meaningful entities with truth being separate from experience and consciousness and sees 
data as real and independent from the processes of their production (Crotty, 1998).  This 
infers that the researcher is a neutral observer.  These notions are not complementary to my 
research question as the purpose was not to seek ‘one truth’ through neutral observation, 
but to better understand complex experiences.  Conversely, subjectivism views that 
meaning is imposed onto objects by the researcher, rather than being constructed through 
the interaction between the subject and the object (Crotty, 1998).  Thus subjectivism 
emphasises the thoughts of the researcher as opposed to the relationship with the real 
world, as constructionism aspires.  In this study I was expressing my understanding of the 
stroke survivors’ reports of their experiences, and in turn, they were expressing their 
understanding of their experiences of the world.  Therefore, together, the research 
participants and I co-constructed the knowledge which developed into the findings for this 
study; a constructivist epistemology. 
 
 3.2.4 Symbolic interactionism as theoretical perspective 
Theoretical perspective is the philosophical stance underpinning a methodology, 
providing context for the process involved and a basis for its logic (Crotty, 1998, p.16).  
Symbolic interactionism is defined by Charmaz (2006) as “a theoretical perspective 
derived from pragmatism which assumes that people construct selves, society, and reality 
through interaction” (p.189).  This perspective postulates that “meanings arise out of 
actions, and in turn influence actions” (Charmaz, 2006, p.189).  This philosophical position 
appears appropriate for the exploration of stroke survivors’ experiences where peoples’ 
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construct of their body is likely to be inextricably linked with their interactions; both 
internally within themselves and externally in the world. Similarly symbolic interactionism 
also relates to my understanding as the interviewer of participants’ words and my 
subsequent analysis of their dialogue, recognizing that theory development will be 
intimately entwined with my interaction and active quest for meaning.  This is an 
acknowledgement that the way I interviewed participants and how I interpreted what was 
said, shaped theory development.  A symbolic interactionist approach to grounded theory 
therefore acknowledges that active processes are involved for people to create and mediate 
meanings of their stroke experience.   
 
Symbolic interactionism is contrary to positivism and post-positivism which is the 
theoretical perspective that underpinned earlier grounded theorist’s work.  Positivism 
asserts that scientific research serves to discover objective things through neutral 
observation (Crotty, 1998).  Post-positivism questions the absoluteness of positivism 
including the ability to make neutral observations.  However, post-positivism still alleges 
that there is an objective reality to be observed (Crotty, 1998).  The idea of an objective 
reality is an inappropriate perspective for study of stroke survivor’s experiences which 
relies on interpretations of events and situations.  Conversely Charmaz’s approach to 
grounded theory underpinned by symbolic interactionism emphasises interpretive 
understanding of the participants experience with a co-creation of grounded theory 
(Charmaz, 2006).  Therefore the researcher is not considered independent from that which 
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Symbolic interactionism recognizes that the researcher is likely to have undertaken 
some prior reading around the topic leading to the generation of a research question.  
Unlike Glaserian grounded theorists, Charmaz does not consider that this prior reading 
necessarily contaminates the analysis (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007).  Instead Charmaz states 
that “preconceived theoretical concepts may provide starting points for looking at your 
data but they do not offer automatic codes for analyzing these data” (Charmaz, 2006, p.68).  
To compose this research question I had already become familiar with the area of 
embodiment and transition in stroke survivors through the existing research literature.  
However, when it came to data analysis I distanced myself from the literature, by not 
reading any publications during this time, to allow a more inductive approach to analysis to 
occur whereby theory emerged from the data as opposed to data being a means of theory 
verification.  This process illustrates how these philosophical and theoretical assumptions 
impacted on methodological decisions and resonated throughout the research process. 
  
3.3 Methods 
The methodology process is represented in Figure 1.  The concurrent data 
collection and analysis illustrated is a crucial defining feature of grounded theory.
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Theoretical sampling 
- Recruiters advised of refined 
sampling criteria 
- Revision of interview guide 
 
Thesis write up 
- Comparison of theoretical framework with existing 
literature 
- Summary of study findings sent to participants 
- Thesis write up  
 
- Data analysis 
- Initial coding of transcript 
- Peer coding 100% of transcripts 
- Codes analyzed and developed 
- Cross coding between transcripts 
- Codes formed into theoretical framework 
- Concepts tested and revised on subsequent 
interviews 




- Participants contacted weekly via phone for first 
3 weeks after discharge home 
- Phone calls digitally recorded and memos taken 
- Interviews undertaken with participants (+/- 
family member) in own home  





- Training of recruiters working on stroke 
ward 
- Recruiters identify participants and give 
information sheet 
- Purposeful sampling with initial 
participants. 
- Theoretical sampling with later recruits  
- Recruiters advise me of potential 
participants  
- Prior to hospital discharge I met with 
participants  
- Informed consent form signed 
 
 
Figure 1: Application of Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2006) in this study 
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3.3.1 Recruitment of participants 
Potential participants were identified by two recruiters working on the stroke 
rehabilitation ward at the Princess Margaret Hospital in Christchurch, New Zealand.  
Recruiters were full-time physiotherapists who were treating the potential participants and 
could readily determine if potential participants met the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the 
study. Recruiters were instructed on the overview of the study (see Appendix 1 for recruiter 
information sheet) but otherwise had no vested interest in the research project.  The recruiters 
were provided with a resource folder including all the information sheets and inclusion criteria 
checklist.  They approached potential participants and informed them of the study but made it 
clear that participation was entirely optional and the decision would not influence their care in 
any way.  If potential participants were interested in receiving further information, recruiters 
provided the participant information sheet (see Appendix 2) and notified me.  I then arranged 
to meet potential participants in person on the ward.  At this stage I iterated the content of the 
information sheet verbally with potential participants and checked their understanding of what 
was involved if they were to participate.  If the potential participant remained interested in the 
study and met the inclusion criteria then written consent was obtained by all participants at 
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Inclusion/exclusion criteria 
People were eligible to participate in this study if they were in hospital for a first time 
stroke, and were either over the age of 55 years if they were Māori and Pacific Islanders or 
over the age of 65 if they were of another ethnicity.  The decision to recruit only first-time 
stroke survivors was made to focus the study more specifically on initial experiences of stroke.  
The inclusion criteria related to age and ethnicity reflected the admission criteria for the 
Community Stroke Rehabilitation Service of the Canterbury District Health Board.  This 
criteria is justified because of the disparity for age of onset for stroke which exist between NZ 
European and Māori or Pacific Island populations (Dyall et al., 2008; Feigin et al., 2006).   
 
Participants also needed to self-identify as having experienced a significant change in 
physical ability since their stroke.  The purpose of this criterion was to focus the study on 
exploration of the experiences of people with stroke regarding body changes, so if they felt 
they had experienced no physical changes their experience would not inform this research 
question substantially.  People also needed to have the capacity to consent to participate in the 
study.  Judgement of capacity to consent was made on the basis of functional evaluation of 
their cognitive abilities.  This evaluation was conducted by the recruiting physiotherapist 
based on their professional expertise and the clinical records to which they had access.  
Cognition was routinely considered by the recruiting physiotherapists in conjunction with their 
team as part of discharge planning.  Although no formal screen of cognition was conducted for 
the purposes of this study, the knowledge the recruiting physiotherapists had of the person, 
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combined with the person’s ability to engage with me during our initial meeting was deemed 
to provide sufficient functional indication of their ability to consent and participate.  People 
with aphasia were included if cognition was otherwise intact. 
 
Recruiters were advised to exclude people who were medically unwell based on 
medical team assessment, or lived outside of the Greater Christchurch area.  People were 
excluded who were unable to communicate in English.  
 
Sampling techniques 
Purposeful sampling was initially used to select the first two participants to allow a 
starting point from which theory could grow.  This is an accepted technique to maximize 
possibilities of obtaining data by starting with a sample where the phenomenon being 
researched is known to occur (Coyne, 1997).  The criteria described in ‘Inclusion/exclusion 
criteria’ were the only parameters stipulated to recruiters for the first two participants.  
Subsequent participants however were selected using theoretical sampling.    
 
Theoretical sampling is particular to grounded theory and is integral to the constant 
comparative method whereby initial data analysis informs subsequent decisions regarding 
what data needs to be collected next and from which specific sources (Charmaz, 2006). This 
meant that I, in collaboration with my supervisors, made strategic decisions about which 
participants were likely to provide the most information-rich data to meet the analytical needs 
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of the study.  For instance, at one stage people were sought who had experienced severe 
physical weakness from their stroke.  This was achieved through regular discussion with the 
recruiters and made it necessary to stagger participant recruitment to allow time to develop 
emergent categories and modify selection criteria accordingly.  Recruitment continued until 
theoretical saturation was reached.  Theoretical saturation is “the point at which gathering 
more data about a theoretical category reveals no new properties nor yields any further 
insights about the emerging grounded theory” (Charmaz, 2006, p.189).  Controversy exists as 
to whether theoretical saturation can truly ever be reached, or if it is possible to objectively 
determine when data saturation might be reached (Hallberg, 2006).  From a pragmatic 
perspective however, it has been suggested that theoretical saturation can be considered when 
collecting further data is counterproductive in that it offers no further explanation to the 
emergent theory (Mellion & Tovin, 2002).  This study adopted the stance to theoretical 
saturation of Charmaz and stopped recruitment when no new categories were being generated 
from the data, at which point seven participants had been interviewed.   
 
In my role as physiotherapist with the Community Stroke Rehabilitation Service in 
Christchurch I would usually work with a number of the participants recruited on their return 
home.  However, to ensure there was no conflict of interest it was arranged that all participants 
recruited into the study were treated by another physiotherapist in the service.  It was made 
explicit that in my role as researcher I would not be providing any rehabilitation advice to 
participants and would redirect them to discuss with their health care providers any issues that 
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arose.  Furthermore, all information gained from participants was treated as confidential, 
although participants were aware their General Practitioner could have been contacted if any 
concerns around participants’ personal safety arose such as suicidal ideation.  Confidentiality 
was important as it allowed participants to talk openly with me as a researcher rather than a 
health professional, potentially allowing them to disclose more information whilst aiding them 
to be at ease.  Participants were aware that I was a physiotherapist but no details of my role 
were provided until after the interview was complete. 
 
 3.3.2 Data collection 
Basic demographic data of participants was collected by myself from hospital records 
including age, ethnicity, stroke type, length of hospitalisation, residential status, and functional 
ability. This information served to provide descriptive and contextual information about the 
subjects and included;   
• Stroke type.  This was recorded as either haemorrhage location or using the 
Oxfordshire Stroke Classification Project system (Bamford et al., 1991) if it was an infarct, 
which is the standard classification used by the CDHB.  This system classifies according to 
stroke location in the brain, which indicates the nature of stroke impairment (see Table 2).   
• Length of hospital stay.  This was recorded to provide proxy indication of 
stroke complexity which may have impacted on participants embodied experience.  
• Residential status post discharge. This was captured as being either living 
alone, living with others, rest home or hospital level care.  This provided an indication of the 
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environment into which participants were transitioning. Note that I am referring to all these 
discharge destinations as being participants’ home throughout this thesis.   
• Functional ability.  This was captured via the Barthel Index.  The Barthel Index 
of Activities of Daily Living is a measure of 10 common activities of daily living (Collin, 
Wade, Davies, & Horne, 1988) which was completed by me based on their hospital records.  It 
is generally accepted as a reliable and valid measure of functional ability for the descriptive 
purposes of this study (Salter et al., 2005).   
 
Table 2: Oxfordshire Community Stroke Project classification for ischaemic stroke (Bamford 
et al., 1991) 




New higher cerebral dysfunction (dysphasia, dyscalculia, 
visuospatial disorders) 
Homonymous visual field defect 
Ipsilateral motor and/or sensory deficit of at least 2 areas of face, 




Pure motor stroke (most common) OR 





Only 2 symptoms of TACI OR 
Higher cerebral dysfunction alone OR 






Ipsilateral cranial nerve palsy with contralateral motor/sensory 
deficit 
Bilateral motor/sensory deficit 
Disorder of conjugate eye movement 
Cerebellar dysfunction without ipsilateral long tract deficit 
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Participants were contacted via phone by myself on a weekly basis for the first three 
weeks of their return home (i.e. three calls per participant prior to the much more extended 
semi-structured interview).  It has been suggested that this type of prolonged engagement with 
research participants can enhance the depth of relationship between participants and 
researchers, and therefore enhance the credibility of the research (Charmaz, 2006).  From a 
constructivist epistemology, the richness of the data generated from an interview is dependent 
in part on the relationships between the researcher and participants. The phone calls were 
audio-recorded and transcribed.  This phone contact was structured with questions focused on 
an overview of their week, perceptions of physical activity and discussing any observations 
they had made regarding their body (see Appendix 3 for phone guide).  The purpose of these 
initial phone calls was three-fold: 1) to build rapport with the participant prior to the main 
interview, 2) to gather information about their initial experiences of their body and attempting 
to return to physical activity after discharge from hospital, and 3) to provide contextual 
information about the participants lives to inform the development of the main interview 
questions.  The length of the phone calls was intended to be brief and ranged from 2 minutes 
44 seconds to 11 minutes and 11 seconds.  On average phone interviews were six minutes. As 
intended, I perceived that the interviews enhanced rapport and therefore the credibility of this 
constructivist grounded theory study.   
 
At one month post-discharge a date was agreed with the participants for the completion 
of the semi-structured interview.  This interview was unique for each participant, consisting of 
 
  
  62 
 
open and non-directive interview questions, but was based on an interview schedule which 
centred on the experience that participants had had of their body since their stroke (see 
Appendix 4).  Questions were initially developed from theoretical concepts alluded to in 
existing research.  The interviews were conducted at a location of the participants’ choosing 
which in all cases was in their own home. This was undertaken so that each interview was held 
where participants felt most comfortable and therefore most open to reflection and 
conversation.  The interviews lasted between 32 and 69 minutes, and were digitally recorded 
then later transcribed verbatim.  Pseudonyms were used for all participants and any identifying 
information (e.g. names of places or organisations) was replaced by non-identifying 
descriptive terms to maintain anonymity. 
 
As a novice researcher, developing interviewing skills to facilitate rich data collection 
was paramount.  I therefore undertook a preparatory practice interview with one of my 
relatives to check the flow and content of the interview guide questions.  This process 
prompted me to further develop the introduction to the interview in order to better prime 
participants to the style of interview, plus to develop an exit section to ensure the session was 
terminated in a non-abrupt manner.  Throughout the data collection process regular 
supervision occurred to help enrich my interview skills and to develop successive interviews.  
Although all interviews were founded on a single interview guide the line of questioning was 
tailored to each participant and evolved as the study progressed in relation to emergent 
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categories.  This evolution of questioning is another feature of theoretical sampling (Charmaz, 
2006) and enables theory development which is grounded in the data. 
 
 3.3.3 Data analysis 
Data analysis followed the constant comparative method of grounded theory.  The 
data, transcribed verbatim by myself (see Appendix 8 for key to transcription conventions), 
from the semi-structured interviews was exported into qualitative data analysis software 
NVivo (QSR International Pty Ltd, 2012), where it was manually coded and categorized using 
the constant comparative method.  The relationship between identified codes and categories 
was explored with increasing levels of abstraction of the data.  This involved utilizing initial 
coding (Charmaz, 2006) which was open, remained close to the data and was completed 
quickly.  Next, focused coding (Charmaz, 2006) was utilized which was more conceptual in 
nature and involved sifting through codes to find the most significant and frequent codes.  At 
this stage there was much time spent back and forth between each participant’s data to check 
emergent coding both at the initial and focused level.  Finally axial coding (Charmaz, 2006) 
was employed in which categories were related to subcategories, thus recognizing the 
interplay of categories.  Throughout this process, as well as before and after data collection, I 
used journaling and memos to document development of ideas.  Part of this analysis process 
required me to move from inductive analysis towards abductive reasoning in which I 
attempted to consider “all possible theoretical explanations for the data, forming hypotheses 
for each possible explanation, checking them empirically by examining data, and pursuing the 
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most plausible explanation” (Charmaz, 2006, p.104).  These coding practices were not a linear 
process but a dynamic process moving between codes and participants.  Memos were written 
throughout all levels of coding on any emerging ideas.  All transcripts were peer coded by my 
supervisors and emerging themes discussed regularly with supervisors.  Collectively this 
process facilitated theories to be constructed rather than discovered (Charmaz, 2006).  Use of 
the constant comparative method meant that there was a fluid interplay between data 
collection, methodology and analysis with theory development being entwined throughout.   
 
 3.3.4 Scientific rigour 
Standards for rigour have been accepted by grounded theorists to increase 
trustworthiness of findings however processes vary between theorists.  For this study the 
processes advocated by Charmaz (2006) were used.  Charmaz (2006) advocates for the criteria 
of credibility, originality, resonance, and usefulness – all underpinned by reflexivity to 
enhance trustworthiness.  These elements recognize that there is interpretation and subjectivity 




Reflexivity can be considered as a scrutiny and transparency which the researcher 
provides (Hall & Callery, 2001).  Transparency in my preconceptions as a researcher, was 
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promoted through the widely accepted strategies of journaling, memo writing, audit trail 
through NVivo (QSR International Pty Ltd, 2012) software, peer debriefing and engaging in 
reflexive self-awareness.  A presuppositions interview with an independent, experienced 
scholar was undertaken to facilitate this reflexive self-awareness.  The interviewer prompted 
self-reflection on being both a researcher and a practitioner and the potential impact this might 
have on how I questioned participants and interpreted their words.  Furthermore it compelled 
me to consider the potential dilemmas for participants seeking professional advice from me 
and the potential impact of emotion evoking interviews on participants.  At times participants 
were asked to discuss sensitive feelings and issues.  As a healthcare practitioner it was 
counterintuitive not to validate or respond to these experiences as I felt conditioned to address 
these issues through rehabilitation input.  However, through debriefing and journaling I 
developed my skills as an empathetic listener and structured the interview in such a way to 
allow natural closure.  Reflexive preparations for interviewing also crystallized for me the 
need to allow participants to talk tangentially from my questions in order to express more 
deeply held reflections.  My insights described here have been echoed by other authors 
undertaking research as a clinician (Conneeley, 2002). 
 
Credibility 
Credibility refers to whether there is sufficient evidence to support the claims made 
(Charmaz, 2006).  It relates to how believable reported findings are regarding the phenomenon 
under discussion.  Methods for enhancing credibility that were used in this study included; 
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• Allowing participants to guide the enquiry process through open questioning 
and exploring statements they made. 
• Checking generated theoretical construction against participants’ meanings of 
the phenomenon by directing questioning to subsequent participants. 
• Using participants’ actual words in the theory.  Similarly using extended 
extracts from the interviews to illustrate that the proposed theory was in fact grounded in 
participants’ statements.  
• Articulating my personal views and insights regarding the phenomenon 
explored.  This included writing memos to document emerging ideas, log booking and regular 
supervision sessions to discuss emerging ideas and explore the way in which prior knowledge 
may be imposing on the data.  This promoted systematic comparisons and a clear attendance 
to the process of theory construction every step of the way. 
• Peer coding where data was coded independently by me and then 
independently coded by my supervisors.  This was so data could be checked for clear 
emergent themes and to enrich the analysis process.   
 
Originality 
Originality refers to whether categories provide new insight (Charmaz, 2006).  This 
involved reviewing existing literature surrounding stroke, embodiment and transition to both 
provide a theoretical frame of reference and to establish gaps in understanding.  As already 
highlighted controversy exists around the place of the literature review in grounded theory 
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research.  Consistent with Charmaz’s stance, some reading was undertaken prior to data 
collection, and then a more focused and in-depth review of the literature was undertaken after 
categories and theories had emerged.  A “theoretical agnosticism” (Henwood & Pidgeon, 
2003, p.138) was attempted whereby I took a critical stance towards earlier theories.  This 
confirmed that the emergent theory was able to provide new insights into the area of 
embodiment in the transition to life after stroke, and minimized the chance of re-discovering 
and re-labelling previously established ideas and theories. 
 
Resonance 
Resonance refers to whether the categories portray the fullness of the studied 
experience (Charmaz, 2006).  This was again achieved through the process of theoretical 
sampling whereby progressive interviews were targeted to enhance or reject an emergent 
category.  Furthermore, open questioning ensured participants were able to freely express their 
experience.  Resonance was further enhanced by member checking through sending a 
summary of findings to participants and allowing opportunity for them to respond.  See 
Appendix 5 for the summary of findings provided to participants.  No objections were made 
by participants and the feedback received stated “I have learnt to slow down and take each day 
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Usefulness 
Usefulness refers to whether the theory offers interpretations that people can use in 
their everyday worlds (Charmaz, 2006).  This was challenging to judge until research findings 
were formally disseminated.  However during presentations of preliminary findings to 
colleagues, the topic resonated with their practice from questions, discussions and informal 
feedback received.  For me, this research question was deeply entwined with the role that I 
worked in at the time, and emerged from a lack of understanding regarding embodiment in 
stroke.  Therefore to me this study is directly relevant for the people who deliver services such 
as the Community Stroke Rehabilitation Service.  Similarly participants expressed in 
interviews a strong desire to share their experiences in order to help other stroke survivors, 
suggesting they too placed value on better understanding the experience of stroke.  Knowledge 
in this area of embodiment post-stroke serves to enhance current understanding, but also 
serves as a platform from which further knowledge can grow.   
 
3.4 Ethical and cultural considerations 
The research received ethical approval from University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee (Health) on 6th September 2013 (Reference: H13/060, see Appendix 6).  The 
Committee requested clarification on the level of peer review, recruitment process, and 
assessment of cognitive competence of participants.  Peer review was provided by the 
Rehabilitation Board of Studies (University of Otago) at the time the research proposal was 
developed.  Ongoing supervisory support was provided from Dr Fiona Graham and Dr 
 
  
  69 
 
William Levack.  The recruitment process and evaluation of intact cognition/competence was 
also clarified as per section 3.3.1. 
 
The research received an endorsement from Ngai Tahu Research Consultation 
Committee on 23rd July 2013 (see Appendix 7).  The committee suggested that ethnicity data 
be collected, and liaison with the Māori Research Advisor at the University of Otago, 
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Chapter 4: Results 
 4.1 Introduction 
Eight people were approached to participate in the study over a period of three months.  
One individual in the post-discharge phase of the study decided against participating when he 
was contacted by phone.  Therefore a total of seven participants were interviewed ranging in 
age from 66 to 89 years old, five being men, and two being women, all of New Zealand 
European ethnicity.  Participants’ stroke type, length of admission and circumstances varied 
and are summarized in Table 3.  Two participants chose to have their spouse present during 
the interview, both of whom contributed minimally to the conversation and spousal input was 
not coded.  To maintain confidentiality descriptive information has been kept to a minimum 
and each participant has been given a pseudonym. 
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Table 3: Overview of participants 
Pseudonym Age Stroke type3 Length of hospital stay 
(weeks) 
Residential status at time of 
interview 
Barthel Index on 
hospital discharge 
Matthew 79 Right posterior circulatory 
infarct 
4  Alone in own home 95/100 (mild) 
George 84 Left posterior circulatory 
infarct 
7  With wife in own home 95/100 (mild) 
Grace 89 Right partial anterior 
circulatory infarct 
12 Private hospital facility 30/100 (severe) 
Helena 78 Right partial anterior 
circulatory infarct 
6  With daughter in own home 80/100 (mild) 
Peter 69 Right posterior circulatory 
infarct 
6  Alone in own home 95/100 (mild) 
Michael 66 Right lacunar circulatory 
infarct 
10 With wife in own home 65/100 (moderate) 
Don 79 Left total anterior 
circulatory infarct 
4  With wife in own home 25/100 (severe) 
                                                 
3 Oxfordshire Classification (Bamford et al., 1991) 
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4.2 Overview of theoretical model 
The core experience of the embodied self after stroke for participants one month 
following discharge from hospital was being in a state of flux between having a ‘divergent 
body-self’, that is ‘this body and me’, through to having a ‘cohesive body-self’, where there 
was a sense that ‘it’s all me’, illustrated in Figure 2.  Flux refers to the flowing and movement 
of emphasis and awareness that occurred between these concepts.  The ‘cohesive body-self’ 
was related to a sense of control and freedom, both literally in terms of the control of one’s 
body, but also more abstractly in relation to personal agency such as independence and control 
over decisions.  The ‘cohesive body-self’ also related to an individual’s sense of identity 
which, for some, remained a constant, and for others, was redefined.  Conversely, a ‘divergent 
body-self’ whereby participants described their body being disjointed from their personhood, 
was associated with a sense of bodily strangeness and a body which was both unpredictable 
and effortful. The ‘divergent’ and ‘cohesive’ body-selves, though opposing conceptually, were 
not mutually exclusive, and can therefore be considered as orthogonal.  Orthogonal means 
having a set of mutually perpendicular axes, so that people could experience concurrently high 
or low divergence or cohesion in their body.  Thus divergence and cohesion did not sit at 
opposite ends of a spectrum, but instead were states which participants fluxed between both 
throughout the interview process, but also gradually over time.  Similarly these ‘states’ were 
not necessarily polar emotionally.  Although there was a tendency for the ‘cohesive body-self’ 
to be referred to positively, the ‘divergent body-self’ could, at times be referenced in a 
comfortable and positive light also.  This state of flux was especially apparent through 
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contradictions participants made within interviews regarding their sense of having a different 
body, yet feeling a familiar sense of self, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter.  
 
Participants described a range of factors that appeared to ground and thus reassuringly 
‘anchor’ them within what was often a confusing and surreal experience.  ‘Anchors’ included 
the individual’s knowledge, attitude and their environment both social and physical. These 
factors anchored participants to a more real and coherent bodily experience.  These themes 

















Figure 2: Theoretical representation of the embodied experience for stroke 
survivors transitioning from hospital 
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4.3 A Divergent body-self  
The post-stroke body was frequently viewed as separate to the participant’s sense 
of self, represented by the theme, a ‘divergent body-self’.  This theme encapsulates how 
participants identified a body which felt distant, and profoundly different from their sense 
of self.  Consequently there was a disruption to the continuity of the participants’ sense of 
‘me’ from pre- to post-stroke, with their bodies having become viewed as foreign and 
separate.  Within this theme, participants described a body which was strange, 
unpredictable and effortful.  Bodily strangeness included objectification of the body, a 
sense of an unreal experience, or simply a body which felt strange.  The unpredictable 
body encompassed both a lack of bodily control and a body which could not be predicted, 
usually due to fatigue and uncontrolled movement.  The effortful body included the 
struggle of bodily movement, a body which demanded concentration and a body which 
was slow to act, or follow the participant’s will.  Many participants described moments of 
familiarity with their strange, unpredictable and effortful bodies.  However, this was not a 
static or linear experience.  Instead, the experience of a divergent body-self would fluctuate 
back and forth between a more familiar and united body-self; the ‘cohesive body-self’.  
This section describes and explains participants’ experiences of having a ‘divergent body-
self’ following stroke. 
 
 4.3.1 Bodily strangeness 
A common view expressed by participants was that their post-stroke body was not 
only different but strange to them.  Strangeness was experienced by all participants despite 
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a broad range of stroke types and physical effects from their strokes.  Participants would 
state simply how “it’s just strange” (Michael).  The experience of strangeness was 
challenging for some participants to explain and was often associated with frustration, but 
also at times, with curiosity.  For instance Peter reported a profound strangeness when he 
tried to explain the weakness in his left leg;  
Oh, I don’t know how to describe it really.  It won’t do what you want it to do 
most times, you know.  You want it to, it’s a strange feeling to have it not 
connecting with your brain.  And you take it as, when you’re normal, that’s not 
there when you’re normal.  How can I say it?  You don’t think anything about 
it.  When you’re wanting to try and do something, and it won’t let you do it.  
It’s the strangest feeling in the world. 
Here Peter identified the strangeness of his leg “not connecting” with his brain but 
yet emphasized the inexplicability of the strangeness.  He also highlighted how, prior to the 
stroke, he had not ever thought about how his body felt connected – it was simply 
“normal”.  The stroke however had caused a disconnection between what he was asking of 
his body and what it did, creating strangeness of his own body.   
 
Altered sensations 
Some participants were able to isolate a specific reason why their body felt strange 
to them.  One reason was that their bodies produced physically new or different sensations 
than they had previously experienced.  For instance when Peter was asked if his 
strangeness was lessening as he was getting stronger (10 weeks after his stroke) he stated;    
I don’t think so.  It’s still, I’ve still got that, no I don’t think so.  It’s still feeling 
very strange to me.  Very strange to me.  It’s always cold, my foot’s always 
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cold.  I feel like I’m grizzling but I’m not really.  I don‘t know how to answer 
that really, to be quite frank with you.  
The inexplicability of the strangeness prevailed.  Peter divided himself from his 
body which felt strange stating “very strange to me” rather than ‘I feel strange’.  This 
statement infers he did not feel strange in his sense of self, just in his body.  Peter did 
attempt to qualify his statement by describing altered sensation, although he suggested, that 
like the disconnection between his mind and body, the altered sensation is just one 
component of the strangeness.  However, other participants attributed their bodily 
strangeness specifically to altered sensations such as changed spatial awareness or visual 
changes.  Altered sensations were quite subtle for some but yet still perceptible.  For 
instance, George, who had had a posterior circulatory infarct, had quite minor sensory 
changes but still identified a difference in sensation before and after his stroke that was 
significant to him;  
Well they’ve done a lot of tests on me, with pin pricking and that sort of thing 
on both legs and really the difference is very minute.  It’s not very much at all.  
I would know the difference but just [participant’s emphasis] know the 
difference.  So if I’m walking I might throw one foot a little bit off centre 
compared to another one.  But very very little.  Not as though I was gonna put 
a foot out and throw it like that or anything [indicates wide step].  I might just 
put it out and it be a little bit off centre.   
George’s change in sensation was not objectively measurable but was perceivable 
by him and impacted on his familiarity with his body’s movement.  In contrast to this 
subtle change being obviously perceived by George, Matthew had an obvious sensory 
change which he almost forgot about.  Matthew had a left homonymous hemianopia which 
meant he had lost the vision in the left side of both eyes.   He described his experience of 
having a hemianopia as being a strange feeling; 
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Oh it’s just…see I’m looking here now and everything looks normal, even with 
this being blank out here [indicates left side]...Sort of a strange feeling really.  
Why can’t I, you know, reach out? You know I look over there and I think oh 
yeah, everything’s normal.  But I realize I’m turning my head, I’m not looking 
out of the [left] side of my eye. 
For Matthew, he still felt what he was seeing was the same as prior to the stroke, 
and had to consciously remind himself of this bodily change which was a strange 
experience for him.  However, Matthew did not express frustration at this strangeness, 
instead, this was more simply an observation for him.  So despite the high impact of his 
sensory change, Matthew gave little attention to the change in his body.  Whilst Matthew 
was quite accepting of this change, George’s narrative suggested a feeling of shock and 
heightened response as he described an incidence of recognizing different sensations to 
what he had been expecting. 
When one day I picked up, er put my hand in hot water or something and 
picked something up, it was just like electricity running through my right hand 
which is my good one [unaffected arm].  Like electricity.  I had to put it down 
so quick, cos I was going to drop it.  I’ll never be game to do it again.   
This sensory reaction could be considered as minor at an impairment level (World 
Health Organization, 2001), and yet George had a heightened response, like electricity, that 
he had not been expecting and which impacted on George’s day to day life.  He responded 
to this negative bodily experience by making a conscious decision not to undertake that 
activity again.  Thus at times this bodily strangeness was simply an observation, whereas at 
other times it served as a learning experience, such as George learning not to touch hot 
objects with his right hand, or Matthew learning to turn his head.  In this sense, the 
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Objectification 
A specific type of bodily strangeness which occurred for all participants to varying 
degrees was an objectification of their own body.  Although objectifying the body is not 
unique to stroke survivors, the extent that participants did this was profound. Participants 
often talked about a body which was separate to them, referring to their body in the third 
person.  For instance Grace, who had weakness in her left arm, consistently referred to her 
arm as ‘it’ as she talked about the experience of trying to lift her arm;     
See sometimes in the morning I play with this [referring to arm] and make it 
come up [lifts arm] and at some points it hurts, but it is, my son is pleased to 
see me doing this with it. See I lift this now...[attempts to lift arm]…I’m 
disappointed in it [referring to arm]. 
Grace’s reference to her arm indicated a sense of her body being separate to herself 
with Grace being an almost distant operator of her own arm.  Her comment that she was 
disappointed in ’it’ reinforced this separation from her arm which she had personified and 
felt negatively about. Similarly Helena spoke of how her left side ‘disobeyed’ her, and 
again objectified her body as ‘other’, referring to her limbs with the definitive article ‘the’ 
or ‘it’, rather than the more typical possessive ‘my’; 
….the left side um definitely felt as if it wasn’t there, you know.  It was um, 
something you didn’t think about because it wasn’t, the foot wasn’t obeying 
your mind, your directions.  The arm wasn’t obeying directions. 
Like Grace, the way Helena spoke about her own arm suggested a separation or 
distance between her body and mind, with disobedience being suggested when she said 
“the arm wasn’t obeying directions”.  Although Helena consistently objectified her body, 
she used the generic pronoun ‘your’ when referring to her mind, suggesting a separation 
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between her body and mind.  This idea of dualism in body and mind was also expressed by 
Don, who had no use of his right arm after his stroke: 
If we talk a bit more about your right arm; as you’re holding it now, what does 
it feel like?  It’s not very friendly. Not going.  I feel it all the way. 
Don personified his arm with reference to it as “unfriendly” whilst conjuring an 
image of a dichotomised personhood. Don expressed an acrimonious relationship, with the 
stroke-affected body being viewed as hostile.  Examples like this, where the participants’ 
perceived parts of their bodies to be so separate from themselves as to be attributed with 
distinct opinions and intentions, highlights the extent of the experience of bodily distance 
and strangeness after stroke.  The distance and strangeness was also represented by the use 
of similes associated with frustration.  For example, Michael’s description of his stroke-
affected arm; 
It was just like a lump of meat, a heavy lump of meat.  You know you just 
couldn’t move it; it dangled down.  Oh, sometimes it’d get in the road.  It was 
no bloody use at all, especially if you were trying to get dressed.  
Like other participants, Michael was frustrated by the inconvenience of his 
impaired arm on his ability to do tasks like getting dressed.  Michael’s description of his 
arm feeling “like a lump of meat” suggested not only a passivity in his arm, but also a 
deadness.  Phrases such as “a lump of meat” were also used by other participants to 
express distaste and rejection of their own body.  Specifically, George also referred to his 
body as “meat” when describing a significant fall he had whilst in hospital; 
Well what actually happened was that, it was probably my fault, but I’m sure 
they told me I could go to the toilet if I wanted to.  But I was going out to the 
door in the ward, and I go very much to the left, and I banged into the door, 
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those smoke doors which are like concrete and I banged my head and my 
shoulder and I finished up on the floor.  Banged my head again, cracked a rib, 
twisted my neck, hurt my behind down at the bottom; it’s still a bit sore, not 
bad.  What else? Must have been something else (laughs)…I done the lot, yeh.  
A real box of meat.   
The way George described his body as a “real box of meat” suggests a 
depersonalization of his own body as his body is reduced to an extinguished, lifeless 
substance.  The image of his body being a piece of meat also reinforces the notion of 
objectification and strangeness about his own body.  George went on to explain how this 
fall “put him back” in his rehabilitation as his body healed.  Thus there was a mismatch 
between the “meat” of his body, a sort of underperforming, disrespected servant, and his 
own drive to improve, indicated by his attempt to walk to the toilet unsupervised.  
Similarly, Peter used a derogatory simile to represent the image he had of himself when he 
was walking; “Oh, like a loose unit, yeh.  Not a very good image, no, not really a very 
good image”.  Peter’s word choice of “not a very good image” again conveys a negative, 
whilst “a loose unit” pertains to unpredictability, and perceiving himself as being unlike 
others.  Peter’s perception had been reinforced by the physiotherapist in hospital when 
demonstrating to Peter how he walked.   
[The hospital physiotherapist] thought I was walking a lot better, when I went 
up there [to visit hospital].  But she still felt that, she still described it as, 
showed me the way I was walking, and I didn’t like that at all (laughs).  Is that 
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Unreal 
For all participants the incidence of stroke marked a profound line between their 
embodied experience before and after the event, described by several participants as being 
so marked as to be ‘otherworldly’.  George expressed this distinction as like the start of a 
new book; 
Well I said to my daughter, if I was a writer I’d write a book for before the 
stroke and one for after the stroke.  Because I said they’re going to be two 
worlds that are going to be absolutely different, so different.   
Although participants like George were clear in stating that life was different after 
stroke, it was challenging for participants to express exactly what was different in relation 
to their embodied experience.  Indeed participants often spoke of how “unreal” their bodily 
experience had been.  For instance, when asked what it felt like when she was moving, 
Grace stated “it’s unreal”.  She returned to this word “unreal” often and talked of 
struggling to work out what was a dream she had had when sleeping and what was real; 
Do you think of the image you have of yourself and your body that you have in 
your mind, do you think that’s changed from before the stroke to now?  Oh it’s 
bound to have, but I can’t think how; I can’t give you any specifics.  And it’s 
taking me a while to sort of separate the imagination from the real.  And you 
know those dreams I was having, I never knew if they were real or fantasy.    
Although Grace felt there must have been a changed image of her body, she was 
unable to explain it.  Despite this uncertainty between reality and dreams, when Grace 
talked about the image of her recovering brain, she expressed that it was “real”;  
You’ve talked a bit Grace about your brain and the connections that you’re 
visualizing.  Do you have any images in your mind of the connection of your 
brain to your body?  Yes, that’s what I was saying about those little threads 
and the pictures, and there was just so many of them.  And, well not so many, 
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just they were so very vital.  And you could see them trembling there just 
waiting to make a connection.  But they couldn’t, they couldn’t, there were just 
too many, or not enough connections, or whatever.  You know it was sort of a 
feeling I could feel.  Something was really real. 
Grace, like other participants, had an understanding of what was occurring in her 
body on a neurological level which appeared to assist her in making sense of the strange 
experience she was having of her body.  Her description of the very “real” experience of 
her nerve endings “trembling there just waiting” is vivid and powerful.  This is in contrast 
to her “blurred” and “unreal” description of her lived experience, with confusion about 
what was real and what was unreal being echoed in her descriptions of early experiences in 
hospital after stroke; “I don’t know, the rest of it is sort of blurred to me cos the next thing 
I knew I was being offered a bed in the [rehabilitation hospital]”.   
 
This notion of an unreal experience is mirrored by George who stated “I didn’t 
think I was that ill.  But then I was in another world.  I presume.  I don’t know”.  Like 
many participants, Grace and George referred to the early stages after stroke as being a 
“blur” and struggled to recall events in the initial phases after the stroke, including how 
they experienced their body.  The metaphor “in another world” seems to have been used by 
George to express an inexplicable experience.  Grace and George’s statements also 
highlight the ontological aspect of the physical experience of stroke with participants 
questioning their very being and existence.  For instance, Grace stated in the interview that 
“it’s a whole new ballgame” when explaining the changes in her life after her stroke.  Like 
George’s metaphor of life after stroke being like “a new book”, Grace’s expression 
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suggested not only the profound change that the stroke had induced, but a change in what 
existence meant for Grace.   
 
In summary, bodily strangeness encompassed a number of facets.  Strangeness 
could be subtle or obvious, and not necessarily directly related to the severity of physical 
changes. Many participants objectified the affected parts of their body and at times even 
imposed critical judgment on these parts as being disobedient, lazy and passive, with these 
body discourses conveying mostly negative images.  However, the strangeness of their 
own bodies was often inexplicable with many participants describing it simply as unreal or 
otherworldly.   
 
 4.3.2 An Unpredictable Body 
The participants’ experiences of a ‘divergent body-self’ were also apparent in the 
references they made to a post-stroke body which was unpredictable.  This was both in 
terms of a lack of movement control and of being unable to rely on their body, especially 
in moments of tiredness.  This unpredictability impacted on the embodied experience by 
changing how participants viewed their body and the control they had, or the lack of 
control, over their actions.  Helena who had dyspraxia as a result of her stroke, described 
how her arm had become “unpredictable”, as if it had a life of its own;  
My arm is [slaps left arm], I can still feel it, I can feel it, but it’s gone 
unpredictable.  It doesn’t, it isn’t doing this so much [demonstrates wavering 
left arm]; it was knocking the food off my plate or some of it.  And yesterday, 
what did it do yesterday?  Something unpredictable. 
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Helena spoke about her arm as if it were a separate being; one capable of 
generating its own behaviour.  Unpredictability in the body thus overlapped with 
objectification and bodily strangeness.  Helena’s tone reflected being irritated by her arm’s 
apparent insolence as she attempted to eat her dinner.  Furthermore there was an 
implication that this part of her body could not be trusted due to its unpredictability.  The 
divergence between her body and self was further pronounced by the consistent reference 
to her arm as ‘it’.  This suggested that her arm had taken on its own unpredictable identity.    
 
Being careful 
An unpredictable body for many participants related to an experience of a lack of 
control over bodily movements.  This caused participants to be more cautious in activities 
such as walking.  For example, Matthew, who had experienced a fall due to his stroke said 
“you know I’m very careful I don’t trip over.  I’m watching where I’m going, and watchful 
sort of thing” when asked what it felt like for him to walk.     Walking, something which 
usually is assumed as predictable and easy, had become something which demanded 
caution for Matthew.  As a result he had become hyper-vigilant and adopted a role of being 
“watchful” when walking.  Similarly George spoke of his caution when walking; 
Well I’m just very careful…I had this bad habit of going left.  If I was walking 
with this here [points to walking frame], sometimes if I got off balance I was 
likely to be way out here and not leaning way over like that, you know 
[indicates leaning left, then straight].  
George used the past tense to talk about his lack of control in walking suggesting 
this was not such an issue to him at the time of interview.  However, his use of present 
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tense for “I’m just very careful” implied that he continued to exert caution when walking.  
The way that George used the word “habit” suggested that although his walking “going 
left” was not perhaps expected, he had learnt to anticipate this unpredictability.  
Consequently the unpredictable had become predictable for him, with the outcome of him 
being cautious.   
 
The caution reported by Matthew and George appeared to enable them to do 
seemingly risky activities such as bending over and walking.  I asked Matthew what he 
meant by “being careful” to which he replied; 
Well, I go out to get the paper, I’ll be tearing down; not tearing down, but I’ll 
be getting down the drive pretty good...And then when I’m getting the 
[newspaper], when I am getting along, you’re going too fast, you know.  And 
I’ll deliberately slow down, so I am getting the message, don’t worry about 
that. 
This deliberate slowing down suggested that Matthew, like George, had learnt 
strategies to resume control over his body, despite his body remaining unpredictable at 
times.  This had enabled him to get the newspaper from the mailbox without falling like he 
had previously, although these new strategies did require ongoing additional effort to be 
maintained.  This suggests that the embodied experience of the body being predictable 
versus unpredictable was a dynamic process, requiring regular, continuous attention.   
 
Tiredness 
Another common issue which impacted on participants’ body predictability was 
tiredness.  This tiredness could lead to participants being surprised by what their body 
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would do when they were undertaking everyday activities such as walking or shopping.  
Michael described what tiredness after stroke felt like; 
Ooh, heaviness in the eyes and the struggle of the brain to work, you know, 
efficiently and as brightly.  You struggle along.  There’s certain things where 
you can get fogged up with your brain when you’re stressed, I’m not referring 
to that.  But just a, your eyes are tending to be heavy and things like that. 
This tiredness, which had been unpredictable for Michael in hospital, had become 
something familiar to him after several weeks at home.  Michael was able to recognize the 
signs of tiredness and differentiate these from other feelings like stress that he was familiar 
with.  Like other participants, he had learnt to predict the unpredictable in his body.  In 
contrast, Peter suggested that the pattern of his tiredness was not predictable from one day 
to another; 
And the tiredness.  I get very tired.  I’m quite tired today, whereas yesterday I 
was fine and the day before.  But today I’ve got down to a level where I’m 
quite tired.  Nothing mentally but just tired, the body’s just tired. And I thought 
well today I’ll just have a quiet day, sit back.  And that’s been a big thing for 
me.  Mentally I’m alright, and going to, you know I’ve accepted the fact that 
this is what, this has happened, this is what’s happened.  And um, so be it.   
Peter’s comment that “the body’s just tired” suggested a sense of a divergent body 
to what he considered himself.  This sense of divergence was further emphasized by 
Peter’s division of which experiences he considered to be “mental” versus those he 
considered to be his “body”.  Despite these bodily changes which Peter was unable to 
predict, he alluded to acquiring a tolerance of this post-stroke embodied experience, 
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Thus the divergent body-self is also related to the unpredictability of the post-stroke 
body.  This unpredictable body included both a lack of control and a particular type of 
tiredness which participants were often surprised by.  For some, they had familiarized 
themselves with this new unpredictability and been able to put in strategies such as taking 
time to be more careful and recognizing unpredictability in their body to help predict how 
their body may behave in other situations.  For others though, their body remained out of 
control and unfamiliar; unpredictable. 
 
 4.3.3 An Effortful Body 
Participants described their post-stroke body as effortful to move and demanding of 
their concentration.  This effort contributed to participants feeling distant from their body 
after stroke.  Participants frequently spoke of the effort their body now demanded to do 
previously simple tasks.  For instance Don, who was unable to move his right arm and had 
limited movement in his leg described what it felt like to try to move: “It feels different 
effort [sic].  Effort’s different.  But I hope to get it better.  But it is slowly coming back”.   
Don who had dysarthria (slurred speech) and dyphasia (difficulty to speak) as a result of 
his stroke, clearly expressed the effort that movement now required.  Despite this feeling of 
bodily difference with associated effort, Don remained hopeful for improvement. He also 
suggested that there had already been a change in the degree that his body was effortful, 
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Struggle to move 
Effort was often described as difficulty or a struggle to move.  For instance Grace 
described her complete lack of movement in her affected arm when trying to remove her 
hand from the walking frame; “…this left one, if I get on there [indicates walking frame] 
it’s so hard to get it off, I can’t seem to move the fingers off.  I’ve got to physically shift 
them”.  Grace had to use her unaffected arm to compensate for the lack of movement in her 
other arm.  The expression “so hard” suggested the effort of moving her fingers which 
were referred to in the third person.  When asked what it felt like to move her arm Grace 
replied “heavy, just heavy as lead.  I pick this one up [moves affected arm] and I can 
hardly lift it”.   
 
Effort was not just isolated to participants like Don and Grace who had little ability 
to move without help.  Other participants, who had more ability to move, also described 
the effort of walking.  For example, Michael spoke of what it felt like to walk; 
When I’m walking now it’s quite a bit more effort because you gotta work with 
each leg to move forward, and you know, make them, place them in the right 
position and everything like that.  So you’re not going to fall or anything like 
that.  Even at this time I’m still using the walking stick.   
Despite Michael being able to function to a much higher level than Grace and Don, 
by for example walking and working, he still experienced effort of movement.  This was 
also despite Michael having made gains in his ability to walk after his stroke, suggesting 
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The ‘struggle’ of an effortful body was not a static experience.  The participants’ 
experience of effort could change within different situations and this was illustrated by the 
contradictions that were present in participants’ discourse.  For example Peter contradicted 
himself when describing the effort required to move his legs: “I could lift the right leg up, 
you know from the knee, right up, and the left was flat.  Both are the same now, just a bit 
different”. This indicates his perception of his body having changed, yet the experience of 
his body was still variable.  Peter inferred that the sense of bodily struggle fluxed with the 
passing of time.  For others the perception of struggle was almost lessened by a sense of 
hope for the future.  For example, Michael spoke of being at a “transitional stage”;   
So when you’re trying to do things like trying to put your socks on, and your 
left arm isn’t able to help you, what does that make you think about your body?  
Oh, it’s something that you can’t do, and er I think really that you find that 
you’re wanting to do it, and you will do it.  But you’re going through a 
transitional stage when you can’t do it.  
Despite Michael experiencing the struggle of his effortful body at the time of 
interviewing, he viewed this as a “transitional stage” and anticipated that this effort would 
subside.  The notion of a transitional stage seemed to make the effort of bodily movement 
more acceptable for participants.  For instance Don described his inability to move as “a 
vertical climb” which depicted both effort and the sense he was on a journey when I asked;   
Don, if you and I were to change bodies now, can you tell me what would I 
need to know about your body?  I can’t move. (Undistinguishable words) It’s a 
vertical climb, my body. 
What do you mean by ‘vertical climb’?  Because I’m way down low, you can’t 
move, you can’t touch anything, you know your body’s a (undistinguishable 
words), it won’t move.  But slowly [indicates going upwards], I hope. 
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Don was devoid of any movement in his right arm; it simply “won’t move” he said.  
This analogy of being low down on a vertical climb suggested both the effort of movement 
but also the anticipated journey ahead for Don on his recovery for which he was very 
hopeful.   
 
Concentration 
In addition to feeling a struggle to move, participants described the effort of being 
more aware of their body and having to concentrate on things they had previously 
performed automatically.  For instance, Peter expressed a heightened awareness of his 
body through considerable mental effort when walking;   
My left leg; I’m trying to get it going like my right one.  I think I, I um, when I 
put my right leg forward I have to think, right now I’m going to put my left leg 
forward the same.  But that just doesn’t happen, no.  It’s just not gonna happen 
at the moment.  But I don’t, I’m just very very focused on getting that 
movement, trying to get that movement in my left leg.   
Peter had to consciously focus on each individual component of walking, breaking 
the task down.  He highlighted the contrast between his left and right leg indicating the 
effort of intentionally stepping his stroke affected leg.  When asked whether this “focus” 
changed for him in different situations he responded; 
Nah, I think about it all the time to get that movement, try and keep that 
movement right.  Um, I’ve found a good way to get into my car.  Rather than 
try and get in and drag my knee forward, mumble and grumble; I’m very 
conscious of it.  Very conscious of it, to get it right. 
Peter had to be conscious of his body at all times to successfully negotiate his 
environment, presumably unlike prior to his stroke.  This concentration appeared quite 
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consuming for Peter in the way that he said “I think about it all the time”.  Similarly 
Helena, who had a dampened sensory awareness of her body due to reduced 
proprioception, reported having to be “aware” of her body.  This caused her to give more 
attention to her body within the surrounding environment than she had prior to her stroke. 
It feels, it’s just strange.  I have to be more aware of this side of me anyway 
[indicates left side], I have to think about it, this side of me…Well you have to 
be, spatially you’ve got to be aware.  Not banging into things on that side 
[indicates left], you’ve got to watch how much space you’ve got on that side of 
you all the time.  
Helena recognized that she had become more aware of her left side but when 
questioned how she increased her awareness she simply said “I don’t know”.  This 
suggested that although a cognitive process was occurring, and greater cognitive effort was 
required, this had not necessarily occurred at a conscious level.  Conversely, Michael 
described the conscious effort which he had learnt to give his since his stroke; 
It’s just a matter of you’ve got to concentrate on what you’re doing.  You know 
before you’d go to walk somewhere or do anything, you didn’t have to think 
about it.  Now, especially when you’re walking, you’ve got to concentrate 
carefully on it.  If you don’t concentrate you can lose your balance and things 
like that. 
Michael’s effort and the concentration required to move his body inferred that 
whilst the participants’ post-stroke bodies demanded more focus, there was a way to learn 
how to control their effortful body.  In this way the once strange body becomes familiar, 
the unpredictable body becomes predictable, and the effortful body becomes easier.   
 
All these experiences shaped the embodied experience of stroke.  The divergent 
body-self is epitomized by the distancing participants felt from their bodies.  However, this 
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distance was changeable and the sense of divergence varied in prominence for participants, 
suggesting the fluxing of the divergent body-self with a more cohesive experience. 
 
4.4 Cohesive body-self  
In contrast to experiences of a ‘divergent body-self’, an overarching sense of 
wholeness remained for participants albeit to varying degrees.  When expressed, wholeness 
conveyed participant’s body and self as seamless; a ‘cohesive body-self’ which 
encompassed a sense that the collective experience is ‘all me’.  The experience of a 
‘cohesive body-self’ related to the regaining of bodily control, a feeling of freedom, and a 
clear sense of identity.  For the participants, the experience of regaining control of their 
body was associated with a sense of progress.  Similarly, a number of participants spoke of 
a feeling of freedom, either present prior to their stroke, or something they had felt again 
since their stroke.  Freedom was referenced both in terms of freedom of movement and in 
relation to independence.  Furthermore, the ‘cohesive body-self’ was associated with a 
clearer sense of identity which prevailed despite many participants being unable to execute 
the activities which had shaped their previously held self-identity such as being ‘an active 
person’.  These sub-themes of a ‘cohesive body-self’ will be further explained in the 
following section. 
 
 4.4.1 Control 
Control refers to the participants’ experience of bodily control and their sense of 
control in their lives generally.  All participants expressed how their stroke had influenced 
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their sense of control, such as Grace who stated “I was completely out of control” when 
describing her experience in hospital. When participants referred to their sense of control, 
either over their body or more generally over their lives, they used phrases that reflected a 
sense of wholeness.   
 
Bodily control 
Participants’ often experienced a loss of control over their post-stroke bodies as 
described in ‘the unpredictable body’.  Unlike the references participants made to their 
unpredictable body though, when participants referred to the degree of control they had 
over their bodies they used the possessive ‘my’ and ‘I’ in relation to their body. For 
example Helena stated “physically after I had the stroke I felt I couldn’t control my left 
foot”.  Despite Helena expressing lack of bodily control, she conveyed ownership of her 
body.  This contrasts from other times in the interview when she distanced and objectified 
her body.  Furthermore, participants associated their bodily control with their self-
assurance and sense of progress. For instance, Matthew’s sense of control translated as 
confidence when he described the difference between walking unaided and with a 
supermarket trolley; 
See we walked all around the supermarket the other day and I came home and I 
was as good as gold.  And then we just walked down the road here yesterday 
and I was absolutely buggered.  And I said to me daughter ‘so I wonder what 
that was?’  And she told me, she said ‘you were hanging on to the trolley 
weren’t you?’  And that just shows you, security.  It was just a matter of getting 
that self-assuredness back; to get the confidence back. 
 
  
  95 
 
In this scenario Matthew’s sense of bodily control in walking was directly linked 
with his ‘self-assuredness’ in general.  When Matthew was able to walk around the 
supermarket there was a sense of it just is – “good as gold”, where his body and self were 
cohesive.  Similarly Helena used changes in her ability to control her leg and arm as 
evidence of her progress;   
At the hospital it was said I’d forgotten I had a left side.  Maybe I had for a 
while but I soon woke up about that.  And there at the hospital and since I came 
home, I’ve managed to get control of my foot but not my arm.  My arm is 
[slaps left arm], I can still feel it, I can feel it, but it’s gone unpredictable.   
Helena used the analogy of “waking up” to represent regaining control of her leg, 
whilst the lack of control in her arm, as previously highlighted, she termed 
“unpredictable”.  Control and unpredictability can be considered as polar and conflicting, 
yet Helena could feel partially in control and partially that her body was unpredictable.  
This illustrates a changing relationship Helena had with her body, showing the fluidity of 
her embodied experience.   
 
Control over life 
Control also referred to participants’ sense of control in their roles, identity and 
general existence.  For example, George, who described himself as “an active, busy 
person”, used a metaphor to represent how his wife had taken control since his stroke when 
he said despondently; “The roles have changed; Mary [wife] is now the controlling person 
in the house and I’m just the passenger”.  This suggested George had adopted a degree of 
passivity in life roles with an increased dependence on his wife.  Furthermore, his 
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statement implied a sense of lost control which his wife instead had.  Thus George’s sense 
of control over his body not only influenced his ability to walk independently, it also 
influenced his sense of control in relationships.  Similarly Helena described how her lack 
of arm control influenced how she felt about herself generally; 
What does it make you think when your arm is unpredictable? That, it makes 
you wonder if it’s coming, if it will come back.  It makes you initially feel as if 
you’re losing control of yourself completely [chuckles]. 
Can you say a bit more about that?  Yes, that is a big shake up. To feel that 
um, a part of you has well maybe died.  That is very challenging.  
Despite previously acknowledging an improvement in her ability to control her left 
leg, she at times still felt she was “losing control completely”.  Control of her arm, or lack 
of it, thus was associated with Helena’s sense of control as a whole.  This overwhelming 
lack of control, for Helena, was to the extent that she felt part of her had died.  Despite this 
strong statement, she later, perhaps profoundly, suggested that we never truly have control 
of our bodies anyway; 
But I think as you get older you’ve got to learn that we just have to take 
whatever comes, because what comes is going to come, and you haven’t got 
any control of it anyway as far as your body’s concerned. 
Although Helena perceived bodily control fluctuated in life, the experience of 
stroke appeared to amplify this feeling of having, or not having, control.  In this way 
Helena’s stroke prompted existential contemplation where she questioned the control 
anyone has over their lives, with a loss of control in life being almost inevitable for 
everyone.  This implies integration between Helena’s experience of her body and her wider 
beliefs about life, ageing and being human.   
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In summary, participant’s had a changed sense of control after their stroke 
including control related to bodily control, control in daily tasks, and in relationships.  
Participant’s feeling of bodily control could also influence their perception of control in 
other aspects of their lives. This included prompting some participants to raise existential 
questions of human agency.  In all these types of control, a sense of unity was prevalent, 
without any division of body and self as evident in expressions of a ‘divergent body-self’ 
in the same interview. 
 
 4.4.2 Freedom 
Freedom was referred to in the context of bodily movement and of life choices.  
Where freedom had been experienced participants spoke of themselves as a whole rather 
than as having a separate body.  Similarly, where freedom had not been experienced but 
instead was being sought, participants referred to this state in the context of ‘me’.  
Although freedom, either before or after stroke, was not referred to frequently by 
participants, when it was mentioned, it was emotive.  For instance, George described the 
freedom of walking without a frame after his stroke. 
Walking with a frame is not as free moving as walking without a frame.  So I 
really miss that . . . It’s lovely to be able to walk around here without the 
frame.  It’s quite a free feeling and I can cope.  
George alluded to walking with a frame not feeling like true walking as it was not 
“free”.  George also linked this feeling of bodily freedom to his ability to cope and a 
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The time that I really found it most was that time I was telling you when the 
lady [the physiotherapist] said ‘for god’s sake, just walk’.  That was freedom.  
It really was.  I can still recollect what it was like, you know, nothing there, I 
didn’t have to hang on to anything…I suppose it’s something that, all my life 
I’ve been able to walk everywhere I’ve wanted to…And I think that just being 
able to do that was . . . I could be subconsciously going back to my boyhood 
days, I remember that. 
George’s first experience of walking after his stroke was vivid.  Walking was a 
positive experience for him as it was something very familiar to him, in the midst of the 
unfamiliar hospital environment and unfamiliar stroke experience.  George’s bodily 
movement was thus emotive.  His feeling of freedom was so resonant in his body that it 
evoked a sense of being a child.  Michael also made reference to walking as a child, but 
this time it was in contrast to his own lack of freedom in walking; 
One of the other surprising things was, in the ward was, er one of the room 
mates had a great grandchild, 18 months old; walking.  You know, at that stage 
getting up, walking and falling over, whatever.  And here we’re basically the 
same stage... No, it’s good to be able to do that again.  But there is still a long 
way to go.  Because when you realize how well you could walk before, to now; 
that’s a hell of a difference still to go.  The things of just getting up and say 
moving round the kitchen…It’s a lot harder now because you’re on a chair, a 
wheelchair or something like that, and those movements are hard. 
Michael appeared to be in a state of flux between feeling he had some degree of 
freedom in his walking, to lacking freedom when trying to move around his own home.  
Like George, Michael described it as “good” to be able to walk and again it prompted him 
to consider how easy it was to walk before his stroke.  This description of child-like 
walking is in stark contrast to participants like Peter and Matthew, who, as previously 
mentioned, spoke of concentrating incredibly hard on every aspect of walking.  Helena, 
like Peter and Matthew, did not describe experiences of this freedom but appeared to be in 
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quest of it.  For instance Helena spoke of waiting for her body to become “freer” to enable 
her to do exercises suggested by her physiotherapist. 
Now sometimes I can do them [referring to exercises] twice and sometimes I 
can’t even manage them twice without putting the foot down or without having 
more fingers on the bench. So I thought, what does it matter if I don’t do it 
[referring to the exercise program] this week, I can do it next week or when 
I’m, maybe next week I’ll feel a little bit freer.   
Helena appeared hopeful for more freedom of bodily movement despite having 
expressed a feeling of being “stuck” like a “vegetable”.  In contrast to her otherwise 
persistent reference to her body as an object with “it” and “this”, when speaking of 
freedom Helena used the possessive “I”.  Similarly Grace took ownership of her body 
when referring to the freedom of moving her body; “suddenly you’re devoid of being able 
to use your hand, get out and walk, do you own thing; your freedom’s all gone”.  Grace 
related her sense of bodily freedom to her independence and perceived freedom of choice.  
This illustrates how Grace’s experience of lost bodily freedom reflected in her entire 
experience of the world.    
 
In summary, freedom, both in terms of movement and independence, was lost, 
sought, and sometimes found by participants.  For those who had felt this freedom of 
movement after stroke, there was a link to their pre-stroke existence when they could move 
freely without thought.  Freedom of movement was also associated with participant’s 
perceived freedom of choice.  In this way the notion of freedom made participant’s bodily 
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 4.4.3 Self-identity 
The participants’ sense of self-identity at the time of interviewing appeared 
constant despite their stroke.  For some participants, who felt they could no longer be true 
to their identity, this created a mismatch and confusion.  For others, their unwavering sense 
of self-identity brought them strength and enabled them to speak more coherently of their 
body and self.   
 
Altered body impacting on identity 
Participants described how their altered body impacted on their perceived identity.  
For example, Helena described herself as being an active person prior to her stroke who 
“never sat down”.  However, the physical restrictions from her stroke including weakness, 
incoordination and fatigue, caused Helena to spend much more time sitting alone at home 
as she describes here; 
I was an active person. 
How would you describe yourself now?  A vegetable.  A very annoyed 
vegetable.  I don’t like it at all. 
Can you explain why a vegetable? Well, um I’m a vegetable because I just 
can’t seem to, somebody’s got to accompany me whether it’s in the car, if I go 
for a walk, and anyway I can’t walk very far.  That makes me feel more like 
something that’s planted than a person.  I’m stuck at the moment.   
This expression of being a “vegetable” related to her dependence on others after her 
stroke as well as her reduced activity capacity.  Thus for Helena her identity directly 
related to her bodily ability such as being able to go out for a walk.  Her lack of ability had 
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reduced her self-identity to a negative image of a vegetable.  Helena attempted to explain 
this feeling further by describing it as “somebody else” in her body after her stroke; 
It feels as if you’ve gone and somebody else is in your place.  Not that all that I 
was perfect, I know I wasn’t.  I was a woman who had been hurt by life and 
couldn’t let go of stuff.  But I think I’ve, that’s knocked that out of me.  It sort 
of said very sharply, this is how you got here. 
Here Helena appeared to simultaneously be referring to the strangeness of her 
body, in which “somebody else” had taken over, as well as the foreignness of this body to 
her identity.  For instance Helena spoke of a feeling of being “stuck” which made her feel 
“lost”; “there’s two parts to that [feeling lost and alone].  There’s the stroke part and then 
there’s the getting used to the loss of what you perceived to have been yourself”.  She 
suggested that there are specific bodily effects of the stroke which made her feel lost but 
that she had also lost a part of her identity as she was unable to engage in the activities she 
valued.  Likewise Helena expressed a negative, critical relationship with her body; 
Do you feel different about yourself when you’re alone, versus when you’re 
with your friends, versus when you’re in public? When I’m just on my own 
such a lot I begin to think, you’re just a big blob of nothingness and that’s not 
pleasant (starts to cry).   
Helena’s reference to being a “blob of nothingness” appeared to be in reference to 
both her sense of body and sense of self.  Although this was a distressing experience for 
Helena there is a sense of cohesion between how she viewed her body and herself as a 
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Enduring identity in spite of changed body 
At other times participants described an enduring identity despite their bodily 
inability to match the characteristics they associated with their self-identity.  The presence 
of an enduring identity appeared to minimize the degree of bodily strangeness participants 
experienced.  For example, Peter, who described himself as “an active person” stated; 
Those are the things that disappoint me.  Cos I’m so used to doing, being on 
my own and doing my housework, doing everything, and being tidy I suppose.  
And it’s really a matter of thinking well, no I’ll do that tomorrow, I won’t deal 
with that today, I won’t do this and this and this, I’ll leave that couple of things 
to tomorrow, or the next day.  There’s no hurry.  That’s what I probably was 
disappointed mostly with; I thought I was going to be a superman again around 
here.   
Here there is a mismatch between Peter’s sense of who he felt he was; “a 
superman” and then what his body would allow him to do in terms of housework.  This 
created a strong sense of disappointment for Peter.  However, despite this disappointment 
and mismatch of identity and ability, his identity was also helpful in making sense of his 
post-stroke experience; 
I mean my friends that I have a beer with and all that you know, they can see 
that I’m alright mentally and everything like that, it hasn’t affected that.  So 
they don’t sort of you know, they were concerned for the start but they’re not 
now.  I just join in and carry on, just do everything myself as much as I can you 
know…just be one of the group really, yeh. 
So in spite of Peter being physically less able after his stroke, his sense of mind and 
identity remained intact, enabling him just to “carry on”. Thus Peter’s constant identity 
almost overrode the profound change in his bodily ability.  Michael’s experience echoes 
this notion of bodily change, yet sense of being the same; 
 
  
  103 
 
Yeh I don’t feel there’s any changed image.  Maybe in the fact that for a while 
I’d be walking along there slower, with a walking stick and everything like 
that.  But that’s something for me to work on and get ahead of that, round the 
corner.   
Despite Michael’s change in walking ability his body image remained a constant 
for him.  He spoke positively about his future ability to walk and minimized the problems 
he had with his walking at the time.  The way that Michael moved between present, past, 
then future tense indicates the fluidity of his self-identity within his embodied experience.  
Similarly, George oscillated in the way he described his sense of identity in both present 
and past tense;  
I play golf on Mondays, bowls on Tuesday, and I play golf on Thursday, and I 
play bowls on Friday and I play bowls on Saturday.  And I mow the lawns.  
I’ve got a garden out there that I used to do.  I walked every day.  Yep, I was 
active. 
Although George used past tense, “I was active”, he used the present tense to 
describe his leisure activities.  Thus despite not playing golf and bowls at the time of 
interviewing, George had an enduring identity of being a golfer and bowler.  This conflict 
in bodily ability and simultaneously held identities suggests self-identity could diminish 
the divergence participants experienced in their body and self.  Similarly Helena spoke of 
conflict in how the left side of her body felt different yet she felt the same about her body;  
Do you feel differently about your left side of your body as a result?  No I don’t 
think so.  It is different, but I’m not feeling differently about it.  It’s still me, 
but it’s, this part of me [slaps left thigh] is just the same as usual, lots of my leg 
is just the same as usual [slaps left leg]. 
Helena inferred her body as being different and yet stating her body is “still me”.  
This example illustrates the dilemma that participants had in making sense of a profoundly 
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different body, and yet a feeling of continuity pre- and post- stroke.  This dilemma is 
further demonstrated by contradictions participants made in their sense of changed versus 
unchanged self.  For instance, George made the following response after being asked if he 
viewed himself differently after his stroke; 
View myself differently?  I’m no less a person than I was before; mentally or 
physically.  Physically of course I am but that’s ok.  If somebody was to hold 
that against me, well I could hold it against them just as easy.  But no, no I feel 
as though anybody, any of my friends or places that I knew about; I’d be no 
bigger or lesser in their eyes.  And if they did, well stuff them. 
George’s immediate contradiction of his physical status as “no less” but yet “of 
course” being changed following his stroke is striking.  This perhaps suggests that George 
was at a transition point in what he viewed as being different for him, yet identifying as the 
same person.  Alternatively, his contradiction may reflect the state of flux between a 
divergent and cohesive body-self.   
 
Enhanced identity 
One participant, Helena, described how despite an often frustrating bodily 
experience, her stroke had enhanced her identity.  Helena expressed how the stroke had 
been both “terrible” but also a positive experience.  In one of the phone calls leading up to 
the interview Helena talked of how her stroke had helped her to “let go” of previous 
anxieties; 
I just feel so different from myself.  I used to be the sort of person who ran 
everywhere.  I was full of life and running everywhere; pretty healthy.  And I 
know I wasn’t the sort of person who could get over things easily, and I used to 
pine for people.  I know I didn’t get over rejection, I was terrible with 
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rejection……I really do think that since I had my stroke, that that part of my 
life has gone.  I don’t think about it at all really. 
And how do you feel about that? Pleased.  Because it was like being haunted.   
It sounds as though the stroke has changed you in several ways.  Do you think 
it’s changed you in a good way or a bad way? I would say in many ways, a 
good way because it isn’t very good to be so sensitive.  I think having the 
stroke, in some ways, has hardened me up.  (Phone call week 3) 
Although Helena recognized that she was different both in a bodily and identity 
sense, and alluded to being less active after her stroke, she described positive changes in 
her approach to life.  Helena’s ability to cope better emotionally after her stroke perhaps 
indicates some form of resilience and personal growth.   
 
In summary, there was often conflict in participant’s statements about what had and 
had not changed since their stroke, which illustrated the renegotiated notion of ‘what is 
me?’ The contradictions expressed about feeling ‘the same’ versus feeling ‘different’ 
suggested that although the stroke resulted in a different physical body, people were able to 
maintain, to a large degree, a coherent sense of self, although this varied between 
participants.  Control, freedom and identity all contributed to a sense of cohesion and unity 
between body and self.  These attributes were referred to positively and were something 
which participants strove for, or spoke fondly of if they had already experienced them after 
their stroke.  However, these concepts also applied to the experiences of a ‘divergent body-
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4.5 Anchors 
Participants described a range of factors that appeared to ground and thus 
reassuringly anchor them from what was often a confusing and unfamiliar embodied 
experience.  Participants reported an “unreal” experience after their stroke which related to 
their body.  However, a number of factors anchored the participants in a more 
comprehendible and coherent bodily experience.  These factors can be summarized as 
knowledge, attitude and environment.  Often these anchors emphasized a more cohesive 
bodily experience influencing participants to feel, or be moving towards a feeling, that ‘it’s 
all me’.  However, there were also times when anchors influenced participants to feel more 
comfortable and familiar with how they experienced their body despite it being divergent 
to their sense of self.  The anchors of knowledge, attitude and environment can therefore 
be viewed as assisting participants in their journey to adapting to their embodied stroke 
experience, irrespective of the extent that this was an experience of a cohesive or divergent 
body. 
 
 4.5.1 Knowledge  
Knowledge included general knowledge of stroke physiology and recovery as well 
as knowledge participants gained of their own post-stroke body.  ‘Knowledge’ can be 
considered as being factual, but also, in the context of this study, is used to express greater 
insight – in other words, meaning gained through personal reflection and interpretation of 
experience. New knowledge enabled participants to make sense of their post-stroke body 
and to regain a sense of control over it.  This helped participants to make sense of why they 
 
  
  107 
 
were experiencing their body differently after the stroke, and this understanding provided 
reassurance.  Furthermore, knowledge of their body allowed them to modify everyday 
activities to allow for their changed bodily limits.  Knowledge about stroke and its effects 
was acquired by participants through learning about their own body and consideration of 
the underlying physiology.   
 
Learning 
Many participants described learning about their post-stroke body within the world 
around them.  For example Michael stated “But at home um, no it’s more of a development 
process of what’s been learnt at the rehabilitation, and working on that to improve it”.  This 
indicates that Michael continued to be learning at the time of interviewing, one month after 
leaving hospital.  He went on to explain how he learnt to concentrate to help him to walk;  
It’s [how to walk] just something you learn as you’re being developed.  You 
concentrate on them [rehabilitation activities] to do it because then you have to 
do it again.  So the quicker you learn to do it [walk], the quicker it comes right. 
Michael perceived that learning through concentration would enable him to resume 
bodily control again to walk.  For others, learning was in willing their body to persist 
beyond their perceived limitations.  Grace spoke of how she learnt to persevere in 
rehabilitation in order to regain bodily control despite the effort it took;   
..they had a beautiful gym there and you know these girls would take me on 
these different things and it was wonderful.  But I was sort of saying to myself 
I hope it’s soon over, I can’t do this for much longer. This is much too much 
for me, you know.  And that sort of attitude, which is so wrong, but I couldn’t, 
I couldn‘t get all fired up.  Yeh, it was a learning process. 
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Despite Grace viewing the gym sessions as somewhat torturous she summarized it 
as a “learning process” which was “wonderful” as she learned a new way of being in her 
body and what her body was capable of.  Other more specific insights she described about 
her post-stroke body included how she needed “space between [her] legs” to walk.  
Together, this knowledge made her persevere with walking practice despite her “dreading” 
the thought; 
And you know I would dread at the thought of sitting in a chair like this and 
then having to get up with the help of one of those [indicates frame] and start 
walking.  And you know the tendency is to say, ‘oh give me a chair and let me 
sit down’.  But I think no I’ll persevere because I want to get to the walking.  
And my walking has improved a lot, but I can feel myself I’ve got to discipline 
myself; left, right, left, right.   
Here discipline was linked with progress for Grace, and bodily control allowed a 
more positive experience of walking.  This was in spite of Grace acknowledging the effort 
of walking with her self-described “tendency to give up”.  Thus she learnt that the effort 
was worthwhile in helping her to return to walking.  In this way Grace’s learning about her 
body anchored her into a more acceptable experience of her body in what was otherwise a 
challenging and confusing time after her stroke.   
 
Participants’ experiences of learning about their bodies was often inextricably 
linked with insights into their post-stroke self-identity.  Like Grace, Helena spoke of 
learning about her new sense of self: “Well, I can’t move around, I can’t do the things I 
used to do.  I’ve got to learn to be whoever I am, now and for the rest of my life.  And that 
takes time”. Helena connected bodily movement with her sense of self, indicating that she 
was not just learning to live with a changed body after stroke, but also a changed sense of 
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self reflecting an adjusting identity.  For Helena, there was cohesion in the way that her 
body and her sense of self had changed after stroke, albeit in a way that was challenging 
for her.  She alluded to learning about her new self as helpful in adjusting to her future.  
Like Grace, this suggests that knowing who she identified as anchored Helena in an 
embodied experience that she found more acceptable, albeit challenging. 
 
Understanding physiological changes 
Participants made sense of their bodily experiences by trying to understand what 
may be happening physiologically since their stroke.  For instance, Helena considered why 
she had sensory changes in her arm; 
But that part [taps left arm] I feel a slap more keenly there [indicates left wrist] 
than I do there [indicates left upper arm].  So the nerves must be affected 
differently at different little…they must come in little groups.  And some go 
that a way and some go that a way. 
Like several participants, Helena had formulated her own understanding of what 
was happening at a physiological level in order to make sense of her strange bodily 
experience. This clarified for her why she had altered sensation.  Similarly George, 
explained a theory he had about neural plasticity based on wiring; “my thinking is that the 
brain is wired one way and if I can get something that can connect those little wires 
together and change it”.  George’s perspective of neural plasticity, like others, was 
empowering for him as he perceived that this was something that he could change.  
Similarly Grace also talked of her perception of unconnected nerve endings in her brain.  
She expressed a determination, quest even, to get these nerve endings to meet;   
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And I didn’t really know, I think I had this picture of a brain or of a something 
and it sort of showed all these lights or not wires but I suppose they were nerve 
endings that weren’t joined to anything.  And it sort of threw me because I 
thought I’ve gotta get those to meet each other.   
Consideration of the neurological basis for bodily strangeness appeared helpful to 
Grace.  This understanding was therefore reassuring and anchored participants in a more 
acceptable embodied experience despite their body feeling strange and unfamiliar.   
 
In summary, knowledge and understanding through rehabilitation, and personal 
insights after stroke, was associated with participants reporting a more accepted embodied 
experience, usually cohesively.  Participants’ knowledge about their post-stroke body 
explained and clarified their new experience which helped them to accept the changes in 
their body.   
 
 4.5.2 Attitude 
The participants’ attitudes also appeared to anchor them to a more personally 
acceptable embodied experience.  Attitudes included their personal outlook and sense of 
higher purpose.  Participants’ attitudes often lead them to speak of a more cohesive body-
self, but at other times enabled them to speak more positively of the divergent body-self.  
For some participants, their attitude reflected a sense of resilience and personal growth 
from the stroke.  For other participants however, fear could ‘de-anchor’ them to create 
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Personal outlook  
All participants spoke of their individual approach to their stroke recovery.  Their 
approach was closely intertwined with how they interpreted their bodily experience.  For 
example, George spoke of his personality trait of being “determined” and how this helped 
him to deal with the challenges of bodily activities; 
I’m a reasonably determined person, and if I can’t do something, I thought oh I 
was a practical guy; I was a builder, and a cabinet maker and that sort of thing.  
And you notice you do things sometimes that you think ‘that’s gonna be tough 
to do’.  But anyway, you get stuck in and do it.  So I’m reasonably determined.  
Not stupid, determined. So yeh [physiotherapist] was always getting me to do 
things which were very difficult to do.  And I can absolutely see where she’s 
coming from.  Cos when you went back next time you might just say ‘we’ll run 
over those’ you know.  And you know it’s quite surprising how easy it was the 
second time. 
George’s determined approach to life assisted him with the challenges of attending 
physiotherapy where he was being pushed physically.  In this way George’s personal 
outlook enabled him to view the difficulties of regaining bodily control more positively.   
 
Personal outlook also included the participant’s sense of hope which featured 
strongly throughout interviews.  References to hope were often coupled with expressions 
of the challenges of their post-stroke body.  For instance, when I asked Don what it felt 
like to lift his arm he replied “ It’s er heavy. It just stops…try to pick it up every day.  I 
hope, I hope, I hope it gets higher”. This sense of hope appeared to help Don tolerate the 
frustration of being unable to lift his heavy arm.  He almost used hope as an approach to 
his recovery as he perceived that nothing had been useful in his recovery: “What things 
have you found useful in terms of making progress? Nothing useful…go training [therapy] 
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and you can’t touch it.  I hope, I hope, I hope, I really do hope”.  Thus hope made Don 
better able to cope with his lack of bodily control despite his effort in therapy.   
 
For others hope was more of an outcome of having made physical progress.  For 
example George reflected “I couldn’t even stand up.  And now I’m walking so, so I’ve got 
hopes”.  Here George’s bodily experience had enhanced his personal outlook, allowing 
him to hope for further progress.  Thus hope could impact on bodily experience and bodily 
experience could impact on hope; further illustrating the fluctuating nature of the embodied 
experience.  Participants described consciously applying hopefulness in order to achieve 
better outcomes.  For instance Michael stated “your progress would be hindered if you 
weren’t positive.  There’s only one direction I want to go”.  He made this connection with 
being positive and hopeful to making progress in his ability to walk.  This indicates how 
attitude could be purposefully utilized to improve the embodied experience of stroke. 
 
Higher purpose 
Participants described how a sense of purpose beyond themselves such as religion 
or metaphysical meaning could empower them in the face of adversity after their stroke.  
Higher purpose was especially mentioned as participants reflected on lost bodily control 
and strangeness.  For example Grace often responded to questions about her body with a 
connection to her faith;   
I can put my faith in God and that any spirit of fear that I can feel is not real 
because God’s spirit gives me power, love and a sound mind.  And they’re 
positive things and I cling to them, yes.  It’s been a real blessing to me. ….. I 
know God’s brought me this far and I’m very grateful 
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Grace spoke not only of how her faith helped her to cope but also of how her stroke 
appeared to affirm her faith in God.  Furthermore Grace’s belief in God gave her strength 
to manage the fear she had after her stroke.  Grace alluded to having experienced personal 
growth as a result of her stroke, with a strengthening of her relationship with God;  
I think it’s made me realize I’ve got to get more depth, yes.  And I think it’s 
made me more dependent on God I think. You know when you’ve got full 
health and everything you don’t need anyone do you. 
Grace suggested that she was still in the process of developing this relationship she 
had with God by saying “I’ve got to get more depth”.  This indicated a dynamic process, 
one based on spiritual developments, not necessarily physical ones.  Similarly Helena 
spoke of how her sense of higher purpose anchored her more comfortably in her ageing 
and post-stroke body.  
You just, if you haven’t got a god I feel sorry for you because I think you’ve 
got to have, there’s got be something up there that’s a higher power than 
myself.  But I think as you get older you’ve got to learn that we just have to 
take whatever comes, because what comes is going to come and you haven’t 
got any control of it anyway as far as your body’s concerned. 
Helena made a connection between her sense of higher purpose and bodily control, 
suggesting that her belief enabled her to accept any changes in her body. It appeared that 
Helena’s physical body was perhaps less important to her than her higher purpose, 
especially as her body aged.  There is also a note of inevitability in both Grace’s and 
Helena’s statements which appeared comforting for them.  Helena’s and Grace’s spiritual 
focus indicate that personal belief systems were pivotal in coping with the effects of their 
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Effect of fear 
Separate from the aforementioned positive attitudes, participants also described the 
effect of fear of their body failing them either in the past, present or future.  Fear seemed to 
destabilize or ‘de-anchor’ participants by creating uncertainty and anxiety about their body.  
For example Grace spoke repeatedly of feeling scared in relation to a fall she had had when 
she was getting out of bed;   
And I did have a scary experience, because I did.  The other girl was an 
excellent nurse and I wouldn’t want to put her down in any way.  But I don’t 
think she realized how very sort of unstable I was, mentally and physically.  
And I fell down here [indicates side of bed], and it’s made me very scared.  I’m 
terrified that I’ll get that nurse again. 
Fear was directly linked with Grace feeling unstable “mentally and physically”, 
thus vulnerable.  Her bodily experience was one of anxiety and fear whenever she got out 
of bed or saw that particular nurse again.  Matthew and George also described how their 
fear of falling impacted on their use and experience of their body.  Matthew had fallen 
when walking to the mailbox and struggled to get up.  He was subsequently very cautious 
about walking outside.  Similarly George had fallen when in hospital and described how 
his behaviour had changed when in public places, primarily because of his fear of falling; 
We go out occasionally for coffee and I’ll always take the trundler, mainly 
because I don’t want to fall flat on my face in the coffee bar.  And everybody 
be running around, fussing over me.   
In all instances fear influenced participants’ relationships with their body which 
were viewed as less predictable and controlled since their stroke.  Thus fear ‘de-anchored’ 
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participants to an unstable experience of a body which failed, or threatened to fail them.  
This influenced what they were willing to attempt with their post-stroke body.  
 
In summary, participant’s positive attitude helped them to feel more at ease with 
their body and self, be it a cohesively or divergently experienced body.  Positive attitude 
included personal outlook, and higher purpose, both of which appeared to stabilize 
participants in what was often a blurred and strange experience.  Furthermore, participants’ 
attitudes elevated their sense of personhood despite a changed body, eliciting a degree of 
resilience. Conversely, fear appeared to ‘de-anchor’ participants by heightening their 
experience of a lack of bodily control and unpredictability.  Thus participants’ attitudes 
were influential in their embodied experience, with positive attitudes being helpful and fear 
being unhelpful in reconnecting with their bodies after stroke.  
 
 4.5.3 Environment  
The environment also anchored participants to a particular bodily experience 
following their stroke be it the social, physical or rehabilitation environment.  These 
environments influenced the embodied experience for participants either drawing them 
more towards the ‘divergent’ or the ‘cohesive body-self’.   
 
Social 
Family or friends had a pervasive effect on the participants’ experiences of their 
bodies after stroke.  The connection participants made with family was often directly 
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linked with their perception of their body and themselves.  For instance, when I asked 
Peter about his view of himself he spoke of his positive attitude and family;  
So it sounds like you used to be a very active person and identified as being 
quite sporty.  How do you view yourself now?…Um, I’ve got, no I’m alright, 
I’m positive every day about everything, you know.  But I’m lucky I’ve got my 
children here in Christchurch and they keep an eye on me and everything you 
know so.  No I’m fine really.   
Family were a contributing factor in Peter’s feeling of being “fine”.  Throughout 
the interview Peter followed a statement of his struggle post-stroke with a statement of 
what helped him, often in reference to friends and family.  Furthermore, Peter deliberately 
responded to people in a way that aligned with his pre-stroke identity, as someone who was 
capable and “normal”.  For example;  
What do you say to people when you try to explain those ongoing things that 
come with the stroke?  I don’t really say anything about it.  I mean people have 
asked, some people have asked me you know, what’s happened to you, cos I 
like that being on [indicates ankle brace on left foot], that’s a great help.  I just 
say I’ve sprained my ankle, and that’s all I say.  But I um, I don’t really talk 
about it a lot…I just join in and carry on, just do everything myself as much as 
I can you know.  
Peter appeared to interact in ways that minimised his physical changes, and 
emphasized himself as the same person he was prior to his stroke.  Peter’s dismissing of 
his foot drop as a sprained ankle suggests an unwillingness to share his stroke story to any 
great extent, allowing him to avoid this becoming a major component of the self-narrative 
he projects to others.  Thus, the way Peter chose to engage with others in his social 
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Other participants gave examples of how the social environment anchored them to 
the divergence between their body and self.  For example Helena described how she felt 
differently about her body in different company: “When my friends are there I feel so 
happy to see them.  And I feel ok about me.  When I’m out in public I feel a bit mad with 
myself because I’m so, so handicapped.”  The social environment had a considerable 
impact on Helena’s embodied experience.    Helena recognized the influence of others on 
her internal experience and mused about how being in the company of others might help 
her to feel less “stuck”; 
Well, at home things are different.  I was in control of my car, my house, my 
housework, shopping, I cleaned my windows, I liked going visiting people.  
Now I’m grounded.  Somebody else takes me.    I’m stuck at the moment.  
How does one get rid of that stuck feeling? 
What do you think? Well, I think you’ve got more chance of doing it if you’ve 
got, I think maybe perhaps when there’s more company around it might be 
easier.  But certainly being, feeling so lost doesn’t help [crying] 
Even though Helena was aware of the impact of the social environment on her 
body, she remained heavily influenced by this environment.  Thus in this situation the 
social environment was both the amplifier and the minimizer of a divergent body and self.  
 
Physical 
The physical environment also anchored participants to particular embodied 
experiences.  Physical surroundings influenced how participants experienced their body 
and how effectively they executed physical activities like walking.   For example, Michael 
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drew comparisons about what it felt like to walk in the hospital setting versus his own 
home; 
Right, you get around at the hospital in a certain way, you know walking and 
things like that, and the wheelchair.  You get home and it was a struggle to get 
up the steps, a struggle to walk in the passage even with the walking stick, 
everything like that.  
Michael’s home, at least initially, emphasized a divergence in his self and body in 
which it was effortful to move.  Later Michael said he viewed this as a “learning 
experience” and alluded to his eventual mastering of how to move more freely within his 
home.  Many participants made a distinction between their experiences of their body when 
inside their homes compared to moving outside, such as George who relayed; 
I have my good days and bad days but on a good day I could put that [walking 
frame] aside and not even use it all day.  But I wouldn’t go outside without it.  
No, if I’m inside there’s different things I can grab hold of, if I need to, which I 
haven’t.  
George’s confidence in his body’s reliability was dictated by the environment 
around him.  Thus George experienced his body as free when walking indoors but 
restricted and somewhat frightening when walking outdoors. Similarly Peter spoke of the 
effort of doing domestic chores as well as simply walking.  Having a small home had 
minimized the degree he had needed to exert this effort;   
If I had of had my other house I had, the big house, a three-story house, I don’t 
know how I would’ve got on.  The way it’s turned out really, it’s probably 
worked out alright for me really, with not much to do. 
Peter’s reflection on the physical layout of his current and previous homes indicates 
that the physical environment diminished how often he experienced a divergence between 
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his physical body and sense of self as capable and independent.  This theme of 
‘environment’ relates to ‘knowledge’ as participants learnt what to expect of their bodies in 
particular physical environments. 
 
Rehabilitation 
Like other environments, rehabilitation emphasized either the divergence or 
cohesion between the participants’ experience of their body and sense of self.  The 
rehabilitation environment included the staff and the daily routine of inpatient facilities.  
For example Michael drew the comparison of how he felt walking with one of the hospital 
physiotherapists compared to at home with his wife;  
When you’ve got people walking with you, some people are very much easier 
to walk with.  And er, one of the physios was sort of always wanting you to 
walk with your hand up and do things that were unnatural.  Whereas others 
walking along and you feel comfortable and it’s a lot better.  So my wife’s a 
registered nurse, which is, well she’s brilliant [tearful].  She’ll walk behind and 
in what I call ‘truck and trailer’ [laughs].  And just it’s a matter of balance 
more than anything, er the fact of security, just a hand barely on the hips, you 
hardly feel it, but it just gives you that confidence. 
The unfamiliar experience of walking with the physiotherapist appeared to 
exaggerate Michael’s feeling of bodily strangeness.  Conversely, he felt “comfortable” and 
“better” when walking with his wife who, although still providing some physical support, 
allowed walking to feel “easier” and more natural for him.  Thus the normalcy of walking 
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For other participants the rehabilitation staff played the role of anchoring them into 
a more comfortable experience of their body and self.  For example, Grace described a 
heightened comfort with her post-stroke impairments and abilities when in the company of 
a particular staff member who enabled her to feel hope for the future.  
They sent me to [the hospital] and um, it was quite amazing going there.  An 
experience I never dreamt I’d ever have.  Suddenly you’re devoid of being able 
to use your hand, get out and walk, do you own thing; your freedom’s all gone.  
And there you are sort of at the mercy of the kindness of others…But I 
remember there was one sister in particular who was wonderful to me and she, 
I sort of longed for her to be on duty because um, she would talk to me about a 
future, and ask me what I wanted to do, and you know, opened a new avenue 
for me.  
Although the notion of feeling “devoid of being able to use your hand” and having 
“an amazing” experience seem incongruent, the rehabilitation staff enabled Grace to 
visualize a future for herself.  This knowledge of life after stroke enabled Grace to think 
cohesively as ‘me’ rather than in terms of a body which could not move. 
 
The rehabilitation environment also included the influence of therapy on the 
participants’ bodily experiences.  For instance Peter enjoyed the feeling of physiotherapy 
sessions; “So I’ve been doing them [exercises] everyday…she [physiotherapist] really 
worked me hard and I really enjoyed it.”  Peter especially enjoyed the experience of doing 
exercises despite it feeling hard.  When asked what his body felt like when in 
physiotherapy Peter said “Oh good, yeh good” which is in contrast to other times when he 
described his body as feeling “very strange”.  This suggests that the physiotherapy 
environment influenced how he experienced his body, enabling him to feel pleasure as he 
moved instead of feeling “terrible” like he’d expressed at other times.   
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In summary, the environment surrounding participants influenced their bodily 
experience anchoring them more clearly and comfortably in either a more cohesive, or 
sometimes a more divergent relationship between their body and self.  Environments 
included the social, physical and rehabilitation environment but these settings influenced 
participants in differing ways.  Thus the environment, like other anchors, was 
idiosyncratically influential for participants in their embodied experience of stroke. 
 
4.6 Summary of the embodied experience 
The embodied experience of stroke one month after leaving hospital was complex, 
idiosyncratic, and dynamic.  The bodily experience after stroke is altered to the extent that 
it can cause people to question their self-identity, lose hope for their future and impact on 
their sense of control over their lives.  Participants expressed experiencing a body which 
was divergent from who they were as people; a body that was strange, effortful and 
unpredictable.  Conversely, and at times concurrently, participants spoke of a sense of 
wholeness in spite of a changed body.  Knowledge, attitude and the environment appeared 
to influence this embodied experience considerably. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss how the findings of my study reflect and advance existing 
understanding of the embodied experience of stroke for people transitioning from hospital.  
In particular I postulate that the bodily experience of stroke extends far beyond the 
physical body, and question what this means for the physiotherapy profession whose focus 
arguably remains centred on physical experiences.  I also reflect on my personal journey 
and experiential learning through doing this research, and consider what this may mean for 
fellow physiotherapists. Finally, I suggest some of the limitations but also implications that 
this study has for clinical practice and recommend areas for further research.   
 
5.2 The body and sense of self as intertwined 
The substantive finding from my study is that the bodily experience of stroke is 
intimately related to a person’s sense of self; with my references to self meaning “the 
experiencing subject” (Leary & Tangley, 2012, p.2).  At times it was the differences 
between a stroke survivors’ body (physical) and sense of self (subjective) that were 
intensified, whilst at other times it was the unity of body and self that was illuminated.   
This interplay between body and sense of self after stroke contrasts with the commonly 
assumed view that holds the experience of body and the experience of self as synonymous 
or inseparable.  Indeed, the experience of stroke can challenge stroke survivors’ own 
perception of the relationship between their body and their self.  However, there is no 
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standard trajectory for all stroke survivors regarding this phenomenon.  Instead the 
relationship of body and self is idiosyncratic, evolving temporally and contextually, and 
can be particularly challenged when transitioning from the hospital to home.  
 
5.3 Divergence in body and sense of self 
Experiencing a body that was strange reverberated through all interviews, as it has 
done through previous studies.  Words synonymous with bodily strangeness are commonly 
found in descriptions of the body being ‘divergent’ from a person’s sense of self after 
stroke.  Strangeness has been described by others as “alien” (Arntzen et al., 2014, p.10; 
Charmaz, 1995, p.662), “fragmented” (Arntzen et al., 2014, p.10), “foreign” (Faircloth et 
al., 2004a, p.75), “separate” (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000, p.728), “odd” (Arntzen & Elstad, 2013, 
p.69), “unhomelikeness” (Leder, 1990, p.24), or “a body that is not me” (Kitzmüller et al., 
2013, p.24).  Thus bodily strangeness predominates the profoundly new bodily experience 
many stroke survivors have, segregating life-before versus life-after stroke (Arntzen et al., 
2014; Ellis-Hill et al., 2000; Faircloth et al., 2004b).  This resonated in my study with 
descriptions of life after stroke being “a whole new ballgame”, “a new world” and “an 
unreal experience”.  At face value, this is perhaps not an unexpected finding.  However, 
the way in which bodily strangeness so powerfully impacted on participants’ perception of 
themselves, was particularly striking for me.  The resulting divergence between 
participants’ perception of their body and sense of self meant that at times people viewed 
their body from an outside perspective, as if their body was separate from what they 
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Divergence of the body from self after stroke has been described by other authors 
like a new relationship between a person’s body and his or her mind, with conversations 
happening between the two (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000; Merleau-Ponty et al., 2004; Pallesen, 
2014).  Central to this changed relationship is the way that stroke survivors in this study, 
like others, often viewed their body as ambiguous with a sense of detachment and often 
objectification (Charmaz, 1995; Kitzmüller et al., 2013). This was frequently evident 
amongst my participants, with people commonly referring to their own body as an article.  
Objectification has been suggested to serve as a defence mechanism in that perceiving the 
body as machinery could reduce the impact of the body’s failings (Thomas & Wardle, 
2014).  By deliberately separating oneself from a failing body, Thomas and Wardle (2014) 
propose one’s being does not need to be embodied by its physical shortcomings.  I believe 
that the participants in my study were often unaware of the divergence which had occurred 
for them between their body and self, and this was instead a subconscious process.  In fact 
I asked one participant why he referred to his leg as “it”, to which he replied “I didn’t 
realize I was”. Thus although divergence in body and self is common in stroke survivors, it 
is not an embodied experience that people necessarily have insight into. 
 
The experience of a separate body and self is strikingly similar to Descartes largely 
rejected theory of Cartesian dualism (Goldberg, 2011).  Perhaps ironically, a dualistic view 
of one’s body and mind, be it consciously or not, and be it helpful or not, is seemingly 
unaminously experienced by people after stroke.  However, unlike Descartes’ notion, 
stroke survivors embodied experience was dynamic being in a state of flux between 
dualism (divergent) and a more whole (cohesive) experience of body and mind.  
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True to bodily divergence from self, participants described a new mind and body 
conversation, as suggested in previous research whereby “the mind is telling the body - 
which is not listening - what to do” (Faircloth et al., 2004a, p.75).  Instead, stroke survivors 
like my participants, have described how their mind had to instead listen to their body, 
with a resulting heightened awareness of their body.  This awareness was often described 
by participants as forced and negative, and has been termed in previous literature as “body 
dys-appearance” (Bullington, 2009; Leder, 1990, p.26).  “Dys-appearance” with ‘dys’ 
meaning abnormal, difficult or bad, refers to times when the body is forcibly present and 
appears as something bad (Leder, 1990).  This is in contrast to everyday situations where 
the body is not often thought about; it “dis-appears” (Zeiler, 2010, p.335).  Strikingly, the 
experience of bodily dys-appearance was reported by my participants irrespective of the 
level of their impairments (World Health Organization, 2001), with seemingly minor 
impairments having significant effects on participants awareness of their body.  
Importantly, this suggests that the embodied experience of stroke is not dependent on 
stroke severity.  
 
The challenge which occurred for my participants, and which is mirrored in other 
studies (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000; Kitzmüller et al., 2013; Kvigne & Kirkevold, 2003), is that 
their body, which participants were trying to listen intently to, had become unpredictable. 
This was due to a variety of reasons such as weakness, incoordination and fatigue, all of 
which translated into a distrust of their own body.  Body unpredictability overlapped with a 
sense of effort that participants experienced when attempting everyday activities like 
dressing and walking.  Other studies have acknowledged body unpredictability with the 
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synonyms “demanding” (Kvigne & Kirkevold, 2003, p.1300), “perplexing” (Ellis-Hill et 
al., 2000, p.729), and “fragile” (Kitzmüller et al., 2013, p.22).  As a consequence of 
unpredictability the post-stroke body dictated people’s ability to function, which in turn, 
affected their ability to do not just everyday activities, but also the activities which they felt 
made them ‘them’. Thus, at times, the physical body had not only become central to 
awareness but also consumed self-identity.  In this way the body ‘becomes’ stroke, like 
pain and chronic illness have also been described to do (Bullington, 2009; Charmaz, 1995).  
When the “background becomes the foreground” (Bullington, 2009, p.106) like this, stroke 
encroaches into a person’s perception of him or herself, which is considered the social 
construct of self-identity.  This amounts to an experience of living in a body that is “not 
me” (Kitzmüller et al., 2013, p.24).  Consequently, having a changed physical body after 
stroke had a profound effect on peoples’ entire perception of themselves and of them in the 
world.    
 
5.4 Cohesive body and self 
Concurrent to the experience of a body that was divergent and “not me”, 
participants also described an almost paradoxical sense of cohesion between their 
perception of their body and their sense of self.  The cohesive body-self represents both a 
unity and an overflowing of characteristics between body and self.  This overflow could 
occur in either direction between body and mind so that, for instance, freedom of 
movement could infer existential freedom, or alternatively a sense of being an ‘active’ 
person could override an opposing bodily experience.  Furthermore, some people alluded 
to a sense of personal growth and enhanced self-identity after their stroke.  As such, the 
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embodied experience of stroke was not a static state, but instead could be influenced by 
temporal, contextual and intrinsic factors. 
 
All participants related their bodily experiences after stroke to their sense of 
personhood, indicating that self-identity is significant in the embodied experience of 
stroke.  Importantly though, participants’ self-identity was evolving, being viewed relative 
to their own interpretation, as has been identified by other studies (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000; 
Kitzmüller et al., 2013; Pallesen, 2014).  At times, it appeared having a stroke prompted 
people to question “who am I?”, whereas at other times the stroke appeared to affirm 
participants’ sense of self.  Self-identity in the presence of health conditions has been 
identified as a complex concept and there are a multitude of proposed theories (Levack et 
al., 2014; Sivertsen & Normann, 2014).  Central to these theories is the sense of changed 
assumptions in self, and the dynamic nature of self-concept.  In particular health conditions 
have frequently been reported to make people question previous assumptions of who they 
believed themselves to be (Bullington, 2009; Levack et al., 2014); with no apparent 
relationship between physical ability and self-concept (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000).  This was 
echoed in my findings, with the most severely affected participants appearing to often have 
the strongest sense of self-identity.  
 
It has been suggested that to maintain a strong identity people need to perceive their 
core self as constant and continuing, despite other aspects of oneself, like the body, 
constantly changing (Faull & Hills, 2006). An altered perception of self-identity, with 
uncertainty about previous assumptions of the world in the presence of an event, such as a 
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stroke, has been described as “a biographical disruption” (Bury, 1982, p.168).  Although 
participants in my study identified a fundamental change as they entered a “new world” 
after stroke, what was more predominant was a sense of “restructuring” (Levack, Kayes, & 
Fadyl, 2010, p.995) of the body-self and world relationship.  This reverberates in other 
studies of stroke survivors, with the proposal instead of a “biographical flow” whereby 
“stroke can be integrated with various social contingencies in constructing a biography that 
continues to flow across space and time” (Faircloth et al., 2004b, p.256). Similarly, 
through the ageing process, a number of clashes between a person’s body and sense of self 
have been described with resultant reframing of self-identity (Cott et al., 1995; Thomas & 
Wardle, 2014), also described as “the narrative self” (Gallagher, 2013, p.20). This notion 
resounds with the stroke survivors in my study as they spoke of a quandary of reframing 
their self-identity in relation to their bodily experience.  As part of this reframing, people, 
either ageing or in the presence of health conditions, have been said to make identity trade-
offs whereby they readjust activities so as not to reveal their inabilities, enabling them to 
preserve their self-identity (Charmaz, 1995).  Part of making trade-offs means prioritizing 
what is important, which was evident amongst my participants, with consolidation of what 
they felt to be important.  This quandary was only partially resolved at the time of 
interview; possibly reflecting the transition phase, but maybe also reflecting the ongoing 
biographical flow process we have through life.   
 
The cohesion between body and self was often, but not always a positive 
experience. For instance a loss of physical abilities was at times reflected as a loss of self-
identity amongst participants.  This can be seen not simply as a disruption to self-identity, 
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but as a profound loss of self, as reflected by Murray and Harrison (2004) in their study of 
stroke survivors.  Consequently bodily strangeness could infer a strangeness also in their 
own personhood (Murray & Harrison, 2004).  The degree and emotional effect of my 
participants’ embodied experience was idiosyncratic in that it manifested differently for 
each person, reflecting the complexity of this experience.  For instance some participants 
spoke of grief and loss after their stroke, whereas others alluded to a sense of personal 
growth.  Gadow (1980) argued that there are two directions that a person can take when 
attempting to restore unity between their self and body: “renewed dichotomy” and “a new 
unity” (p.176).  However, there was not such a dissection in my findings, instead a fluid 
spectrum between dichotomy and union which participants moved between both within a 
moment and over time.  Furthermore the cohesive or divergent body and self was not 
polarized, either conceptually or emotionally, instead being orthogonal.  This is an 
important aspect of the embodied experience of stroke as it means both the process and 
outcome are idiosyncratic as there is no single route or goal; what is acceptable for one 
stroke survivors may not be acceptable for another.   
 
Consequently the relationship between a ‘divergent’ and ‘cohesive’ body-self was 
highly dynamic and impressionable.  This experience mirrors that of recovery and 
adjustment generally after stroke, which has largely been described as “non-linear, ebbing 
and flowing over time, presenting successes and setbacks” (Sarre et al., 2013, p.721).  As 
such, the embodied experience of stroke, like recovery, cannot be viewed as a simple 
process but instead seen as a “life-long project” (Kitzmüller et al., 2013, p.27).  However, 
my study emphasizes the particular turbulence in people’s relationships between their body 
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and self on leaving hospital after stroke.  As Arntzen at al. (2014) has also suggested, this 
may be due to homecoming forcing stroke survivors to make sense of their changed 
perceptions of body, participation in everyday life and sense of self, unlike in hospital 
where institutional settings ‘normalize’ an otherwise profoundly strange embodied 
experience.   Institutional settings have been said to postpone the uncertainty and grief of 
the embodied stroke experience as people are surrounded by others with stroke, but also 
because health care professionals do not embark on discussions about the tensions between 
stroke survivors’ perceptions of their bodies and senses of self (Arntzen et al., 2014).  
Instead, stroke survivors are left to make sense of their bodies and selves when they have 
left the security of hospital (Arntzen et al., 2014). 
 
The other component of body-self cohesion after stroke was the perception of 
control and freedom; both over one’s own body and over life choices.  We possess a basic 
assumption that it is ‘me’ that initiates our own actions and ideas.  Stroke challenged this 
sense of agency for participants.  For some participants this related directly to their ability 
to control their bodily movement. Previous studies have specifically considered agency 
from this perspective of body intentionality and movement, especially in the context of 
apraxia (Arntzen & Elstad, 2013; Maurice Merleau-Ponty et al., 2004).  Arntzen and Elstad 
(2013) concluded that where stroke survivors were unable to control their bodily 
movement, it caused them to also question if they had control over themselves 
existentially.  This results in what has been described as “an unhomelike” being in one’s 
own body whereby the body is felt as alien but yet the same (Svenaeus, 2000, p.125).  This 
experience was reflected in some of my participants but not all.  Like “dys-appearance” 
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(Leder, 1990, p.26), this was not related to degree of impairments (World Health 
Organization, 2001) or stroke severity.  However, what was consistent for all participants 
was a positive recall about experiences or hopes of freedom and control suggesting 
perceived agency was helpful in the embodied experience.  
 
Agency referred not just to stroke survivors’ perception of control of their body and 
life, but also referred to their sense of place in this world. Thus the embodied experience of 
stroke was not simply a bodily phenomenon but an existential one as well.  This is in part 
due to tensions between what participants wanted to do and what their body allowed them 
to do in their everyday life as suggested in previous studies (Bergström, Eriksson, Asaba, 
Erikson, & Tham, 2015; Kitzmüller et al., 2013; Pallesen, 2014).  This more practical and 
tangible interpretation of agency was prevalent amongst participants.  Consequently, 
regaining the ability to undertake a seemingly simple and relatively minor everyday task 
could result in significant gains in perceived agency.  However, agency also referred to less 
tangible pondering by participants around the control they had over their own life, and 
musings about higher meaning such as spirituality and metaphysical existence.  Having a 
stroke appeared to throw participants into an “unreal world” causing them to question 
previously held assumptions about the world around them.  Past studies of stroke survivors 
have described people experiencing a foreign world after stroke (Bergström et al., 2015; 
Ellis-Hill et al., 2000).  In this unreal or foreign world the body could often “dys-appear” 
and “become the foreground” (p.248) with the result that stroke survivors’ view of the 
world narrows (Toombs, 2001). This changed experience of the world due to a new bodily 
experience, can be transformational in such a way that it as if the person no longer lives in 
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the same world (Toombs, 2001).  This notion reverberated amongst my participants.  Thus 
having a changed bodily experience can profoundly affect stroke survivors’ experiences 
and perceptions of the world.  
 
 In summary, the relationship between body, self and the world is complex 
after stroke.  Experiencing the body as strange, distant and object-like is common amongst 
stroke survivors, with a resulting changed awareness and dialogue with their own body.  
However, this changed relationship between body and self was highly dynamic, being 
connected with many other psychological factors like self-identity and agency, temporal 
factors such as transition from hospital, and contextual factors.  These contextual factors 
can influence the embodied experience and will be considered in the following section. 
 
5.5 Influencing the embodied experience  
The relationship between stroke survivors’ body and self was dynamic and 
complex at the time of transitioning from hospital.  Accordingly, the embodied experience 
was impressionable at this time, being in a state of flux. This emphasizes Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1996) argument that embodiment is not just the relationship between body and mind but 
also the relationship with the world.  This is perhaps the most significant point when 
considering rehabilitation; the embodied experience stroke survivors have is not absolute, 
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 5.5.1 Importance of context 
There is a paradox that is illuminated when stroke survivors leave hospital and find 
that their bodies do not act as they had expected in familiar situations.  This has been 
suggested to result in a crisis both in terms of body-self dilemmas but also in terms of 
practicalities which the real world hold (Arntzen et al., 2014; Cott et al., 2007; Luker, 
Lynch, Bernhardsson, Bennett, & Bernhardt, 2015).  My findings suggest there was a clear 
distinction between hospital and ‘home’, especially for those who had moved into long-
term care facilities as a result of their stroke.   These findings support the previous 
understanding that transitioning from hospital is challenging (Cott, 2004; Cott et al., 2007).  
This has been cited as being due to feelings of abandonment (Ellis-Hill et al., 2009), the 
challenge of regaining physical function (Wood et al., 2010) and getting back to 
meaningful roles (Cott et al., 2007; Pringle, Drummond, & McLafferty, 2013; Wood et al., 
2010).  The tension between stroke survivors perception of their body and self has also 
been observed in the in-patient setting (Arntzen et al., 2014).  However, in this setting 
Arntzen et al. (2014) observed that this renegotiation was “muted in the professional 
context” (p.10) which was suggested as a protective mechanism.  Participants in my study 
often spoke of positive experiences of the hospital environment, particularly with 
rehabilitation staff.  The moments which appeared most prominent to my participants were 
often the small, incidental moments such as a charge nurse chatting about the future, or a 
physiotherapist telling a person to “just walk”.  These moments helped to anchor 
participants into a more acceptable embodied experience.  These moments stood out to 
participants, perhaps suggesting that discussions regarding stroke survivors’ changed 
relationship between their body and self were indeed muted as Arntzen et al. (2014) had 
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suggested.  Regardless, this implies that the environment surrounding stroke survivors is 
not only important but can also be influential for embodiment.   
 
Returning home also prompted stroke survivors to consider what having a changed 
physical body meant in terms of how they considered (or constructed) their self-identity.  
This has been described as the “social self-body” (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000, p.730) and refers 
to how the body is perceived differently when under social gaze.  This, for my participants, 
was related to perceived social stigma of moving differently or being dependent, but also 
related to the heightened physical awareness of their body when in an unfamiliar 
environment.  Other studies of stroke survivors have suggested that people’s feeling of 
normality is central to their recovery, to the degree that other people’s reactions could have 
an effect on stroke survivors perceptions of themselves as ‘normal’ (Kaufman, 1988).  This 
notion was evident amongst my participants with many people minimizing physical 
restrictions of their stroke, or alternatively being mindful of how their post-stroke body 
must appear to others.  Similarly, participants could experience their body more positively 
when in the presence of a loved one, compared to with health care professionals.  This 
suggests that the embodied experience of stroke is also socially constructed. 
 
 5.5.2 What helps? Anchors 
My theoretical model of embodiment for people transitioning from hospital after 
stroke depicts how, further to an individuals’ context, the knowledge and attitude he or she 
held was also influential.  These anchors could be said to help stroke survivors to create 
coherence in their biographical flow (Faircloth et al., 2004b). Corbin and Strauss (1987) 
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termed this “biographical accommodation” (p.261) or others have described it as “narrative 
reconstruction” (Faircloth et al., 2004a, p.84).  This terminology suggests reframing or 
redefining of oneself.  However, anchors in the context of my findings also referred to 
stroke survivors becoming re-familiar with their body, whereby a ‘new normal’ within 
their body was learnt.  Faircloth et al. (2004a) refers to this as “testing the body” (p.78) and 
Kvigne (2003) describes this as “re-embodiment” (p.1304).   
 
Part of this re-familiarizing allowed my participants to become comfortable again 
with their body; echoed by Charmaz (1995) where the “sick body” (p.672) becomes 
familiar and comfortable.  This intrinsic knowledge of one’s body and one’s body in 
relation to the world has been previously cited as being a resource to live with a 
“vulnerable” and “unreliable” body (Pallesen, 2014, p.235).  This idea is similar to Zeiler’s 
(2010, p.338) terminology of body “eu-appearance” where the once “sick or disabled” 
body that had “dys-appeared” (Leder, 1990, p.26) can then stand out as “good and easy”, 
becoming a positive experience.  This phenomenon has been described by other authors.  
For instance, Papadimitriou (2008) described how people using wheelchairs could become 
“en-wheeled” (p.695) once they were able to view their wheelchair as an extension of 
themselves, and as a means of allowing body intentionality.  Likewise, Gibson (2006) 
referred to the notion of “decentred subjectivity” (p.194) whereby a person’s sense of self 
is no longer contained within the physical body, but could positively extend to aids such as 
wheelchairs.  This learning process that people with health conditions, like my participants, 
have undergone appears to anchor people more satisfactorily in their changed physical 
body, allowing a more positive embodied experience.  
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Knowledge, both intrinsic about one’s own body, and general in terms of stroke 
and anatomy, appeared to improve participants embodied experience.  Similarly Thomas 
and Wardle (2014), who interviewed retired people about their experience of ageing, 
concluded that people’s understanding of the biopsychosocial nature of their bodies 
enabled them to maintain their bodies’ dignity and self-worth in spite of created conflicts 
in body and self through ageing.  This positive effect of knowledge on the embodied 
experience resonated in my findings.  Likewise a number of participants spoke positively 
about participating in physiotherapy and especially exercising.  Previous research has 
found that physical activity can improve peoples’ perceptions of their body (Kitzmüller et 
al., 2013; Morris, Oliver, Kroll, Joice, & Williams, 2015), which can be considered as a 
form of “manifestation of selfness” first described by Gadow (1982, p.181).  This idea is 
echoed by Zeiler (2010) who described positive bodily awareness whereby a person can 
refer to their body as a thematic object without alienation but instead as a well-functioning 
body with bodily pleasure.  Participants in my study spoke of how their body felt good 
when exercising, despite the effort of the task in hand.  Charmaz (1996) discussed the idea 
of “surrendering” whereby a person stops pushing bodily limits and instead goes 
intentionally in quest of control over his or her own body.  This can be considered as 
mastery and was often described by my participants.  Although mastery often moved 
participants towards a more cohesive experience of their body and self, the process of 
mastery has been said to infer objectification of the body (Gadow, 1980).  As such, 
mastery of the object body, where there is accepted divergence between body and self, is 
viewed by Gadow (1980) as essential for onward the development of a self-body unity.  
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This supports my findings that knowledge, especially of one’s own body, after stroke can 
enhance the embodied experience. 
 
Participants’ attitudes also anchored them into a more comfortable embodied 
experience.  This is supported by a systematic review of adjustment studies after stroke, 
which indicated that personal characteristics such as determination, perseverance, a 
positive outlook, hope and inner strength, were all important in adjustment (Sarre et al., 
2013).  Hope in particular was a common thread for my participants and appeared to be 
helpful in adjusting to their post-stroke embodied experience.  Hope is a known motivator 
and is associated with improved well-being (Bright, Kayes, McCann, & McPherson, 2011).  
Importantly, it was often the seemingly small things which helped participants to maintain 
hope such as incidental comments by nursing staff, or a moment with a loved one.  This 
finding is supported by other studies exploring goal setting (Brown et al., 2013) and 
resilience after stroke (Sarre et al., 2013). 
 
Additionally to hope, attitude also referred to a participant’s personal outlook.  
Often this referred to what participants described as “being positive”.  Positivity 
overlapped with hope for the future but also presented in people’s interpretation of events 
such as viewing challenging therapy sessions with optimistic determination.  For many 
participants, this positivity was attributed to a personal trait, for example, being a 
‘determined person’.  For some participants, having a positive outlook also related to being 
spiritual, which featured as a source of strength and foundation for these participants in an 
otherwise unreal and unfamiliar bodily experience.   Similarly Faircloth et al. (2004b) 
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observed how some stroke survivors bolstered acceptance of their bodies’ limitations by 
referring to a transcendent purpose.  These traits are acknowledged in the field of positive 
psychology, being listed as character strength and virtues (Peterson & Seligman, 2004).  
Thus these are not new ideas about personal attributes being important in peoples 
experience after stroke.  However, what is illuminated is that these personal attributes are 
significant in people’s interpretation of their bodily experience after stroke, a notion which 
has historically been understated in stroke research. 
 
Although many participants spoke of the challenges of their embodied experience, 
some participants alluded to a sense of personal-growth from their stroke.  For instance, the 
stroke had crystalized what was important for some participants for which they were 
grateful.  This can be considered as resilience.  Resilience, like many psychological 
concepts, is an evolving paradigm.  To date there are no consensus definitions for 
resilience but it is generally accepted as a positive adaptation despite experiencing 
adversity (Herrman et al., 2011).  The body can be considered as central to resilience and 
yet is under-acknowledged in the resilience literature (Sarre et al., 2013) despite empirical 
evidence that the body is significant in relation to what makes a ‘good’ life, especially in 
terms of health (Aranda, Zeeman, Scholes, & Morales, 2012). Resilience can be viewed as 
dynamic, being both found within personal attributes, and made from external assets, such 
as societal interpretation of health problems (Aranda et al., 2012).  Although the term 
resilience often refers to positive transformation, it has also been conceptualized as 
encompassing seemingly negative responses, which serve to protect the individual (Lepore 
& Revenson, 2006).  Thus resilience does not mean either bouncing back or learning to 
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live in a situation of ongoing risk (Sarre et al., 2013).  Instead there is not such a 
dichotomy, and both of these things can occur concurrently (Sarre et al., 2013).  This was 
apparent amongst my participants, with ‘anchors’ sometimes emphasizing the divergence 
in an individual’s embodied experience, and yet enabling them to feel more at ease and 
accepting of their post-stroke body.   
 
In summary, contextual, temporal and intrinsic anchors such as knowledge and 
attitude can be considered as helpful for stroke survivors in their embodied experience.  
This affirms previous findings that personal, social and psychological factors (World 
Health Organization, 2001) are significant in health.  However, it should be emphasized 
that personal, social and psychological factors are also highly influential on how people 
experience their body after stroke.   
 
5.6 The embodied experience as central to stroke physiotherapy  
The embodied experience of stroke clearly extends beyond the physical body, and 
yet embodiment remains tacit and hidden in physiotherapy practice and models.  Thus 
there appears to be a discrepancy between theoretical models of physiotherapy and the 
practice context of chronic conditions such as stroke.  Furthermore, it is plausible that there 
is also a discrepancy between what physiotherapists perceive their rehabilitation approach 
to be and what they deliver.   
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 5.6.1 Embodiment and current physiotherapy approaches 
Physiotherapy practice has been criticised for its lack of theory and theory 
development in relation to embodiment (Cott et al., 1995; Nicholls & Gibson, 2010) and 
hyper-focus on physical function (Nicholls & Gibson, 2010; Sarre et al., 2013).  The most 
predominant framework for thinking about physiotherapy practice is the World Health 
Organisation’s International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) 
which acknowledges the multi-faceted nature of health, including personal and social 
factors (World Health Organization, 2001).  The ICF attempted to combine concepts from 
the biopsychosocial model of health conditions, and disability models, to create an 
encompassing model (Sampaio & Luz, 2009).  Superficially, it may seem that the ICF 
acknowledges the embodied experience in health conditions. However, the ICF continues 
to compartmentalize people’s experiences of health and disability.  In particular the ICF 
has been denounced for failing to acknowledge potential differing perspectives of the 
individual compared to the perspective of external observers, such as health care 
professionals (Wade & Halligan, 2003). Additionally the ICF model fails to consider 
temporal factors such as the individuals stage of life and phase of health condition (Wade 
& Halligan, 2003), and as such does not acknowledge transitory periods like that in my 
study. Finally, the ICF is embedded with ontological assumptions of a pre-social, neutral 
body (Sampaio & Luz, 2009) which fails to consider the complexities of embodiment. My 
study highlights the tensions between body and self in the embodied experience of stroke.  
Thus it is possible that health care professionals, like physiotherapists, may wrongly make 
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Some theoretical pieces about physiotherapy practice have attempted to address this 
void and explore a more multi-dimensional view of the body.  For example, Wikström-
Grotell and Eriksson (2012) discussed the concept of movement in physiotherapy, 
emphasizing the need for a more multi-dimensional understanding of movement instead of 
the historically biomedical focus.  This perspective was founded on the observation that 
theory-building in physiotherapy has been underpinned by a positivist paradigm, with a 
lack of philosophical questions being asked by the profession (Wikström-Grotell & 
Eriksson, 2012).  Movement is often quoted as the common denominator for 
physiotherapists, with practices being stated to develop, maintain and restore people’s 
maximum movement (World Confederation for Physical Therapy, 2014).  The Movement 
Continuum Theory of Physical Therapy developed by Cott et al. (1995) attempts to rectify 
the lack of theoretical evolution of physiotherapy by providing a theory of how 
physiotherapists conceptualize movement, and approach clinical practice.  However, there 
has been little development or acknowledgement of the Movement Continuum Theory 
(Cott & Finch, 2007), and movement remains to be considered at a biomechanical level by 
physiotherapists, rather than as an embodied phenomenon.   
 
Physiotherapists aren’t alone in fragmenting people’s bodies when working with 
people after stroke (Bendz, 2003) but given the increasing weight of evidence that more 
integrated, person-centred ways of working with people after stroke are better received and 
more meaningful, a reframing of practice is necessary.  My research study supports this 
need by illustrating that the body is more than ‘a machine’ and yet interventions utilized by 
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stroke physiotherapists do not commonly account for the body beyond biomechanical 
aspects.   
 
A few studies have attempted to better understand the concept of the body in 
clinical practice for physiotherapists.  For example, Jorgensen (2000) explored the concept 
of the body and health specifically in physiotherapy by conducting semi-structured 
interviews, and observing physiotherapists with orthopaedic patients (Jorgensen, 2000).  
They concluded that despite physiotherapists believing they took a ‘holistic’ approach, 
their practice reflected a very physical and instrumental concept of the body focusing on 
attainment of functional tasks and overlooking patients’ interests, roles, experiences and 
expectations.  Similarly, interviews with stroke survivors, their carers and physiotherapists 
regarding physical activity indicated disparate priorities (Morris et al., 2015).  For stroke 
survivors and their carers, physical activity contributed to them regaining their physical 
and social sense of self, both of which were related to self-efficacy.  Conversely, 
physiotherapists tended to take a biomedical perspective of physical activity, perceiving 
that stroke survivors had little control over their outcome, and focusing very little on life-
enhancing activities (Morris et al., 2015).  These findings are reverberated in an 
autoethnographic piece exploring person-centred practice in physiotherapy, which 
considered how the biomechanical discourse that historically has underpinned 
physiotherapy is preventing evolution away from a mind-body split and paternalistic 
approach (Mudge et al., 2013).  Thus there is growing endorsement for theoretical 




  143 
 
Person-centredness is commonly believed as important in rehabilitation (Gzil et al., 
2007) especially for stroke rehabilitation during the transition home (Luker et al., 2015; 
Salter et al., 2008; Yeung, Wong, & Mok, 2011) and is advocated as part of physiotherapy 
(Mudge et al., 2013).  The term ‘person-centredness’, also termed patient- or client-
centredness, has been utilized by a number of professions with differing interpretations.  
Patient-centredness emerged from psychologist Carl Rodgers underpinned by humanist 
philosophy (Kirschenbaum & Jourdan, 2005).  In physiotherapy practice person-
centredness is considered as including shared decision making, consideration of 
individuals’ context, and showing respect (Lepege et al. 2007).  The term person-
centredness has become increasingly prevalent in stroke rehabilitation research, guidelines 
and institution policies (Gzil et al., 2007).  For instance, the New Zealand Stroke 
Guidelines state “rehabilitation is a proactive, person-centred and goal-orientated process” 
(Stroke Foundation of New Zealand & New Zealand Guidelines Group, 2010, p.44).  
Similarly in the context of stroke survivors returning home a number of studies allude to 
services needing to adopt a person-centred approach (Salter et al., 2008; Yeung et al., 
2011).  However, given the term person-centredness is interpreted differently by 
professions the reality of what person-centredness actually means practically can be 
elusive (Teasell, 2011).   
 
Physiotherapy practitioners being interviewed have perceived their practice as 
person-centred believing that they gave control to their patients (Beeston & Simons, 1996; 
Bendz, 2000). However a disparity remains between what health care professionals think 
they deliver and what they actually do, with a tendency for health care professionals to take 
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a biomedical approach and for patients to remain passive in their rehabilitation (Bendz, 
2000).  There remains an assumption of a physical body with the concept of the body 
already being fully established within an individual.  However, the embodied self, which 
encompasses the self, must acknowledge that as beings we are continually developing 
reality and meaning; thus the body is infinite (Gadow, 1980).  This flux in relationship and 
meaning of one’s body and self was prevalent in my findings. 
 
Explicit components of person-centredness have been identified in previous 
literature.  For instance Cott (2004) attempted to better explain what person-centredness 
means in practice by identifying the important components of person-centredness from the 
perspective of adults with long-term physical disability (Cott, 2004).  Individualisation of 
treatment and education to aid decision making were amongst the identified themes.  Cott 
(2004) concluded that person-centredness is a philosophy.  This is mirrored by Hammell 
(2011) who suggests person-centredness is fundamentally about the locus of control and 
suggests that clinicians should view themselves as a resource which clients can utilize  
(Hammell, 2001).  For physiotherapists to be able to be an individualised ‘resource’ for 
stroke survivors and deliver person-centred care, they need to have an understanding of 
each person’s individual experience of stroke and transitioning from hospital with a 
changed body.  Therefore a first-person conception of the body has been advocated to 
encourage physiotherapists to look beyond the biomechanical body that predominates 
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Prior to undertaking this research study I believed I was person-centred in my 
practice.  However, in my undergraduate training and clinical practice I was oblivious to 
the notion of embodiment.  I believed there was instead a gap in the existing literature.  
Having explored deeper into research of the embodied experience of stroke, I have realized 
there is in fact a wealth of research on this topic.  This has made me question why I was so 
unaware of what seems now like an obvious experience for stroke survivors to have.  Is it 
that I did not see the existing literature on the topic clearly?  I believe that my training had 
not steered me to consider more holistic and qualitative research studies exploring the 
stroke experience.  Instead I was directed to quantitative studies of biomechanics and 
objective measurements of stroke, with perhaps a token mention of utilizing a holistic 
approach.  Despite there being extensive evidence that health care professionals need to 
take a ‘whole person’ approach to stroke rehabilitation, there appears to still be a 
biomechanical bias in our reading, research and teaching.   
 
Arguably consideration of psychosocial aspects of health are already considered 
within the scope of physiotherapy given it is listed in our professional competencies 
(Physiotherapy Board of New Zealand, 2008; World Confederation for Physical Therapy, 
2012).  However, it appears that physiotherapists need to extend their scope of ‘typical’ 
practice to include an overt consideration of psychosocial aspects of health as well as the 
biomedical.  Is there a risk of physiotherapists dabbling into psychological aspects of 
stroke such as hope and self-identity?  I believe the answer is no, based on my research 
findings.  Rather, there is a need for physiotherapists to live up to the scope we already 
identify for ourselves as a profession but do not fulfil.  This may be due to physiotherapists 
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feeling inadequately trained to deal with psychosocial aspects of health, or perhaps being 
unaware of the biomedical bias in clinical practice (Thornquist, 1994). The next section 
will outline how I believe this can be achieved through my research experience. 
 
 5.6.2 A different approach? Implications for practice 
My research findings indicate there is a need to recognize that the embodied 
experience can flux, being impressionable, at least at the time of transition from hospital to 
home.  Clinicians should not underestimate the significance of this fundamental disruption 
in body and self.  In particular for health care professionals, especially physiotherapists, 
there is a need to acknowledge the psychological aspects of living with a changed body 
after stroke, and be able to work in better partnerships with patients so as to maximize their 
unique recovery experience.  
 
Although my research study did not specifically explore the relationship between 
stroke survivors and health care professionals in the embodied experience, my findings in 
conjunction with previous research indicate that this relationship is an important aspect of 
the anchoring environment surrounding stroke survivors.  For instance, Arntzen et al. 
(2014) suggested that health care professionals approached changed bodies after stroke in a 
narrow way which prompted stroke survivors to take a mechanistic view of their own 
body.  Objectifying and devaluing the body in this way may result in a divergence in 
oneself which, at worst could prompt an existential crisis associated with mental health 
problems (Bandura, 1977). Instead, “psychological processes of identity preservation and 
social affiliation” are argued to be crucial in making sense of one’s changing body 
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(Thomas & Wardle, 2014, p.20).  Consequently, there is a need for physiotherapists to be 
able to understand the psychological adjustments to a changed body after stroke, 
recognizing these can be influenced and then reflecting this in clinical practice.   
   
Physiotherapists are in a powerful position of influence in terms of stroke 
survivor’s embodied experience.  Participants in this study described how their experiences 
with health care professionals was less about what the content of therapy was, but more 
about how it was delivered.  For example, George revelled in the experience of “free” 
walking when his physiotherapists prompted him to just embrace the task in hand.  This 
created a more positive bodily experience.  One component of person-centred care 
therefore should include a broad view of the body, with respect for the persons’ 
experiential and bodily knowledge (Pallesen, 2014; Sivertsen & Normann, 2014).  This 
means promoting stroke survivors as experts in their own bodies and nurturing mastery.  
This overlaps with the notion of “embodied intelligence” which can be described as the 
body itself being “knower and interpreter” (Price, 1993a, p.40).  Embodied intelligence 
relies of a degree of body listening, which my participants described.  Body listening may 
be done at any time but appeared more likely to increase when stroke survivors 
experienced a situation involving physical change.  This has been echoed in people with 
other chronic health conditions like diabetes, multiple sclerosis and asthma, as well as 
healthy individuals (Price, 1993a,b) with body listening being described as both inherent, 
as in “embodied intelligence”, or as a learned phenomenon.  Body listening is important 
because it provides meaning for people of their physical experience, whereby in the 
presence of disease people can learn a new body paradigm.   Price (1993a) argued this 
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awareness can be developed to enhance practical knowledge such as how to manage 
fatigue.  Furthermore this recognition of stroke survivors being experts in their own bodies 
empowers and promotes a person-first approach to stroke rehabilitation (Harrison & 
Williams, 2000; Jones, Mandy, & Partridge, 2000; Luker et al., 2015; Sivertsen & 
Normann, 2014). 
 
In addition to facilitating stroke survivor’s awareness of their own body in order to 
learn a new body paradigm, physiotherapists need to be able to support stroke survivors in 
creating new strategies and redefining themselves.  Rehabilitation must ultimately have its 
goal as opening up new horizons so that stroke survivors do not ‘become stroke’.  
Consequently successful rehabilitation should mean that the lived body has been restored 
to a harmonious state whereby the stroke survivor can once again move freely along the 
mind-body-world continuum (Pallesen et al., 2014).  At times this will mean “illness-in-
the-foreground” where a divergence in body and self is prevalent, but at other times will 
emphasize “wellness-in-the-foreground”, both terms being described by Pallesen et al. 
(2014, p.240).  This can be considered as adjustment.   
 
In the context of adjustment, two types of coping strategies have been described; 
“problem-focused” and “emotion-focused” (Sarre et al., 2013, p.721).  Some of the 
practical strategies could be considered as the essence of physiotherapy practice, such as 
relearning skills, exercising, taking risks to achieve an activity and making modifications 
to activities.  These practical strategies, including physical activity, have been shown to aid 
restoration of a physical and social sense of self (Morris et al., 2015).  However, the more 
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emotion or cognitive focused forms of coping like redefining core ideas of self, re-
evaluating norms and values, and re-evaluating reality (Sarre et al., 2013), are currently not 
considered as being within the scope of physiotherapy practice (Gard & Gyllensten, 2000).  
Furthermore, there appears to be a gap in what physiotherapists believe they deliver in 
terms of psychological consideration and what patients feel they receive (Harrison & 
Williams, 2000) as well as what psychological factors physiotherapists believe can be 
influenced (Morris & Williams, 2009).  This suggests there is a lack of understanding of 
the psychological aspects of stroke as well as clinicians insights into their own practice 
(Gyllensten, Gard, Salford, & Ekdahl, 1999; Harrison & Williams, 2000; Klaber Moffett & 
Richardson, 1997).  Thus physiotherapist training should develop skills to better 
understand and support stroke survivors with the psychological factors underlying their 
embodied experience.   
 
A further significant component of psychological adjustments identified in the 
embodied experience was hope.  Hope is complex, multi-dimensional and can be 
influenced (Bright et al., 2011).  Furthermore, hope has been associated with positive 
outcomes for stroke survivors (Bright et al., 2011).  This suggests that if physiotherapists 
were comfortable and able to acknowledge fear, low mood, self-identity as well as 
‘anchors’ like hope, personality traits and resilience, physiotherapists may be better able to 
instil a sense of a positive future for stroke survivors, regardless of anticipated physical 
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The question of how this can be achieved extends beyond the scope of this current 
study.  However, I do have some recommendations for practice based on my experiences 
through undertaking this study and which perhaps form the basis of future research 
questions (see ‘Recommendations for future research’): 
1) Taking time to listen.  The process of allowing people to speak openly and 
for me to listen attentively during interviews has been liberating for me.  Though I believed 
I asked open questions in my practice prior to this research, I realize on reflection my 
agenda prevailed in these interactions.  For example, wanting to focus on providing 
exercises, or getting through my assessment questions.  Conversely, during study 
interviews I gained rich information and insight into people’s bodily experience of stroke, 
which could have been used to guide rehabilitation had I been their treating 
physiotherapist.  Similarly, the process of taking time to listen also prompted reflection in 
my practice.  I have since noticed and started discussions with my patients on their 
comments of a changed body, which has led to honest and reflective discussions about 
people’s sense of body and self after stroke.  I believe these discussions have been an 
enriching experience for both me and my patients.  With this in mind, I believe as 
undergraduates and as practitioners it is a valuable experience to speak openly with stroke 
survivors about their experience.  This should be without a ‘physiotherapist agenda’ but 
instead as person to person, sharing an individual experience.  This recommendation has 
been conveyed by other clinicians who have undertaken qualitative research and found that 
it promoted attentive listening for them (Bright, Boland, Rutherford, Kayes, & McPherson, 
2012).     
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2) Enhanced inter-professional working both in clinical practice and in 
research.  Softening the boundaries between health care professionals could enable the 
embodied experience of stroke to be considered more wholly rather than 
compartmentalizing people after stroke.  This needs to occur in our discipline-specific 
models, clinical practice and amongst research literature.  There is a wealth of knowledge 
and understanding amongst health care professionals and this could be better shared. 
3) Mastery and mindfulness. The process of promoting people as experts in 
their own bodies appeared helpful both in terms of empowering and mastery.  This notion 
overlaps with the idea of mindfulness which is “the intentional, accepting and non-
judgemental focus of one's attention on the emotions, thoughts and sensations occurring in 
the present moment” (Zgierska et al., 2009, p.267).  Thus facilitating mastery and 
mindfulness in rehabilitation such as physiotherapy practice could enhance the embodied 
experience for stroke survivors.  
 
5.7 Limitations 
Whilst this study has contributed to the understanding of the embodied experience 
of stroke, particularly when transitioning from hospital, there were some limitations to the 
study which need to be acknowledged.  Firstly some experiences associated with 
embodiment might be difficult if not impossible to explain, especially in the presence of 
impairments of interoception.  This inexplicability was, in itself, a finding of this study in 
some regards, however other methods based more heavily on observational data collection 
such as combining interviews with observation of performance of functional activities 
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might help shed further light on the topic of embodiment after stroke in a way that 
grounded theory based solely on interviews cannot. 
  
Furthermore, the small number of participants meant that some important factors in 
the embodied experience may not have been considered.  Although the focus of this study 
was depth of understanding regarding embodiment, rather than breadth, there may be 
additional influencing factors which were not considered for people after stroke.  For 
instance, all participants were of New Zealand European descent, with no Māori 
participants included in the sample.  Culture may be important in a person’s embodied 
experience of stroke (Wilde, 1999) which may have not been evident amongst my 
relatively culturally homogenous participants.  Similarly, participants were all over the age 
of 65, reflecting the characteristics of the people who utilize the service I worked in.  
However, age and stage of life has been suggested as important in the embodied 
experience (Faircloth et al., 2004a; Thomas & Wardle, 2014).  A further possibly 
significant factor in the embodied experience is gender differences.  There were two 
women and five men in this study and no specific gender differences of the embodied 
experience were apparent from the data.  However, a number of previous studies have 
suggested there may be unique embodied experiences for each gender (Charmaz, 1995; 
Clarke & Griffin, 2008; Murray & Harrison, 2004).  Therefore the small sample size may 
have narrowed my interpretation of the embodied experience of stroke. 
 
A further limitation was the temporally isolated view of participants’ embodied 
experience.  Participants were interviewed for data collection on one occasion to capture 
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the transition phase after hospital.  Although phone calls were made to rapport-build and 
capture experiences over the first month after leaving hospital, only a ‘snapshot’ was 
gained of their embodied experience with one formal interview.  It may be useful to know 
how people’s embodied experience change over time after transitioning from hospital after 
stroke by interviewing people again at a later time after their return home.  For instance, 
issues of identity have been described at one year after stroke (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000) but 
appear to be mostly resolved, or at least accepted by five years after stroke (Pallesen, 
2014).  However, previous research focuses on just some components of the embodied 
experience such as identity and coping, over time, presenting a gap in understanding.  
These limitations could be addressed in future research to more fully understand the 
embodied experience of stroke. 
 
5.8 Recommendations for future research 
Understanding the embodied experience of stroke, especially within physiotherapy, 
is in its early stages.  This study has highlighted a number of questions that require further 
investigation including the effect health care professionals have on a person’s embodied 
experience, augmenting interactions that may enhance a persons embodied experience after 
stroke, and consideration of physiotherapy scope of practice regarding embodiment.  
Firstly, given the small size and relatively narrow inclusion criteria for my study, it would 
be worthwhile gathering data on the embodied experience on a wider population such as 
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To better understand how health care professionals can enhance stroke survivors 
bodily experience we need tailored tools to measure this area of work.  Given the 
importance highlighted by stroke survivors of their sense of self in the experience of their 
physical body, it is essential that we can measure self-concept more effectively.  Currently 
research attempting to measure how rehabilitation influences psychological factors utilizes 
measures of health related quality of life (Levack et al., 2014).  However, self-concept is 
distinct from quality of life and it is possible for a person to have a strong self-concept and 
yet a numerically low quality of life according to rating scales (Levack et al., 2014).  
Therefore a robust measure of self-concept, which could be utilized to better capture 
embodied experiences, is an important first step.   
 
Similarly, the significance of psychological factors in the experience of the physical 
body has been illuminated by this study.  This suggests that there is a need for stronger 
collaboration between physiotherapists and psychologists to enable a more holistic 
approach to care.  This is especially pertinent given a documented shortage of 
psychological services for stroke care (Rodgers, Dennis, Cohen, & Rudd, 2003) and 
anecdotally limited access to psychologists in the services I have worked in.  Research 
focused on this collaborative practice and development of specific approaches 
physiotherapists can adopt which better encompass the psychological nature of the 
embodied experience would therefore be paramount. 
 
Additionally, further to my recommendation of physiotherapists developing their 
communication skills to better understand the embodied experience of stroke, research 
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focused on the effectiveness of interventions targeting communication skills would be 
valuable.  Although research has been conducted considering clinicians engagement with 
patients (Bright, Kayes, Worrall, & McPherson, 2014), there is no research regarding the 
effect of engagement between clinicians and people’s embodied experience of health 
conditions. 
 
Finally, theoretical papers regarding physiotherapy scope of practice need to be 
undertaken to enable comprehensive theoretical foundations from which the profession can 
evolve.  Proposals of alternative models for physiotherapy practice have been suggested 
(Cott et al., 1995; Siegert, Ward, Levack, & Mcpherson, 2007).  However these models 
remain suggestions and further research is required to find widely acceptable models for 
the physiotherapy profession.  This would enable physiotherapists to better define and 
develop their practice beyond a biomechanical view of the body.  
 
  
  156 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This thesis has explored the embodied experience of stroke when people leave 
hospital and offers one explanatory theory to describe the dynamic relationship between a 
stroke survivors’ sense of body and self.  Stroke survivors in this study, one month after 
discharge from hospital, experienced a state of flux between a sense of their body and self 
being divergent versus cohesive.  This experience related to the familiarity of people’s own 
bodies after stroke, and the alignment of their bodily perception compared to their 
perception of themselves.  The embodied experience of stroke has been shown to extend 
far beyond the physical body, with people’s bodily experience influencing their perception 
of themselves, and their perception of themselves influencing their experience of their 
body.  This suggests that the rehabilitation of the physical body should not be considered in 
isolation after stroke. 
 
Furthermore, stroke survivor’s embodied experience can be influenced by their 
knowledge, attitude and the environment around them.  This is significant for models of 
rehabilitation, especially physiotherapy whose professional practice is centred on the 
physical body.  Stroke rehabilitation may be enhanced by better understanding and 
integration of embodiment theory into models of care.  Future research should therefore 
focus on how physiotherapists can develop and fulfil their scope of practice to encompass 
people’s entire bodily experience after stroke. 
 
Finally, this research thesis has highlighted the value of experiential learning for 
me.  I believe that the insights I have gained, on reflection, were actually already mostly 
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embedded in existing other professions research.  However, through the process of 
interviewing participants and reflective practice, I feel I have gone through a learning 
process whereby I am now ‘knowing differently’.  This understanding I have gained has 
broadened my view and enabled me to appreciate more fully people’s experiences after 
stroke.  It may be possible to harness this experiential learning process for other 
physiotherapists to further enhance delivery of care for stroke survivors.  Future research 
considering both theoretical models of practice and skills sets for physiotherapists would 
therefore be paramount.  It has been a privilege to undertake this research journey which 
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Glossary 
Constant comparative method:  A method of analysis that generate successively more 
abstract concepts and theories through inductive processes of comparing data with data, 
data with category, category with category, and category with concept.  Comparisons then 
constitute each stage of analytic development (Charmaz, 2006, p. 187).  
 
Constructivism: An epistemology that ‘truth, or meaning, comes into existence in and out 
of our engagement with the realities in our world’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 8).   
 
Credibility: A criteria for against which a grounded theory study can be critically 
evaluated. Credibility refers to how believable the research process, data analysis and 
breadth of the final theory is (Charmaz, 2006). 
 
Data saturation: A grounded theory term referring to a point during analysis when the 
collection of further data is unlikely to reveal any new direction, any new questions or any 
reason to sample data further (Charmaz, 2006).  
 
Embodiment: Embodiment can be defined as “how we live in and experience the world 
through our bodies” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962 as cited by Wilde, 1999, p.27). 
Epistemology: The study of knowledge.  Epistemology relates to one’s beliefs regarding 
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Objectivism: An epistemological position that ‘things exist as meaningful entities 
independent of consciousness and experience, that they have truth and meaning residing in 
them as objects and that careful research can attain that objective truth and meaning.  This 
is the epistemology underpinning the positivist stance.’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 5-6) 
 
Ontology: The study of being and existence.  Ontology relates to how one perceives the 
nature and structure of reality, and in social science, the nature and structure of social 
reality (Crotty, 1998).    
 
Originality: A criteria for against which a grounded theory study can be critically 
evaluated. Originality refers to how novel the work resulting from a grounded theory study 
is.  Originality can be judged on the basis of whether it produces new perspectives, as 
opposed to being a re-packaging of pre-established concepts (Charmaz, 2006).  
 
Positivism:  An epistemology that subscribes to a unitary scientific method consisting of 
objective systematic observation and experimentation in an external world.  The goal of 
positivistic inquiry is to discover and to establish general laws that explain the studied 
phenomena and fro which predictions can be made.  Subsequently, experimentation and 
prediction can lead to scientific control over the studied phenomena. (Charmaz, 2006, 
p.188) 
 
Purposeful sampling: An approach to selection of participants or sources of data on the 
basis of their characteristics.  Purposeful sampling is most often used at the beginning of a 
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grounded theory investigation in order to ensure a wide range alternative perspectives are 
represented in the data for analysis.  However it is replaced by theoretical sampling as a 
study progresses (Charmaz, 2006).  
 
Realism: An ontological perspective that assumes a ‘real’ reality exists, and that this 
reality exists outside the conscious mind (Crotty, 1998).  Realism can be contrasted with 
the ontological perspectives of ‘idealism’: the worldview that reality is solely a product of 
the mind and ideas (Crotty, 1998).  
 
Rehabilitation: A ‘process aimed at enabling persons with disabilities to reach and 
maintain their optimum physical, sensory, intellectual, psychiatric and/or social functional 
levels, thus providing them with the tools to change their lives towards a higher level of 
independence.’ (World Health Organisation, 2001, p. 290)  
 
Relativism: An ontological position that what is said to be reality is really just ‘the sense 
we make of them’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 64).  This perspective assumes that ‘different people 
may well inhabit quite different worlds’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 64).  Symbolic interactionism, 
the theoretical perspective underlying grounded theory, has been said to require relativist 
ontology. (Crotty, 1998).  
 
Resonance: A criteria for against which a grounded theory study can be critically 
evaluated.  Resonance relates to the degree with which a study is meaningful to people or 
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situations outside the immediate scope of the lives of the individual people who 
participated in the study (Charmaz, 2006).   
 
Stroke: An ‘abnormal condition of the brain, characterised by occlusion by an embolus, 
thrombus, or cerebrovascular haemorrhage or vasospasm, resulting in ischemia of the brain 
tissues normally perfused by the damaged vessels’ (Harris et al., 2006, p. 330).  Stroke is 
also known as a ‘cerebrovascular accident’.  
 
Subjectivism:  An epistemological position that the nature and existence of reality (and all 
objects in reality) is solely the product of the subjective experience.  Crotty (1998) made 
this distinction between subjectivism and constructionism: In constructionism, meaning is 
created from the interaction between conscious beings and things in the world, whereas in 
subjectivism, meaning is create independent of the things in the world and imposed on 
reality.  
 
Symbolic interactionism:  A theoretical perspective derived from pragmatism which 
assumes that people construct selves, society, and reality through interaction.  Because this 
perspective focuses on dynamic relationship between meaning and actions, it addresses the 
active processes through which people create and mediate meanings.  Meanings arise out 
of actions, and in turn influence actions.  This perspective assumes that individuals are 
active, creative, and reflective and that social life consists of processes. (Charmaz, 2006, p. 
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Theoretical perspective: The ‘philosophical stance informing the methodology and thus 
providing a context for the process and grounding its logic and criteria’ (Crotty, 1998, p3).    
 
Theoretical sampling: A type of grounded theory sampling in which the researcher aims 
to develop the properties of his or her developing categorise or theory, not to sample 
randomly selected populations or to sample representative distributions of a particular 
population.  When engaging in theoretical sampling, the researcher seeks people, events, or 
information to illuminate and define the boundaries and relevance of the categories.  
Because the purpose of theoretical sampling is to sample to develop the theoretical 
categories, conducting it can take the research across substantive areas. (Charmaz, 2006, p. 
189) 
 
Usefulness:  A criteria for against which a grounded theory study can be critically 
evaluated.   Usefulness related to the utility of the analysis arising from a study and its 
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Appendix 1 
Understanding life in a 
changed body after stroke 
What? A qualitative study being completed as part of my Masters studies.   
Who? People who have had; 
 First time stroke 
 Self-identified significant change in physical ability post-stroke 
 Able to communicate effectively via phone in English  
 Medically stable 
 Able to provide written consent to participate in study 
 Live in the Greater Christchurch area 
 
What’s involved? 4 phone calls on returning home and 1 face to face meeting.  
This will be talking about their experience of living with a changed body after their stroke. 
Participation is entirely optional and will not affect their usual care. 
 
How?  
 Ask potential participants if they are interested in taking part 
 If they are, give them the ‘participant information sheet’ 
 Also contact me with their name and anticipated discharge date 




Extension: 68938  









Participant Information Sheet 
 
Research title: Embodiment in the transition to life after stroke: An 
Exploratory Study 
Lay title: Understanding life in a changed body after stroke  
 
Invitation  
Kia ora, talofa lava and hello, you are invited to take part in a study aiming to explore the 
experience that people have of living in their body after a stroke. Please remember that:  
 Your participation in this study is voluntary (your choice). You do not have to take 
part in this study  
 If you do agree to take part, you are free to withdraw at any time, without having 
to give a reason. This will in no way affect your current or future health care  
 Participation in this study will be stopped should any concerns to your health arise 
or if your doctor feels it is not in your best interests to continue  
 
This information sheet will explain the research study. Please feel free to ask about 
anything you do not understand. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This study aims to improve physiotherapists’ understanding of the experience of returning 
to physical activity after a stroke.  We want to know; 
 What it feels like to have had a stroke  
 What it means to have an altered body when you return to activities at home  
 What having an altered body means for you 
 
This project is being undertaken as part of the requirements for the principal investigators’ 
Postgraduate Masters of Health Science. 
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How are people chosen to be asked to be part of the study?  
People are being invited to participate in the research study if they meet all the 
following criteria:  
 
 Have had a first-ever stroke causing a limitation in physical ability 
 Under the care of Canterbury District Health Board(CDHB) Older Persons Health 
Specialist Services  
 Able to communicate in English on the phone (with or without assistive 
technology) 
 People may be excluded from taking part in the study if they are considered very 
medically unwell.   
Potential participants who meet the study criteria will be approached during their hospital 
stay and invited to take part.  Names of interested participants will be passed on to the 
principal investigator who will then meet participants on the ward to answer questions and 
explain the project in more detail.  Up to 10 people will participate in the study. 
 
What happens in the study?      
 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will; 
 Be phoned once a week when you return home for the first 4 weeks.  You will be 
asked briefly about your physical activity and your feelings on your body that week.  
This discussion will be audio-recorded for future reference.  
 Be interviewed about one month after you return home in a location of your choice.  
You will be asked in more detail about your experience of physical activity and this 
will last up to 1 and a half hours.  This interview will be audio-recorded so that the 
discussion can be accurately recorded.  
 At the end of the study a summary of the research findings will be sent to you if you 
wish. 
 
Please note: The aim of the discussions is not to change what you are doing, but to instead 
explore your experience.  The interviewer will not be there to provide you with advice or 
answer questions regarding your health and may direct you to your GP if required.  You 
may be receiving help from other services at this time and you should continue with their 
recommendations.   
 
Examples of some of the questions you may be asked are; 
1) Tell me what it felt like when you had your stroke 
2) Tell me about your experience of returning home 
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3) What has it been like returning to physical activity since your return home?  
 
If you feel uncomfortable with any of the questions you may decline to answer and you 
may also withdraw from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to yourself of 
any kind. 
 
All discussions will be considered confidential but if there are any issues arising during the 
study that raise concerns about your safety or the safety of others, I will let you know that 
I will contact your GP, or an emergency health service, about these issues. 
 
You are welcome to have a support person from your whānau or family present to offer 
encouragement and support at any point during the study. 
 
What information will be collected and what will be done with it? 
On the first meeting whilst you are in hospital we will collect some basic information about 
you including your contact details, ethnicity and a bit about what you are able to do for 
yourself at that time.  Once you return home all our discussions will be audio-recorded.  
Our discussion will be written down from the recordings and be used by the researcher to 
determine any common themes that arise for all participants. Information that could 
identify you personally (such as names of specific people, places or health services) will be 
deleted from the written notes of these recording.  
 
The information from this study will be used to improve our understanding of what the 
experience of recovery following stroke is actually like for people who have gone through 
rehabilitation and left hospital, with the main focus being on their experiences of body 
function and returning to physical activity after stroke.  The themes emerging from the 
study will be used to improve physiotherapy services for people after stroke.  
 
The researcher will have access to all information which will be securely stored for the 
duration of the study. Specific identifying personal information will not be presented or 
shared beyond the student and her supervisors. All information will be destroyed by the 
principal researcher at the end of the project except that, as required by the University's 
research policy, any ‘raw’, (initial) non identifying data on which the results of the project 
depend will be retained in secure storage for ten years, after which it will be destroyed.  
 
The results of the project may be published in a professional journal and will be available 
in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand).  Participants will be invited to 
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What are the benefits of taking part? 
This study aims to improve our understanding of your experience of having a stroke.  Your 
contribution will aid the development of future physiotherapy services for people who 
have had a stroke. 
 
What are the risks of taking part? 
There are no increased risks to you beyond the risks of everyday life.  There will also be no 
costs for you to take part.  You will just be asked to provide your time.  You may withdraw 
from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind.  
Participation will not affect the level of services you currently receive. 
 
Seeking Cultural Support: 
The researchers acknowledge the importance of spiritual health (Taha wairua), mental 
health (Taha hinengaro), family health (Taha whanau) and physical health (Taha tinana) in 
a person’s overall health and wellbeing.  To ensure cultural safety we welcome the 
inclusion of support from Kaumatua or Whaea for those of you who wish to have this 
support.   
   
What if I have any questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to 
contact either:- 
Emily Timothy    and/or   Dr Fi Graham 
Physiotherapist Senior Lecturer in Rehabilitation 
Princess Margaret Hospital  University of Otago (Wellington) 
Email: emily.timothy@cdhb.health.nz  Email: fi.graham@otago.ac.nz 
Phone: 03 3378938 Phone: 03 338 3217 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago, Wellington School of Medicine. 
If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the 
Ethics Committee administrator on 03 479-8256. Any issues you raise with them will be 
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Appendix 3 







Week number since discharge: 
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Appendix 4 
INITIAL QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEWS 
Thank you for your time and willingness to participate 
 
Introduction 
 As a physiotherapist I have an understanding of the ‘science’ behind 
strokes but obviously I have no experience of actually having a stroke.  
Today I am trying to get an understanding of what it feels like from 
these questions.  




1) Please could you tell me about any other activities you have tried since 
leaving hospital that we have not already discussed? 
 day to day tasks 
 recommended exercise/activity 









 impact of family/friends/general community 
  
Questions about bodily experiences  
1. Please could you tell me what the experience of having a stroke was 
like? 
 Where were you? 
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 What sensations went through your body? 
 What went through your mind? 
 
2. And could you tell me what it is like to physically recover from a stroke 
please?  
 Could you tell me about any unusual sensations you’ve 
experienced 
 How would you describe the experience of trying to move your 
LEFT/RIGHT arm/leg 
 What does it feel like in your body when you trying to do 
exercises? 
 What do these sensations make you think? About your body? 
About your recovery?) 
  
3. Would you mind telling me how you feel about your body in general 
after your stroke?  
 How do you feel about your body in the presence of family, 
friends, and strangers?   
 Do you feel you have a changed image of your body in your 
mind?   




Is there anything else about your experience of stroke that you’d like to 
share with me? 
 
Thank you for so much for your time today.   
Would you like to receive a summary of my findings once I have completed 
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Appendix 5 
Understanding life in a changed body after stroke  
 
Summary of findings 
 
I spoke with a total of seven people one month after leaving hospital, after having a stroke.  
We discussed what it felt like to have a changed body and what this meant for to people.  
This is a summary of the main experiences that people had at the time of our discussion.  
The most common experience people described was a back and forth between a feeling of 
having a separate, strange body, through to a sense that despite the changes to the body, 
‘it’s all me’. 
 
‘This body and me’  
Many people I spoke to described how their body had become strange, unpredictable and 
effortful to them.  This affected what people were able to do but also how they felt about 
themselves.  People often referred to their body like an object that was separate to them.  
This idea I have called ‘this body and me’. 
 
‘It’s all me’ 
At other times people spoke of how they still felt the same in themselves even though 
their body was different.  They described their body and their sense of ‘me’  as one.  At 
these times people described feeling free and in control.  This idea I have called ‘it’s all 
me’.   
 
A changing experience 
These opposite experiences changed frequently for people.  There were a few things 
which swayed how people felt about themselves and their body.  This included 
knowledge of the stroke and its effects, the people and place around them, and the 
persons own attitude.  
 
What does this mean? 
There are things which help people to feel whole despite their changed body after a 
stroke.  Knowing this may help stroke survivors, their loved ones and stroke services to 
have more positive experiences in the time after their stroke. 
 
Who should I contact if I want to know more?  
Emily Timothy (Physiotherapist)  
Princess Margaret Hospital   
Email: emily.timothy@cdhb.health.nz  Phone: 03 3378938   
 
  






















  186 
 
Appendix 8 
Key to transcription conventions 
 
The transcripts for this study reflected as closely as possible the actual words and speech 
patterns of the interview participants. Interview extracts have been edited to illustrate 
points for the purposes of this paper, but all editing has occurred with the intent of 
retaining the original meaning of the speech.     
 
 
Ellipses (. . .) have been used to indicate where speech was omitted.    
 
 
Square brackets [ ] were used to insert editorial notes or words not present on the digital 
recording.    
 
 
Rounded brackets ( ) were used to indicate where non-verbal sounds such as laughter 
occurred on tape.    
 
 
Underlining (yes) indicates stress or emphasis given by the person being interviewed 
through the use of intonation.   
 
 
Italics (how) indicates interviewer speech. 
 
 
Bold (it) highlights interviewer’s emphasis for purpose of data analysis. 
